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The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress:
The United States Supreme Court's Use of
Dictionaries
SAMUEL A. THUMMAt AND JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIERtt
lIlt is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed
jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to
remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to ac-
complish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the sur-
est guide to their meaning.
1
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful
tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor
less."
2
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INTRODUCTION
For nearly 170 years, the United States Supreme Court
has referred to a variety of different dictionaries for a variety
of different reasons.3 Dictionaries have been used in constru-
3. Beyond the Supreme Court, the meanings of specific words have been
important throughout the history of the United States, such as the words
chosen in the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution. Perhaps the
most recent example of the importance of words involves the impeachment of
President William J. Clinton. During his impeachment proceedings, several dic-
tionaries were used in arguments about the meaning of the phrase "sexual rela-
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ing statutory,4 constitutional and common law6 phrases and
twice used to define even the phrase "common law."7 The
Court has used dictionaries to define terms appearing in low-
er court rulings8 and contract language,9 to construe "com-
mon knowledge,"'0 to interpret criminal statutes," to define
"gerrymander" and "attorney," to trace the evolution of a
tions" as used by President Clinton in sworn testimony. See Testing of a
President; 3 Little Words, 'I Have Sinned,' Plus 184 Pages in Clinton's Defense,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 9, 1998, at A27. Further, the definitions of other terms were at
issue during President Clinton's impeachment. See Nation Sees Combative Pres-
ident's Testimony, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Sept. 21, 1998, at Al ("Clinton
replied, 'It depends on what the meaning of the word "is" is.' "). Interestingly,
long before President Clinton questioned the meaning of the word "is" in his
grand jury testimony, Supreme Court Justices turned to dictionaries to define
such everyday words as "any," "in," "no," "of' and "or." See Brogan v. United
States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 808 (1998) (defining "no"); United States v. Gonzales, 520
U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (defining "any"); Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n,
516 U.S. 465, 470 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (defining "in"); Hawaiian Air-
lines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 255 (1994) (defining "or"); Honig v. Doe, 484
U.S. 305, 334-35 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining "or"); Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 182 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (defining
"of').
4. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1990) (construing "child
support" in 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(vi)); Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472,
478-84 (1990) (construing "use" in 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)); Mallard v. United States
Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1989) (construing "request"
in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)); see also James L. Weis, Comment, Jurisprudence by
Webster's: The Role of the Dictionary in Legal Thought, 39 MERCER L. REV. 961,
964-66 (1988).
5. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 622-23 (1991) (construing
"seizure" as used in Amendment IV of the U.S. Constitution); Browning-Ferris
Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264-65 & n.6 (1989)
(construing "fines" as used in the Excessive Fines Clause of Amendment VIII of
the U.S. Constitution); Kring v. State, 107 U.S. 221, 227 (1883) (construing "ex
post facto" as used in Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution).
6. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306
& n.11 (1985) (construing legal maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio defen-
dentis); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957) (using dictionary to find
that" 'stolen' (or 'stealing') has no accepted common-law meaning").
7. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363,
380 n.8 (1977); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 102 (1901).
8. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Coughran, 303 U.S. 485, 491
(1938) (construing "operate" as used by the trial court).
9. Washington Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 47 & nn.10 & 11 (1939)
(Black, J., dissenting) (construing "condition precedent" and "condition subse-
quent").
10. Stewart v. United States, 316 U.S. 354, 362 n.6 (1942).
11. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998) (construing
"uses or carries a firearm" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)).
12. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 n.3 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in
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word 4 and to demonstrate that the use of "commas at the
end of [a] series... is discretionary." 5
The Court has used dictionaries to define the "ordinary
meaning" of a word," to show that a word is not vague, 7 to
show that a word is vague, 8 to show that a word can have a
variety of meanings, to show that a word cannot be de-
fined2 and to show that a word may properly be used in a
particular manner." The Court has even heard several cases
addressing the dictionary itself.22
part and dissenting in part).
13. Kayv. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435-36 n.6 (1991).
14. See Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1987)
(discussing expansion of word "race" in 19th and 20th centuries).
15. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 340 n.6 (1971).
16. See, e.g., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992)
(discussing "normal meaning" of "entitlement"); Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v.
William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1992) (discussing how "solici-
tation" and "solicit" are "commonly understood"); Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1992) (discussing "ordinary meaning" of "relating to");
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 460-63 (1991) (discussing "ordinary
meaning" of "mixture"); John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153-54
(1989) (discussing "ordinary meaning" of "compilation").
17. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 501 n.18 (1982) (construing "roach" as used in drug paraphernalia
ordinance); United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971) (construing "health" as
used in provision criminalizing certain abortion procedures).
18. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 371-73 & n.9 (1964) (finding "insti-
tution" used in loyalty oath was vague); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939) (finding "gang" used in criminal statute was vague).
19. See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 477-78 nn. 10 & 11 (1987)
("Standard reference works include both broad, neutral definitions of the word
'propaganda' that are consistent with the way the word is defined in this statute,
and also the narrower, pejorative definition.") (footnotes omitted); United States
v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 261 n.5 (1966) (discussing "narrow" and "broad" definitions
of "firm"); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 305-06 & n.7 (1957) ("Dictionary
definitions [of 'organizel are of little help.., as ... the term is susceptible of both
meanings attributed to it by the parties here.").
20. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 64 n.3 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
21. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 481-82 (1991) (White, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part and concurring in judgment); Montgomery Ward & Co.
v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 & n.10 (1940).
22. See, e.g., G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22 (1916) (addressing
jurisdiction of district court to make and enforce a final decree in personam
concerning unfair competition in the business of publishing and selling diction-
aries); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Publ'g Co., 237 U.S. 618 (1915) (af-
firming the dismissal of a bill for want of jurisdiction in a suit to restrain the use
of the name "Webster" as applied to English language dictionaries); United Dic-
tionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208 U.S. 260 (1908) (holding that an Amer-
ican copyright is not lost by publishing and selling a work abroad without
inserting the required notice of copyright).
USE OF DICTIONARIES
Although many of the cases relying on the dictionary are
relatively obscure, some are cornerstones in the foundation
of American jurisprudence. For example, in the realm of the
separation of powers there is INS v. Chadha;' in the politi-
cal question arena there is Nixon v. United States;24 from the
First Amendment context comes Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell,2 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation26  and Miller v.
California; from reproductive freedom jurisprudence there
is Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 2r Roe v. Wade
29
and United States v. Vuitch; ° in the tax area there is Eisner
v. Macomber; ' and in the context of personal jurisdiction
there is Pennoyer v. Neff.12
Notwithstanding this widespread use, the Court has
never really addressed the proper role of the dictionary in
the formulation and guidance of American jurisprudence.
The few rules that have been established on this subject
largely have been ignored or obfuscated over time. The in-
crease in the number of legal publications and sources and in
legislative history over the past several decades might sug-
gest that the Court would resort less and less to dictionary
definitions. In fact, however, just the opposite has occurred.
For example, from 1950 to 1959, the Court relied on a dic-
tionary in eleven opinions to construe eighteen phrases." In
contrast, during the 1997-1998 Supreme Court term alone,
the Court relied on dictionaries to interpret twenty-seven
terms in seventeen different opinions.34
23. 462 U.S. 919, 925 n.2 (1983) (construing term "veto" as used in Article I,
Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution).
24. 506 U.S. 224, 231-33 (1993) (construing "sole" and "pardon" as used in
Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution).
25. 485 U.S. 46, 53-56 (1988) (construing "caricature").
26. 438 U.S. 726, 740 n.14 (1978) (construing "indecent").
27. 413 U.S. 15, 20 n.2 (1973) (construing "obscene" and "pornography").
28. 492 U.S. 490, 515 n.13 (1989) (Rehnquist, J., judgment and plurality
opinion) (construing "necessary").
29. 410 U.S. 113, 132 & n.20, 159, 160 & n.59 (1973) (construing "quickening,"
"embryo," "fetus" and "viable").
30. 402 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1971) (construing "health"); see also Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 953-55 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (construing "stare decisis"); Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 402 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (construing "potential"
in defining "viability" as used in Roe v. Wade).
31. 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (construing "income").
32. 95 U.S. 714, 721 (1877) (construing "editor").
33. See infra note 178.
34. See infra note 182.
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This Article explores the Supreme Court's historical use
of the dictionary through the 1997-1998 Court term, ana-
lyzes the usefulness of the dictionary as a legal resource and
proposes a framework for the proper role of dictionaries in
the American legal system.35 The Article begins with an over-
view of the historical origins of general usage and law dic-
tionaries written in English. This overview looks at diction-
aries both abroad and in the United States,36 and highlights
certain conflicts within the lexicographical field The Article
then discusses the origin of the Court's use of the dictionary
and early cases where the Court relied on a dictionary as a
substantive source." Examining the Court's historical use of
the dictionary, the Article then focuses on how frequently the
dictionary is used, which Justices frequently have relied on
the dictionary, and those dictionaries cited most often by the
Court.39
In addressing the difficulties of relying on a dictionary,
the Article discusses the Court's general approach to using
dictionaries-from selecting a word to be defined to selecting
a specific definition-and the problems inherent in that
approach." The Article goes on to address subject matter
areas where the Court has relied on dictionaries and the
problems that arise in relying on the dictionary in those spe-
cific areas.4 '
The Article then analyzes the Court's use of the diction-
ary and discusses why the dictionary cannot represent the
end point for the Court's analytic process in defining
35. "Only a few articles have addressed the Court's use of dictionaries." Note,
Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437,
1437 n.5 (1994) (citing authority); see also Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word:
Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998) (focusing
on the use of dictionaries in statutory construction). Although these articles have
noted the Court's increasing reliance upon dictionaries, they do not describe that
increase in the following contexts: the Court's historical use of dictionaries, the
terms the Court has defined, the dictionaries relied upon by the Court or the
individual Justices' reliance on dictionaries throughout the Court's history.
36. See infra Part I. The use of dictionaries by the Court, however, has not
been limited to English dictionaries. See Appendix C. Indeed, the first dictionary
cited by the Court was a French dictionary used to define a French term. See infra
notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
37. See infra Part I.C.
38. See infra Part H.A and B.
39. See infra Part H.C, D and E.
40. See infra Part III.
41. See infra Part IV.
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terms.42 The Article concludes that, although the dictionary
can provide guidance as to what a term or phrase can
mean, sources other than the dictionary are better aids to
the process of determining what a term or phrase does
mean. Those sources, when appropriate, include context,
history, case law, legislative purpose and scientific
sources. 3 Thus, in American legal jurisprudence, the
dictionary can help the Court to begin the definitional
process, but it cannot be the end point in determining
meaning.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DICTIONARY
Every other author may aspire to praise; the lexicographer can only
hope to escape reproach .... 4
A. General Usage Dictionaries
Perhaps not surprisingly, English language dictionaries
originated in England. Although the early precursors of
English dictionaries trace back to the seventh or eighth
century, 5 the first monolingual English dictionary appeared
centuries later. Robert Cawdrey's A Table Alphabetical of
Hard Words, published in 1604, is generally acknowledged
as the first monolingual English dictionary. 6 Cawdrey's
work was published more than a century after the first
English publication produced on a printing press.47 Although
noteworthy as a first effort, Cawdrey's work was brief and
not particularly accurate. A Table Alphabetical contained
42. See infra Part V.
43. See infra Conclusion.
44. SAMuEL JOHNSON, Preface to DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 3
(1775) [hereinafter SAMUEL JOHNSON].
45. See MORTON BENSON ET AL., LEXICOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF ENGLISH 2
(1986).
46. See JOSEPH HAROLD FRIEND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN
LEICOGRAPHY 1798-1864, at 25-26 (1967); HOwARD JACKSON, WORDS AND THEIR
MEANING 113 (1988); BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 3; DAVID CRYSTAL, THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 203-04 (1988).
47. Recuyell of the Historyes of Troy was printed by William Caxton in 1475
and has been called the first English language publication printed after Johann
Gutenberg's invention of the printing press. See BILL BRYSON, THE MOTHER
TONGUE: ENGLISH AND How IT GOT THAT WAY 126-27 (1990); see also BENSON ET
AL., supra note 45, at 2.
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less than 3000 entries48 and was approximately 100 pages
long. Cawdrey's dictionary "was a fairly sloppy enterprise. It
gave the definition of aberration twice and failed to alpha-
betize correctly on other words."49 It was, however, a start.
Although numerous other dictionaries surfaced in the
120 years following Cawdrey's ground-breaking work, the
next watershed event did not occur until 1721 when
Nathaniel Bailey Xublished the Universal Etymological
English Dictionary. Bailey's work was "[t]he first dictionary
to aim for anything like comprehensiveness . . . ."" Curious-
ly, although Bailey's dictionary came before other more
famous dictionaries and contained more entries than many
of its successors, his work never received the credit that
perhaps it was due.52 Instead, Dr. Samuel Johnson is given
credit for publishing the "first great English dictionary.""
Characteristic of most early dictionaries, Johnson's
Dictionary of the English Language, published in 1755, pre-
dominantly was the work of the author himself.4 Johnson,
however, appears to have been a curious candidate to be the
father of the English dictionary.
Blind in one eye, corpulent, incompletely educated, by all accounts
coarse in manner, he was an obscure scribbler from an impover-
ished provincial background when he was given a contract by the
London 5publisher Robert Dodsley to compile a dictionary of
English.
Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language defined
approximately 43,000 words and contained 114,000 support-
ing quotations.56 This was a mammoth task, causing Dr.
Johnson to note in defining the word "dull" that "[t]o make
48. See BENSON ETAL., supra note 45, at 3.
49. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 152.
50. See BENSONETAL., supra note 45, at 3.
51. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 152.
52. See id.
53. RONALD L. GOLDFARB & JAMES C. RAYMOND, CLEAR UNDERSTANDINGS: A
GUIDE TO LEGAL WRITING 36 (1982); see also Philip B. Gove, Introduction, The
Dictionary's Function, in THE ROLE OF THE DICTIONARY 6 (Philip B. Gove ed.,
1967); BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 3-4.
54. See BRYSON, supra note 47, at 152. For a description of the evolution of Dr.
Samuel Johnson's dictionary see ALLEN REDDICK, THE MAKING OF JOHNSON'S
DIcTIONARY 1746-1773 (1990).
55. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 152.
56. See id. at 154.
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dictionaries is dull work."7 Although certainly not flawless,58
it served as a foundation for all other English dictionaries..
5
It would be decades after Johnson's 1755 work before a dic-
tionary printed in the United States would surface.
The first American English dictionary was published by
Samuel Johnson, Jr.6" Unrelated to England's Dr. Johnson,
Samuel Johnson, Jr. was a Connecticut schoolmaster who
published A School Dictionary in 1798.62 Although containing
just 4100 entries,63 this work was to be the foundation of
American English dictionaries. In 1800, Mr. Johnson collab-
orated with Reverend John Elliott and published A Selected,
Pronouncing and Accented Dictionary. Although at least
four other dictionaries came after Mr. Johnson's works and
57. SAMUEL JOHNSON, supra note 44, at 159. "Lexicographer" was defined as:
"A writer of dictionaries, a harmless drudge." Id. at 233.
58. [Dr. Johnson] professed a preference for what he conceived to be
Saxon spellings for words like music, critic and prosaic, and thus
spelled them with a final k, when in fact they were all borrowed from
Latin. He was given to flights of editorializing, as when he defined a
patron as one "who supports with insolence, and is paid with flattery"
or oats as a grain that sustained horses in England and people in
Scotland. His etymologies, according to Baugh and Cable, were "often
ludicrous" and his proofreading sometimes strikingly careless. He de-
fined a garret as a "room on the highest floor in the house" and a
cockloft as "the room over the garret." Elsewhere, he gave identical
definitions to leeward and windward, even though they are quite
obviously opposites.
BRYSON, supra note 47, at 153. When the dictionary was published, Dr. Johnson
was prepared for criticism.
It is the fate of those who toil at the lower employments of life.. . to be
exposed to censure, without hope of praise; to be disgraced by
miscarriage, or punished for neglect.... Among these unhappy mortals
is the writer of dictionaries. . . .Every other author may aspire to
praise; the lexicographer can only hope to escape reproach.
SAMUEL JOHNSON, supra note 44, at 3.
59. See generally BRYSON, supra note 47, at 154 ("his Dictionary of the English
Language . . .is a masterpiece, one of the landmarks of English literature").
Johnson's work has been cited as "first touch of sheer genius to English
lexicography." Albert H. Markwardt, Dictionaries and the English Language, in
THE ROLE OF THE DIcTIONARY 32 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1967).
60. See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 9.
61. See BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 6.
62. See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 9. This work came ten years after the first
dictionary printed in the United States, which was a version of a British
dictionary-William Perry's Only Sure Guide to the English Tongue. See BENSON
ETAL., supra note 45, at 6.
63. See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 10.
64. See id. at 10-11; see also BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 6.
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before those of Noah Webster,65 Johnson's Accented Diction-
ary is known as the "second American forerunner" to Noah
Webster.66
Webster's first work appeared in the early 1780s,'
7
whereas his first widely accepted publication appeared in
1788.68 Webster's first true dictionary was the Compendious
Dictionary of the English Language, which was published in
180669 and was not particularly well received. 7 This lack of
acceptance may be attributable in part to "Websterian spel-
lings," which reflected Webster's own personal view of how
words should be spelled." Unusual spellings were not the
only idiosyncrasy that made Noah Webster a somewhat
unlikely leader in American lexicographical history.
Noah Webster (1758-1843) was by all accounts a severe, correct,
humorless, religious, temperate man who was not easy to like,
even by other severe, religious, temperate, humorless people. A
provincial schoolteacher and not-very-successful lawyer from
Hartford, he was short, pale, smug, and boastful.... It is a wonder
that anyone paid any attention to him at all. Often they didn't.
2
65. These four dictionaries were: DANIEL JAUDON ET AL., AN ENGLISH
ORTHOGRAPHICAL EXPOsITOR (1804); Wu.AM WOODBRIDGE, A KEY TO THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, OR A SPELLING, PARSING, DERIVATIVE, AND DEFINING DICTIONARY
(1801); HENRY PRIEST, THE YOUNG LADIES' POCKET COMPANION (1801) and CALEB
ALEXANDER, THE COLUMBIAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1800). See
FRIEND, supra note 46, at 12-13.
66. FRIEND, supra note 46, at 10; see also BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 6.
67. "A Grammatical Institute of the English Language-consisting of three
books: a grammar, a reader and a speller-appeared between 1783 and 1785."
BRYSON, supra note 47, at 155.
68. See THE AMERICAN SPELLING BOOK (1788). With respect to The American
Spelling Book, one author has noted:
This volume (later called the Elementary Spelling Book) went through
so many editions and sold so many copies that historians appear to
have lost track. But it seems safe to say that there were at least 300
editions between 1788 and 1829 and that by the end of the nineteenth
century it had sold more than sixty million copies ....
BRYSON, supra note 47, at 155.
69. See BRYSON, supra note 47, at 156.
70. See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 22-23. As a result, even though there were
several American English Dictionaries by 1806, for the first quarter of the
nineteenth century, England's Dr. Johnson had "if not a monopoly, something
comfortably close to one, on both sides of the Atlantic." Id. at 23.
71. For example, the 1806 Compendious included "porpess" instead of
"porpoise," "cag" and "kag" as alternatives for "keg," and "ieland" and "iland" as
alternatives for "island." See id. at 22.
72. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 154, 157.
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Webster also was, at times, a strenuous pursuer of
causes. He lobbied Congress to make simplified spelling a
legal requirement, which could have "turn[ed] America into
the only country in history where deviant spelling would be a
punishable offense.""3 Furthermore, Webster apparently
"was more accustomed to deprecating the work of others
than to questioning his own."" In addition, he may have
taken credit for coining words that had existed for centuries
and for learning that he did not possess.75 "It is hard to find
anyone saying a good word about him."76
Following Webster's 1806 dictionary, there were no
particularly significant American English dictionaries
published until Webster's American Dictionary of the Eng-
lish Language arrived in 1828." This is the "main book with
which [Webster] is associated in the popular mind . ,,
Although the critical reviews of this 1828 dictionary varied
greatly," it was the most complete dictionary of its time,
73. Id. at 129. Webster also "wrote impassioned letters to congressmen,
dabbled in politics, proffered unwanted advice to presidents, led his church choir,
lectured to large audiences, helped found Amherst College, and produced a
sanitized version of the Bible .... " Id. at 157; see also JACKSON, supra note 46, at
117 (discussing Webster's attempts to introduce spelling reforms). He proposed to
"regularize" spelling in A Collection of Essays and Fugitive Writings. See RONALD
A. WELLS, DIcTIONARIES AND THE AUTHORTARIAN TRADITION 59 (1973). Such
regularizations included "waz" for "was," "breth" for "breath," "wurd" for "word,"
"tung" for "tongue," and "reezon" for "reason." See id. 'Ihis proposal was publicly
derided, however, even by Webster's friends, and he abandoned the scheme.
'Reezon' could not carry the day." Id. at 59-60.
74. FRIEND, supra note 46, at 14. Indeed, in what is known as a "war of the
dictionaries," Webster accused a former associate, Joseph E. Worcester, of
plagiarism in the 1830s. See BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 8; see also FRIEND,
supra note 46, at 83 ("[Webster's] fear [of Worcester] . . . precipitated the
dictionary war"). Even after Webster's death, the Merriam Company published a
pamphlet entitled A Gross Literary Fraud Detected, charging that the version of
Worcester's Universal and Critical Dictionay-published in England-improp-
erly failed to give credit to Webster. See WELLS, supra note 73, at 68.
75. See BRYSON, supra note 47, at 154-55.
76. Id. at 155.
77. See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 22; BRYSON, supra note 47, at 155.
78. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 155.
79. With respect to the 1828 landmark effort, "opinion over the years has
ranged from uncritical praise to full damnation." FRIEND, supra note 46, at 35; see
also BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 7 (noting that the dictionary was "generally
well received both in the United States and in Great Britain" but had "obvious
weaknesses"). As was the case with his 1806 work, part of the criticism may be
attributable to Webster's idiosyncratic approach to language. For example,
"Webster accepted a number of clearly ungrammatical usages, among them 'it is
me,' "we was,' and them horses.'" BRYSON, supra note 47, at 157.
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containing approximately 70,000 entries and definitions that
"were models of clarity and conciseness.""°
After Webster's death in 1843, Charles and George
Merriam purchased the rights to his dictionaries,8 ' and, in
1847, published the first Merriam-Webster dictionary. 2
Since that time, the Merriam-Webster dictionaries have been
updated periodically and new editions have been published.
More recently, Merriam-Webster dictionaries have proceeded
on two parallel courses: Webster's New International Dictio-
nary and Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary.
In England, nearly sixty years after Webster's 1828
landmark, a small paperback called The New English Dictio-
nary on Historical Principles appeared in 1884. This book
purported to contain all English words between "A" and
"ant" and represented the first volume of what would become
the Oxford English Dictionary.' Called the "most masterly
and ambitious philological exercise ever undertaken,"" the
first edition of the Oxford English Dictionary was completed
in 1933 and contained more than 400,000 entries supported
by nearly two million citations.86 In 1989, a second edition of
the Oxford English Dictionary was published, spanning
twenty volumes and containing more than 600,000 entries
and 2.4 million supporting citations, 7 quite a leap from the
3000 entries in Cawdrey's A Table Alphabetical of Hard
Words published nearly 400 years earlier. These dictionaries
provide the foundation for many of today's general usage
dictionaries.88
80. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 157.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 158.
84. See id. at 158-59; BENSON ETAL., supra note 45, at 5.
85. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 158. For an intriguing tale of the relationship
and correspondence between a chief editor of the Oxford English Dictionary and a
prolific volunteer contributor to that work see SIMON WINcHEsTER, THE
PROFESSOR AND THE MADMAN (1998).
86. See BRYSON, supra note 47, at 159-60.
87. See id. at 160.
88. See Aprill, supra note 35, at 286 ("Commercial dictionaries build on the
work of their predecessors"); see also id. at 286-92 (discussing sources of
definitions in general usage dictionaries).
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B. Law Dictionaries
The law dictionary actually preceded the English general
usage dictionary by more than seventy-five years. The first
law dictionary has been traced to John Rastell's Expositiones
Terminorum Legum Anglorum published in 1527.89 That
work contained 208 entries (mostly in Latin and French) and
had a short English preface." Approximately forty years
later, a translation of Rastell's Expositiones became the first
law dictionary to be published in English.9
A more scholarly English law dictionary arrived in 1607
in the form of John Cowell's The Interpreter." Unlike Rastell,
who was a practitioner, Cowell was a Cambridge civil law
professor.93 Unfortunately for Cowell, however, this work
was published in the midst of the struggle between English
civil law and common law.9" As a result, The Interpreter was
severely criticized by Sir Edward Coke and suppressed by
King James.95 To Cowell's credit, however, the dictionary
later was revived and many of Cowell's entries were used in
subsequent law dictionaries.9
Thomas Blount followed Cowell in 1670 with his Nomo-
Lexikon,97 also called A Law-Dictionary, and Giles Jacob's
New Law Dictionary followed that in 1729.98 Jacob's New
Law Dictionary was an impressive work and has been
characterized as "a quick substitute for a legal education."99
It was a good deal more expansive than its predecessors,
perhaps in part to make a "more impressive product in a
sharply competitive market."'0 After Jacob's dictionary came
A New and Complete Law-Dictionary,'' a two-volume work
authored by Timothy Cunningham that was published in the
89. See David Meflinkoff, The Myth of Precision and the Law Dictionary, 31
UCLA L. REV. 423, 426 (1983).
90. See id. at 426.
91. See id. at 426-27.
92. See id. at 427. Legal terms were first added to general English dictionaries
in the first part of the seventeenth century. See FRIENI, supra note 46, at 26.
93. See Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 427.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 427-28.
96. See id. at 428.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 429.
100. Id.
101. T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAw-DICrIONARY (2 vols., London
1764-1765).
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mid-1760s.'0 2
In the early United States, law dictionaries from
England "held the field." °3 That changed, however, in 1839
when John Bouvier published two volumes clumsily titled A
Law Dictionary Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the
United States of America, and the Several States of the
American Union.' Bouvier published this first American
law dictionary in part because of the "difficulties . . . [he]
experienced on his admission to the bar"' and in part
because of his dissatisfaction with law dictionaries 'written
for another country."' In the preface, Bouvier explained,
[Most of the matter in the English law dictionaries will be found
to have been written while the feudal law was in its full vigor, and
not fitted to the present times, nor calculated from present use,
even in England. And there is a great portion which, though useful
to an English lawyer, is almost useless to the American student.
What, for example, have we to do with those laws of Great Britain
which relate to the person of their king, their nobility, their clergy,
their navy, their army; with their game laws; their local statutes,
such as regulate their banks, their canals, their exchequer, their
marriages, their births, their burials, their beer and ale houses,
and a variety of similar subjects. 07
Bouvier's dictionary went through several editions over
time, expanding in scope and coverage, and for many years
was the pinnacle of American law dictionaries. 8 In 1891,
however, Henry Campbell Black first published Black's Law
Dictionary. 9 As with Bouvier, Black recognized that there
were differences between English and American law that
should be reflected in an American law dictionary."0 In pre-
102. See Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 429. This brief history of English law
dictionaries is not comprehensive. For a more comprehensive discussion see, for
example, 1 BOUVIER, Preface to A LAw DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS OF THE UNED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION (1839) [hereinafter 1 BOUVIER].
103. See Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 429.
104. See id. at 430, 442 n.27.
105. 1 BOUVIER, supra note 102, at v.
106. Id.
107. Id. at v-vi.
108. See Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 434.
109. See Preface to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at vi (2d ed. 1910).
110. See id. at v (referring to "maxims used in American and English lav...
necessary to be understood by . . . the student of . . . comparative
jurisprudence").
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paring his dictionary, Black freely acknowledged that he had
relied on other law dictionaries and treatises."1 Specifically,
with regard to "modem English and American law," Black
admitted consulting Bouvier's work."' Black also acknow-
ledged that his first dictionary contained many entries for
"which the definition had to be written entirely de novo,"
apparently without any source."'
Over time, Black's Law Dictionary has progressed
through several editions and the current version is the sixth
edition, first published in 1990."' Although there are other
American law dictionaries,"' Black's Law Dictionary, and to
a lesser extent Ballentine's Law Dictionary, are now the
dominant American law dictionaries."6 Each is limited to one
volume and each contains approximately 30,000 entries."7
Law dictionaries, however, are not the only subject
matter dictionaries. Indeed, there are countless subject mat-
ter dictionaries addressing disciplines such as music,1 8 reli-
gion,"' photography,2 ° accountancy' and car building.'22 Al-
though dictionaries-general usage, law and other subject
matter dictionaries-have evolved and grown over the cen-
turies, this evolution has not been without conflict and con-
troversy. One noteworthy controversy that has affected the
Supreme Court's dictionary analysis began with events that
occurred nearly forty years ago.
111. See id. at vi.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See April, supra note 35, at 307-10 (providing a discussion of the
publication process of Black's Law Dictionary); see also id. at 307 ("Only when a
new edition of Black's Law Dictionary is to be prepared does the staff at West
Publishing Company undertake new research").
115. See, e.g., BALLENTINE's LAw DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969); CYCLOPEDIC LAW
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1940).
116. See Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 434.
117. See id.
118. See generally THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF Music & MUSICIANS
(Stanley Sadie ed., 1980).
119. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF RELIGION (1979).
120. See generally ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF PHOTOGRAPHY (1896).
121. See generally A DICTIONARY FOR ACCOUNTANTS (1952).
122. See generally THE CAR-BuILDER'S DICTIONARY (1879).
1999] 241
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
C. The Prescriptive-Descriptive Dictionary Debate
From the time that Dr. Johnson published his Dictionary
of the English Language in 1755 until the early 1960s,
general usage dictionaries for the most part were character-
ized as being "prescriptive.")2 3 A prescriptive dictionary
"establish[es] what is right in meaning and pronunciation"
and treats the entries in a dictionary as representing the
"proper" way to use English, rather than representing how
language actually is being used. As one lexicographer put it:
"Dictionaries had always assumed that their editors were
better able to make decisions about usage than their readers
were. If they weren't, what were they doing editing
dictionaries?"'"5 Notwithstanding any subjectivity or evolu-
tion in determining the "proper" manner to use a term or
phrase, the prescriptive school of thought relies heavily on
the editors of dictionaries to define and publish the proper
meaning and usage of the terms.
The opposite end of the spectrum from the prescriptive
approach is the "descriptive" school of thought. A descriptive
dictionary "strives to describe a language in its present state,
without getting into judgments of what's 'correct."'125 The
editors of a descriptive dictionary describe how a word is
being used and, unlike their prescriptive counterparts, do
not decide how a word should be used.
In 1961, Merriam-Webster first published Webster's
Third New International Dictionary. Unlike Webster's prede-
cessors and most other previous dictionaries, Webster's Third
was comparatively descriptive.' In defense of this change,
the editor-in-chief of Webster's Third declared that "the dic-
tionary's purpose was to report the language, not to pre-
scribe what belonged in it."128 Much of the literary world,
123. Sometimes such dictionaries are referred to as "normative." See SIDNEY I.
LANDAU, DICTIONARIES THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEImcoGRAPHY 205 (1984).
124. Webster's Way Out Dictionay, Bus. WIM, Sept. 16, 1961, at 89 (emphasis
added), reprinted in DICTIONAIES AND THAT DICTIONARY 57 (James Sledd &
Wilma R. Ebbitt eds., 1962).
125. LANDAU, supra note 123, at 204-05.
126. Webster's Way Out Dictionary, supra note 124, at 57 (stating that this
dictionary was based on "theories" of"a new science, linguistics").
127. See LANDAU, supra note 123, at 205, 207.
128. Norman E. Isaacs, And Now, the War on Words, THE LOUiSVILLE TIMES,
Oct. 18, 1961, reprinted in DICTIONARIEs AND THAT DICTiONARY 79 (James Sledd &
Wilma R. Ebbitt eds., 1962). Distinct from this controversy surrounding general
dictionaries, modern law dictionaries have been described as painfully descrip-
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however, was not convinced.
The New York Times, at least for a time, refused to call
Webster's Third a dictionary, instead referring to it as a
"word book."129 The descriptive approach was deemed "dis-
astrous" because "it serves to reinforce the notion that good
English is whatever is popular."3 ' Dozens of critical reviews
quickly surfaced, and at least one book was written about
the heated prescriptive versus descriptive controversy cre-
ated by Webster's Third,13' a controversy alarmingly de-
scribed as a "war." 2 This "war" has not escaped the Court's
attention. For example, in 1994, Justice Scalia used the con-
troversy over the descriptive approach of Webster's Third to
disregard a definition from that dictionary.
13
Today, most contemporary dictionaries are characterized
as descriptive rather than prescriptive."4 Yet, even modem
descriptive dictionaries do not fully reflect society's usage of
words. "As a result of constant change and growth in lan-
guage, dictionaries are out of date by the time they are pub-
lished. . . .Because of the inevitable time delay between
collection of citations and publication of a dictionary, diction-
aries must lag behind current use of the language." 35 Fur-
thermore, in light of space, cost and other limitations, most
dictionaries are not comprehensive and do not purport to in-
tive. Indeed, law dictionaries have been criticized as "empty[ing] a bagful of defi-
nitions, without any suggestion that one definition is more equal than any other."
Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 436.
129. Webster's New Word Book, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1961, reprinted in
DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY 78 (James Sledd & Wilma R. Ebbitt eds.,
1962).
130. Id.
131. See DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY (James Sledd & Wilma R. Ebbitt
eds., 1962). 'That Dictionary," of course, was Webster's Third. This book contains
more than 60 reviews and critiques of Webster's Third. See id.
132. RONALD A. WELLS, DICTIONARIES AND THE AUTHORITARIAN TRADITION A
STUDY IN ENGLISH USAGE AND LEXICOGRAPHY 74-86 (1973).
133. In MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
227-28 (1994), Justice Scalia disregarded a definition of "modify" from Webster's
Third in interpreting a statute. He noted that the dictionary definition was out of
step with other dictionaries and noted that upon publication Webster's Third "was
widely criticized for its portrayal of common error as proper usage." Id. at 228 n.3
(citing Wilson Follett, Sabotage in Springfield, 209 ATLANTIC 73 (Jan. 1962);
Jacques Barzun, What Is a Dictionary?, 32 THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR 176, 181
(Spring 1963); Dwight Macdonald, The String Untuned, 38 THE NEW YORKER 130,
156-57 (Mar. 1962)).
134. See generally Aprill, supra note 35, at 283-85.
135. Id. at 287; see also id. at 292.
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clude all possible definitions.'36
Putting aside the arguments of whether the prescriptive
or descriptive approach to lexicography is the better ap-
proach, this debate brings into focus the problem of judicial
reliance on dictionaries. If the Court uses a prescriptive
dictionary to define a term, there is no assurance that the
relevant individuals (be it the parties to a contract, the leg-
islators enacting a law, judges or individuals trying to
comply with the law) used that term in the manner set forth
by the prescriptive dictionary. On the other hand, if the
Court uses a descriptive dictionary, there is no assurance
that the relevant individuals used the term as specified by
one of many competing definitions. The dictionary, whether
descriptive or prescriptive, cannot resolve these issues.
Unfortunately, the Court's historical use of dictionaries does
little to delineate the appropriate analysis.
II. THE CouRT's HISTORICAL USE OF DICTIONARIES
[Dictionaries are] the last resort of the baffled judge. 137
A. The Beginning
Three cases, decided over a period of thirty-five years,
provide the background for the United States Supreme
Court's use of the dictionary. In 1830, the Court first relied
on a dictionary to define a term. In Patapsco Insurance Co. v.
Coulter, 18 the Court found that all English and American
authorities agreed that "fraud must be a constituent of the
act of barratry.""' The Court added that
it is worthy of particular notice, that writers on maritime law of
the first respectability (I think Emerigon, gives six in number) in
explaining the marine sense of the word barratry, use the French
word "prevariquez," which can only be translated into "acting
without due fidelity to their owners." The best French dictionary
we have, renders it by "agir contre les devoirs de son charge,"
acting contrary to the duties of his undertaking, and "trahir la
cause ou l'interest des personnes qu'on est oblig6 de defendre," to
136. See generally id. at 293-97.
137. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
138. 28 U.S. 222 (1830).
139. Id. at 230.
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betray the cause or interest of those whom we are bound to
protect.
140
Thus, the Court vaguely referred to the first dictionary that
it relied on as "[t]he best French dictionary we have" and
essentially used that dictionary to translate a phrase.1
4
'
A Justice next turned to a dictionary nearly two decades
later. In 1849, in Smith v. Turner,'2 the Court determined
whether a New York law exacting an arrival fee for boat
passengers was an unconstitutional regulation of foreign
commerce.14 A majority of the Court, in several fractionated
opinions, held that the arrival fee was unconstitutional'
44
Justice Daniel dissented, finding that the New York law was
not an impermissible regulation of commerce.
45
Commerce, from con and merx, which Vossius derives from the
Hebrew, to divide a part of his own for a part of another's, to
exchange, to bargain and sell, to trade or traffic, to have in-
tercourse for purposes of traffic. Merchand, or merchant, from
merx or mercs, contracted from mercis, is by some derived from
mercari, by others from the Greek ... pars, quia res per partes
venditur. To merchand, to by, to trade to traffic.14
In support of these definitions, Justice Daniel relied on
Richardson's Dictionary.'
The dictionary8 next surfaced in Supreme Court juris-
prudence in 1863.48 In Insurance Companies. v. Wright, the
Court interpreted two insurance policies that "professed to
insure Wright against loss on one-fourth of five thousand
bags of coffee, to be shipped on board of 'good vessel or
vessels' from Rio de Janeiro to any port in the United
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
143. See id. at 392-94.
144. See id. at 393 (opinion of McLean, J.); id. at 410 (opinion of Wayne, J.);
id. at 452 (opinion of Catron, J.); id. (Grier, J., concurring with opinion of Catron,
J.); id. at 452-55 (opinion of McKinley, J.).
145. See id. at 500-01 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 501 n.1 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
147. See id.
148. See Insurance Cos. v. Wright, 68 U.S. 456 (1863). This decision
represented the second time that the Court had considered this case. See id. at
459 (citing to The Orient Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 64 U.S. 401 (1859)). The 1859
opinion contained no citation to a dictionary. See The Orient Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Wright, 64 U.S. 401 (1859).
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States."' In dispute was the meaning of the contractual
term "good vessel or vessels."5 '
The Court relied on the dictionary to distinguish the
vessel rating system in England from the system used in the
United States. 5' Citing McCulloch's Commercial Dictionary,
the Court noted that a British insurance syndicate used "a
mode of rating entirely different from any adopted in the
United States."' More specifically, the British syndicate had
a rating system whereas the United States did not, or at
least the British system was "not generally adopted as yet
[in the United States]." 5 ' The Court affirmed the lower
court's opinion,' thereby allowing Wright to import coffee
without fear of being uninsured. These three apparently
innocuous cases, decided between 1830 and 1863, represent
the genesis of the Court's use of the dictionary to define
terms.
B. Judicial Notice as Support for the Court's Use of
Dictionaries
Judicial notice is the principal historical justification for
the Court's use of dictionaries as a substantive source.
155
However, the Court's early cases merely cited the dictionary
and did so without referring to the concept of judicial notice.
In fact, the Court cited to a dictionary in twenty-five opinions
over the course of more than fifty years before it even began
to discuss whether or when it was proper to cite a dictionary.
Thus, for several decades, the Court cited the dictionary as a
substantive source on an ad hoc basis without any discussion
of the propriety of using the dictionary.
The evolution of the Court's few analytical guidelines for
using a dictionary appears to have started in 1875. In Brown
v. Piper,' the Court in dicta stated that judicial notice is
appropriate for "the meaning of words in the vernacular
language."57 More specifically, the Court observed that
149. Insurance Cos., 68 U.S. at 457.
150. Id. at 457-58.
151. Id. at 472-73.
152. Id. at 473.
153. Id. at 473.
154. Id. at 476.
155. See Weis, supra note 4, at 963.
156. 91 U.S. 37 (1875).
157. Id. at 42.
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"[c]ourts will take notice of whatever is generally known
within the limits of their jurisdiction; and, if the judge's
memory is at fault, he may refresh it by resorting to any
means for that purpose which he may deem safe and
proper."
15 8
The Court first squarely addressed the issue of when it
was appropriate to rely on the dictionary in Marvel v.
Merritt. 9 After concluding that a tariff provision was "not
technical," 16 the Court cited to Webster's Dictionary to define
"mineral,' "ore' and "mine," finding that those terms were
"words of common speech, and, as such, their interpretation
is within the judicial knowledge, and therefore a matter of
law." 6' In Nix v. Hedden,'62 another tariff case, the Court
again found that the relevant statutory language had not
acquired a technical or trade meaning." Accordingly, the
word "tomato"
must receive [its] ordinary meaning. Of that meaning the court is
bound to take judicial notice, as it does in regard to all words in
our own tongue; and upon such a question dictionaries are
admitted, not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and
understanding of the court.164
158. Id. at 42. The specific issue decided in Brown was whether an injunction
should have been issued to prevent the infringement of a patent for a device used
to freeze fish. Id. at 38. The quoted language appeared in the midst of a
discussion of the state of the art of artificial freezing, a discussion that was made
necessary because the pleadings and filings were "silent as to the ice-cream
freezer." Id. at 43. The Court apparently took judicial notice "that Lord Bacon
applied snow to poultry to preserve it. He said the process succeeded 'excellently
well.' The experiment was made in his old age, imprudently, and brought on his
last illness." Id. at 44. In the end, the Court found that the patent relied upon by
plaintiff was invalid and thus remanded the case and directed the lower court to
dismiss the claim. Id.
159. 116 U.S. 11 (1885).
160. Id. at 12.
161. Id.
162. 149 U.S. 304 (1893).
163. Id. at 306.
164. Id. at 306-07 (citing authority). Nix decided whether, for purposes of a
tariff provision, tomatoes were fruits or vegetables. Id. at 306. After acknow-
ledging a controversy over the issue, the Court ultimately found that tomatoes
were vegetables. Id. at 307. Although discussed as a seminal dictionary case and
representing a refinement in the dictionary citation rules, see Weis, supra note 4,
at 963-66, the Nix opinion does not cite to any specific dictionary, Nix, 149 U.S. at
306-07. The parties in Nix, however, cited to a variety of dictionaries to define a
variety of terms. Id. at 305-06.
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Thus, Nix extended the Brown analysis to include diction-
aries as permissible aids to refresh the Court's memory and
to enhance the Court's understanding. Moreover, Nix ap-
parently eradicated Brown's "safe and proper" restriction,
whatever that limitation may have meant.
In Werk v. Parker,165 a patent case involving the novelty
of "an oil-press mat or cloth" to extract cotton-seed oil,'66 the
Court firmly approved the circuit court's reliance on a dic-
tionary in defining the state of the art: 'We deem it clear,
beyond question, that the court was justified in taking ju-
dicial notice of facts that appeared so abundantly from
standard works accessible in every considerable library."
67
Thus, by 1920, the Court had decided that taking judicial
notice of dictionary definitions unquestionably was proper.
Unfortunately, the Court's approach to the dictionary,
although sometimes stated differently, has neither changed
nor evolved much in the decades following Werk.'68 The Court
has, however, come to rely on dictionaries more and more
frequently, particularly during the past thirty years.
C. Frequency
Although the Court relied on dictionaries only three
times prior to 1864, in the 1860s, the Court cited dictionaries
in seven opinions in the course of defining nine terms.'69 In
the 1870s, the Court cited dictionaries in ten opinions to
165. 249 U.S. 130 (1919).
166. Id. at 130.
167. Id. at 132-33 (citing cases).
168. At present, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that "the only evidence
rule on the subject of judicial notice . . . deals only with judicial notice of
'adjudicative' facts. No rule deals with judicial notice of 'legislative facts.'" Fed. R.
Evid. 201(a) advisory committee's note. Under this analysis, courts may use
dictionaries to determine "the facts of the case," not facts relevant "to legal
reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal
principle or in the enactment of a legislative body." Id. (citing KENNETH CULP
DAVIS, A SYSTEM OF JuDiciAL NOTICE BASED ON FAIRNESS AND CONVENIENCE IN
PERSPECTIVES OF LAW 69, 73 (1964)).
169. See Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 445 & n.18 (1868) (defining
"duty"); Gordon v. United States, 74 U.S. 188, 194 & n.7 (1868) (defining
"arbitrator"); Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. 290, 300 & n.12 (1866) (defining
"limitation"); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 387, 392-93 (1866) (Miller, J.,
dissenting) (defining "attainder" and "punish"); Bank for Say. v. Collector, 70 U.S.
495, 512-13 & nn.7, 8 (1865) (defining "banks of deposit" and "banks for savings");
Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 69 U.S. 450, 461-62 & n.12 (1864) (defining "pilots");
Insurance Cos. v. Wright, 68 U.S. 456,473 & n.13 (defining "rating").
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define thirteen terms, 7 ° while in the 1880s, the Court cited
dictionaries in seven opinions to define eleven terms.'
In the 1890s, the Court cited dictionaries in eighteen
opinions to define twenty-five terms72 and, during the next
decade, the Court relied on dictionaries in twenty-one opin-
ions to define twenty-six terms. 73 The Court's use of diction-
170. See Arthur v. Moller, 97 U.S. 365, 367-68 (1878) (defining "lithograph"
and "to print"); Schumacher v. Cornell, 96 U.S. 549, 554 (1877) (defining
"wrench"); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 721 (1877) (defining "editor"), overruled
in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Inman S.S. Co. v. Tinker, 94
U.S. 238, 243 (1876) (defining "tonnage"); Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank, 88
U.S. 294, 299 n.2 (1874) (defining "cattle"); Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664
(1874) (defining "tx"); Case of the Sewing Mach. Cos., 85 U.S. 553, 585 n.28
(1873) (defining "suit"); Lapeyre v. United States, 84 U.S. 191, 195 n.8 & 195-96
n.9 (1872) (defining "proclamation"); Oulton v. Savings Inst., 84 U.S. 109, 118-19
n.14 (1872) (defining "banks"); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 584, 601 n.150
(1870) (Chase, C.J., dissenting) (defining "coining," "money" and "pound troy").
171. See Town of Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1887) (defining
"town" and "village"); Ferguson v. Arthur, 117 U.S. 482, 487 (1886) (defining
"proprietary" and "proprietor"); Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U.S. 11, 12 (1885) (defining
"mine," "mineral" and "ore"); Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U.S. 727, 734-35
(1885) (defining "to carry on"); Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111
U.S. 293, 299 (1884) (defining "alizarin"); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 227
(1883) (defining "ex post facto"), overruled by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37
(1990); Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 143-44 (1880) (Miller, J.,
dissenting) (defining "suit").
172. See Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 461-62 (1899) (Brown, J.,
dissenting) (defining "smuggler," "smugglers, "smuggling," and "to smuggle");
United States v. Klumpp, 169 U.S. 209, 212 (1898) (defining "worsted"); United
States v. Laws, 163 U.S. 258, 266 (1896) (defining "profession"); Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 186 (1896) (defining "abandonment"); Reagan v.
United States, 157 U.S. 301, 303 (1895) (defining "felony"); Cochran v. United
States, 157 U.S. 286, 296 (1895) (defining "liable"); Seeberger v. Wright &
Lawther Oil & Lead Mfg. Co., 157 U.S. 183, 185 (1895) (defining "draW and
"draught"); Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296, 306 (1895) (defining "hawkers");
Ernhardt v. Steinhardt, 153 U.S. 177, 182 (1894) (defining "absinthe"); The
Britannia, 153 U.S. 130, 148 (1894) (Brown, J., dissenting) (defining "course");
Bogle v. Magone, 152 U.S. 623, 626 (1894) (defining "sauce"); Sarlls v. United
States, 152 U.S. 570, 572 (1894) (defining "ardent spirits," "malt liquor,"
"spirituous" and "spirituous liquors"); The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 130
(1894) (defining "freight); United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 270 (1893)
(Gray, J., dissenting) (defining "high seas"); Magone v. Heller, 150 U.S. 70, 74
(1893) (defining "expressly"); United States v. Patterson, 150 U.S. 65, 68 (1893)
(defining "hearing"); Hollender v. Magone, 149 U.S. 586, 588-89 (1893) (defining
"liquors"); Homer v. United States, 147 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1893) (defining
lottery").
173. See Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., 211 U.S. 239, 246
(1908) (defining "arrestment"); American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S.
284, 290-91 (1907) (defining "copyright"); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 7
(1906) (defining "slavery," "slave" and "servitude"); Burton v. United States, 202
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aries abated slightly during the next two decades. From 1910
to 1919, the Court relied on dictionaries in eight opinions to
define thirteen terms," while from 1920 to 1929, the Court
relied on dictionaries in ten opinions to define twelve
terms.
175
In both the 1930s'. and the 1940s,'7 the Court relied on
U.S. 344, 371 (1906) (defining "interested"); id. at 396 (Brewer, J., dissenting)
(defining "interest"); Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U.S. 453, 470-
71 (1906) (defining "exclusive"); Serralles v. Esbri, 200 U.S. 103, 111 (1906)
(defining "centavo"); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 269-70 (1905)
(Brewer, J., dissenting) (defining "banishment); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S.
207, 219 (1905) (defining "return"); Keppel v. Tiffin Sav. Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 362
(1905) (defining "surrender"); id. at 383 (Day, J., dissenting) (defining
"surrender"); Hackfeld & Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1905)
(defining "neglect"); Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88, 96 (1904) (defining
"magazines" and "periodical"); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S.
279, 292-93 (1904) (defining "anarchist" and "anarchy"); Martin v. Steamship
Southwark, 191 U.S. 1, 8 (1903) (defining "seaworthiness"); Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 536-37 (1903) (defining "metals," 'mines" and
"minerals"); Board of Dirs. of the Chicago Theological Seminary v. Illinois ex rel.
Raymond, 188 U.S. 662, 673 (1903) (defining "belonging"); Fidelity & Deposit Co.
v. Courtney, 186 U.S. 342, 346 (1902) (defining "immediate"); Patton v. Brady,
184 U.S. 608, 617-18 (1902) (defining "excise"); Wilson Bros. v. Nelson, 183 U.S.
191, 212 (1901) (Shiras, J., dissenting) (defining "act"); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 102 (1901) (defining "common law").
174. See Chelentis v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918) (defining
"right" and "remedy"); Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 113 (1916) (defining
"legislative officer," "legislative officers," "office" and "officer"); Mallinckrodt
Chemical Workers v. Missouri ex rel. Jones, 238 U.S. 41, 53 (1915) (defining
"trust"); Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 329 (1912) (defining "intervene");
Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580, 598 (1911) (defining "abandonment");
Montello Salt Co. v. Utah, 221 U.S. 452, 464-65 (1911) (defining 'Include");
Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U.S. 446, 454-55 (1911)
(defining "rubberoid" and "oid"); Toxaway Hotel Co. v. J.L. Smathers & Co., 216
U.S. 439,448 (1910) (defining "mercantile").
175. See John P. King Mfg. Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277 U.S. 100, 102-
03 (1928) (defining "statute"); Deal v. United States, 274 U.S. 277, 283 (1927)
(defining "depredation" and "robbery"); O'Hara v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 269 U.S.
364, 371 (1926) (defining "watch"); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 665 (1925)
(defining "advocacy"); Banco Mexicano de Commercio e Industria v. Deutsche
Bank, 263 U.S. 591, 601 (1924) (defining "with reference to"); United States v.
Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 184 (1923) (defining "legacy") (quoting Orton v. Orton, 42
N.Y. 486 (1867)); United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 211 & n.1
(1923) (defining "caucasian"); Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 396-97 n.2,
398 (1920) (McKenna, J., dissenting) (defining "concurrent" and "concurrent
jurisdiction"); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206-07 (1920) (defining
"income"); Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159, 169 (1920) (defining
"cattle").
176. See Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Halliburton, 306 U.S. 550, 552 & n.4 (1939)
(defining "packer"); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 454-55 & n.3 (1939)
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dictionaries in seventeen opinions to define twenty-three
terms. The 1950s yielded eleven opinions using dictionaries
to define twenty-one terms. 8 and the 1960s had sixteen
(defining "gang"); Washingtonian Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 47 & n.10-11
(1939) (Black, J., dissenting) (defining "condition precedent" and "condition
subsequent"); Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5, 17 & n.13 (1938) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (defining "arbitrary," "capricious," "harsh," "unjust" and
"unreasonable"); Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604,
607 n.1 (1938) (defining "prime mover"); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery,
303 U.S. 552, 564 n.1 (1938) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (defining "dispute");
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co v. Coughran, 303 U.S. 485, 491 (1938) (defining
"operate"); United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 417 (1938) (defining "refund");
United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 549 n.14 (1938) (defining "counterfeit");
Smyth v. United States, 302 U.S. 329, 365 n.1 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting)
(defining "redeem"); White v. Aronson, 302 U.S. 16, 17 nn.2, 3 (1937) (defining
"game" and "puzzle"); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U.S. 379, 383
n.3 (1937) (defining "pursuant to"); United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 48 (1937)
(defining "make"); Paramount Publix Corp. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S.
464, 471 & n.1 (1935) (defining "combination printing"); United States v. Dubilier
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 & n.6 (1933) (defining '"monopoly");
McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 491 (1931) (defining "candy");
American Fruit Growers Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931) (defining
"manufacture").
177. See Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701, 729 n.12 (1949)
(Burton, J., dissenting) (defining "intended"); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S.
742, 786 n.37 (1948) (defining "excessive"); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6
nn.14, 15 (1947) (defining "equity" and "property"); American Stevedores, Inc. v.
Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 450 n.6 (1947) (defining "damage" and "damages"); Board of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 446 (1947) (defining
"primarily"); United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243-44 n.14 (1947) (defining
"arbitrary" and "capricious"); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 17 nn.3, 4
(1946) (defining "debauchery" and "prostitution"); Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock &
Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 286 n.10, 287 n.11 (1946) (defining "discharge" and
"lay-off'); Roland Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657, 673 (1946) (defining "retail");
Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 501-02 n.1 (1945) (Stone, C.J., dissenting)
(defining "evade"); United States v. Beach, 324 U.S. 193, 197 n.2 (1945) (Murphy,
J., dissenting) (defining "white slave"); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323
U.S. 490, 512 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (defining "ship"); Tennessee Coal,
Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 n.11 (1944) (defining
"employ" and "work"); Stewart v. United States, 316 U.S. 354, 362 n.6 (1942)
(defining "islands"); Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 134
(1942) (defining "embed"); Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 507 (1941)
(defining "sale"); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 n.10
(1940) (defining "alternative").
178. See Beflan v. Board of Public Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 407 (1958) (construing
"incompetency") (quoting Horosko v. Mt. Pleasant Sch. Dist., 6 A.2d 866, 868, 869-
70 (1939)); Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 32 (1958) (construing
"omit"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (construing
"pruriency" and "prurient"); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 305-07 & n.7
(1957) (construing "organize); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411-13 & n.8
(1957) (construing "steal," "stolen" and "theft"); Ullmann v. United States, 350
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opinions using dictionaries to define twenty-three terms.'7"
Since that time, the Court's use of dictionaries as a sub-
stantive source has expanded dramatically.
In the 1970s, the Court turned to dictionaries in forty
opinions to define fifty terms.' In the 1980s, the Court
U.S. 422, 453 n.* (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (construing "trainer sur la
claie"); Shields v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 350 U.S. 318, 326 n.2 (1956) (Reed,
J., dissenting) (construing "running board"); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 520 n.28, 524 nn.43-44, 525 nn.45-47, 526 n.48, 527 n.49, 534, 535-39 &
app. (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment) (construing "blasphemy,"
"blasphemer," "sacrilege," "sacrilegious," "profane," "prophaneness" and "to
profane"); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 140 n.* (1952) (Minton, J., dissenting)
(construing "imbecile"); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 n.7 (1951)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (construing "moral turpitude" and "turpitude"); Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 n.10 (1950) (construing "habeas corpus").
179. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 348 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (defining "garnishment"); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 306 n.7 (1969)
(defining "entertainment); United States v. An Article of Drug... Bacto-Unidisk.
•., 394 U.S. 784, 800 n.20 (1969) (defining "drug"); United States v. Donruss Co.,
393 U.S. 297, 311 n.2 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (defining "intention"); Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 218 n.* (1968)
(White, J., dissenting) (defining "pursuant"); United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257,
261 n.5 (1966) (defining "firm"); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224,
234 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (defining 'refuse matter"); United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 & n.2 (1965) (defining "supreme being" and "theism");
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 297 n.17 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(defining "Victualling house"); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 371 n.9 (1964)
(defining "institution"); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193 n.9 (1964) (Brennan,
J., judgment and plurality opinion) (defining "community"); Manual Enters., Inc.
v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 483 n.4 (1962) (Harlan, J., judgment and plurality opinion)
(defining "filthy," "indecent," "lewd," "obscene" and "Vile"); Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 892 n.6 (1961) (defining
"tradesman"); Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 308 n.3 (1961) (defining
"discovers" and "invents"); Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 106
n.7 (1960) (defining "salvage value" and "useful life"); United States v. Mersky,
361 U.S. 431, 445 (1960) (Frankfurter, dissenting) (defining "statute").
180. See P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 77 n.7 (1979) (defining
"including"); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517, 521 n.11 (1979) (defining
"presume" and "intent"); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979)
(defining "property"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 581 n.9 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (defining "prison"); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
U.S. 434, 442 (1979) (defining "mobilia sequuntur personum"); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 n.9 (1979) (defining "unequivocal"); Dalia v. United
States, 441 U.S. 238, 240 n.2 (1979) (defining "covert"); Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153, 199 n.1 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (defining "malice"); National
Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 480 n.10 (1979)
(defining "board of trade" and "chamber of commerce"); Group Life & Health Ins.
Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979) (defining 'insurance"); Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 402 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (defining "potential");
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 n.14 (1978) (defining "indecent"); St.
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relied on dictionaries nearly 100 times to define nearly 125
terms.'8' In the 1990s, the Court has continued to increase its
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541 n.11 (1978) (defining
"boycott"); NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 243 n.* (1978)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (defining "interference"); Andrus v. Charlestone Stone
Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 610 (1978) (defining "minerals") (quoting Northern
Pacific Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 530 (1903)); California v. Southland
Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519, 527 (1978) (defining "dedicate"); United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 629-30 n.5 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (defining
"envelope"); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 657 n.9 (1977) (defining
"hematoma); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429
U.S. 363, 380 n.8 (1977) (defining "common law") (quoting Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 102 (1901)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 199 nn.20 & 21 (1975) (defining "contrivance," "contrive," "device" and
"manipulate"); Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 312 (1975)
(White, J., dissenting) (defining "encumbrance"); United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411, 438 n.3 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (defining "nunnery"); Schick v.
Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 273 n.8 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (defining
"commutation" and "pardon"); Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S.
264, 283 (1974) (defining "scab"); Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188,
201 & n.21 (1974) (defining "working conditions"); Huddleston v. United States,
415 U.S. 814, 820 (1974) (defining "acquire"); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415
U.S. 130, 132 (1974) (defining "opprobrious") (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518, 525 (1972)); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 n.2 (1973) (defining
"obscene" and "pornography"); BPOE Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 411 U.S. 924,
926 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting from dismissal for lack of substantial federal
question) (defining "ethnic"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 & n.20, 159, 160 &
n.59 (1973) (defining "quickening," "embryo," "fetus" and "viable"); Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 n.16 (1972) (defining "diversion"); Shadwick v.
City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 349 n.7 (1972) (defining "magistrate"); Evansville-
Vanderburgh Airport Auth. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 710 n.1 (1972)
(defining "emplane"); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972) (defining
"abusive" and "opprobrious"); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 571 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (defining "peer"); United States v. Vuitch,
402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971) (defining "health"); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333,
351-52 & n.5 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result) (defining "religion"); Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 182 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part)
(defining "of); id. at 211 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(defining "color").
181. See John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153 (1989)
(defining "compilation"); Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local
Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 97 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (defining "discipline"); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 648-
49 & n.5 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining
"religion" and "respect"); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,
515 n.13 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., judgment and plurality opinion) (defining
"necessary"); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 265 nn.6 & 7, 268 n.10 (1989) (defining "fines for offenses" and
"damages"); id. at 297 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(defining "damages" and "fine"); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S.
229, 238 (1989) (defining "pattern"); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
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810 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (defining "tonality"); Will v. Michigan Dep't
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 n.9 (1989) (defining "body politic" and "public
corporation"); id. at 78-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defining "bodies politic and
corporate," "body politic," "body politic or corporate" and "corporation sole");
Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 894 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) (defining
"civil action"); Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 366 n.6
(1989) (defining "salmonid"); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 128
(1989) (defining "irregularity"); Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist.
of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 301 (1989) (defining "request"); Department of Justice v.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763-64 n.16 (1989) (defining
"private"); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1988) (defining
"finding of fact"); Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113 (defining
"criteria"); id. at 134 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (defining "criterion"); United
States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 962-63 & n.9 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(defining "servitude"); Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 913-14 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining "damages"); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 719
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining "inferiour"); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S.
552, 564 (1988) (defining "substantial"); id. at 576, 577 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment)) (defining "substantial" and "reasonable");
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 482 (1988) (defining "picketing"); Doe v. United
States, 487 U.S. 201, 221 n.2 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (defining "witness");
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988)
(defining "service of process"); McCoy v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 486 U.S.
429, 450 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defining "amicus curiae"); K Mart Corp.
v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 298-99 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (defining "owner" and "ownership"); id. at 324 n.2 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining "oven"); McLaughlin v.
Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 137 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (defining
"willffl"); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988)
(defining "terminate" and "termination); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759,
786 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (defining "material"); Regents of
Univ. of California v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 598 (1988)
(defining "compensation"); id. at 610 & n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (defining
"good will"); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,
468 n.4 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defining "prohibit"); K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 184 (1988) (defining "embargo"); id. at 192 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (defining "embargo"); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54-55
(1988) (defining "caricature"); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469,
476-77 n.6 (1988) (defining "tidelands"); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 334-35 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining "likely" and "or"); McNally v. United States, 483
U.S. 350, 370-71 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (defining "defraud"); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 598-99 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (defining "creation"
and "evolution"); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 479 & n.6 (1987) (Powell,
J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (defining "challenge");
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 477-78 n.11 (1987) (defining "propaganda"); Saint
Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1987) (defining "race");
Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 409 n.17 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (defining
"per curiam"); Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 374 (1987) (Scalia, J., judgment of
Court and opinion) (defining "income"); United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S.
102, 109 n.4 (1987) (defining "disclose"); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
431 n.11 (1987) (defining "fear") (quoting Matter of Acosta, Interim Decision No.
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2986, at 14 (Mar. 1, 1985)); Randall v. Loffsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 673 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (defining "income"); United States v. James, 478 U.S.
597, 605 n.6 (1986) (defining "damages"); id. at 615 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(defining "damage" and "damages"); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310,
315 n.2 (1986) (defining "interest"); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 n.3
(1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining
"gerrymander"); Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 335 (1986) (White, J.,
dissenting) (defining "prompt"); Davis v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 221 & n.6 (1986)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (defining "curtilage"); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475
U.S. 469, 481 n.9 (1986) (defining "policy"); id. at 499-500 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(defining "policy"); Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 745 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (defining "complaint"); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.
491, 496, 500 n.10 (1985) (defining "pruriency," "prurient" and "lust") (quoting
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957)); Bateman Eichler, Hill
Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306-07 & n.11 (1985) (defining "in pari
delicto potior est conditio defendentis"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (defining "establishment"); Schreiber v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 7 & n.5 (1985) (defining "manipulation'); City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 n.6 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., judgment of
Court and opinion) (defining "policy"); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 630 n.2 (1985) (defining "intrauterine device");
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 406 n.20 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(defining "automobile," "camper," and "motor home"); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S.
392, 399-400 n.3 (1985) (defining "accident"); Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38,
40 n.2 (1984) (defining "in limine"); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors
of Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 165-66 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(defining "note"); United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 480 (1984) (defining-
"jurisdiction"); Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 529 n.4 (1984)
(defining "derivative suit"); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983)
(defining "interest"); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983)
(defining "appropriate"); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 n.16 (1983)
(defining "relate"); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983) (Rehnquist,
J., judgment of Court and opinion) (defining "initiated"); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 925 n.2 (1983) (defining "veto"); Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S.
406, 411 (1983) (defining "conveyance"); American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American
Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 421 (1983) (defining "exempt"); United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 188 n.* (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (defining "movement"); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 60 n.3, 62
n.4, 85 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (defining "lewdly," "wanton," "wantonly,"
"malice," "recklessness" and "redress"); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico
ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 & n.8 (1982) (defining "parens patriae); Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 501 n.18, 503
n.20 (1982) (defining "roach," "design" and "head"); Jewett v. Commissioner, 455
U.S. 305, 323 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (defining "disclaimer"); American
Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-09 (1981) (defining
"feasible"); County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 169 & n.9 (1981)
(defining "authorize"); id. at 198 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (defining
"authorized"); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 549 n.4 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring in result) (defining "deprive"); Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450
U.S. 503, 516 (1981) (defining "efficient," "plain," "remedy" and "speedy"); id. at
532 n.4 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (defining "efficient" and "remedy");
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reliance on dictionaries to define terms. From 1990 through
the 1997-1998 term, the Court cited dictionaries in nearly
180 opinions to define more than 220 terms.'82 Projecting
Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 98 n.16 (1981) (defining "substantial"); Industrial
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 719 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (defining "feasible"); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696 n.13 (1980)
(defining "artifice," "device" and "scheme"); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442
(1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (defining "hideous"); United States v. Louisiana,
446 U.S. 253, 264 (1980) (defining "impound"); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S.
684, 708-09 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (defining "lesser offense"); United
States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 720 n.2 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defining
"testimony"); California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 605 n.12, 606 n.15
(1980) (defining "seniority" and "system"); id. at 612-13 nn.3, 4 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (defining "seniority").
182. See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2098 n.13 (1998)
(defining "person"); National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168,
2180-81 (1998) (Scalia, J. concurring) (defining "ensure"); id. at 2189 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (defining "consider," "consideration" and "take into consideration");
Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2215 (U.S. 1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (defining "major"); United States v. Bajakajian,
118 S. Ct. 2028, 2034, 2036 & n.9, 2037 (1998) (defining "remedial action,"
"instrumentality" and "excessive"); Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey,
118 S. Ct. 1952, 1955 (1998) (defining "eligible" and "participate"); Muscarello v.
United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1914, 1915 (1998) (defining "carry" and "carry
arms or weapons"); id. at 1921 nn.2, 5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (defining "carry,"
"carry arms or weapons" and "carries a firearm"); United States v. Bestfoods, 118
S. Ct. 1876, 1887 (1998) (defining "operate"); AVCO Corp. v. United Auto.,
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, 118 S. Ct. 1626, 1629 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
opinion of the Court) (defining "for"); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 118 S. Ct.
1618, 1624 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (defining "application" and "present");
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1279, 1288 (1998) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (defining "court"); Cohen v. De la Cruz, 118 S. Ct. 1212, 1217
(1998) (defining "debt for"); Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974, 977 n.7 (1998)
(defining "willful"); Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818,
823 (1998) (defining "doubt" and "objective"); Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct.
805, 808 (1998) (defining "no"); Foster v. Love, 118 S. Ct. 464, 467 (1997) (defining
"election"); City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 117 S. Ct 2157, 2173, 2174 n.1 (1997)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part) (defining "peace" and "licentious"); McMillian v.
Monroe County, Alabama, 520 U.S. 781, 794 (1997) (defining "sheriff'); United
States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997) (defining "maximum"); Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 637-38 & n. 20
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (defining "impost" and "duty"); Commissioner v.
Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 118 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (defining
"substantial"); id. at 128 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining "material"); United
States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (defining "any"); Dunn v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S. 465, 470 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(defining "in"); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (defining "subject to");
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 342 (1997) (defining "employed"); Ingalls
Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 519 U.S. 248, 255 (1997) (defining
"entitle"); Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997)
(defining "have"); O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 83 (1996) (defining "on
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account of); Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 126 & n.4 (1996) (defining
"motion"); Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 745 (1996) (defining "interest" and
"rate"); Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 680 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (defining "forthwith); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
484, 491 & n.4 (1996) (defining "temperance"); Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516
U.S. 479,485 (1996) (defining "imminent"); Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia,
517 U.S. 186, 254 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (defining "state"); Barnett Bank
of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 38 (1996) (defining "specifically"); Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 529 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (defining
"administer"); Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 133 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (defining "equitable"); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516
U.S. 325, 337 (1996) (defining "price/earnings ratio"); NLRB v. Town & Country
Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995) (defining "employee"); Rutledge v. United
States, 517 U.S. 292, 299 n.10 (1996) (defining "concert"); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995) (defining "promote" and
"manifest"); id. at 872 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting) (defining "seminary"); Capitol
Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763 (1995) (defining
"endorsement"); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 697 (1995) (defining "harm"); id. at 710 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (defining "injure"); id. at 718, 732-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining
"take," "harm" and "proximate"); United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 610-11,
616 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining
"endeavors" and "corruptly"); Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417,
432-33 n.9 (1995) (defining "shall"); id. at 439 (Souter, J., dissenting) (defining
"shall"); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 857 n.7 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (defining "Congress"); Hubbard v. United States, 514
U.S. 695, 700 (1995) (defining "shows"); Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 687
(1995) (defining "doctrine of laches"); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (defining "commerce"); Heintz v. Jenkins, 514
U.S. 291, 294 (1995) (defining "collect debt"); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 80 (1995) (defining "procedure"); Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 575-76 (1995) (defining "prospectus"); Milwaukee Brewery
Workers' Pension Plan v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 513 U.S. 414, 426 (1995) (defining
"amortization plan"); Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
273-74 (1995) (defining "involving"); Nationsbank of N. Carolina v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 264 (1995) (defining "insurance"); Asgrow
Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) (defining "market"); Bailey v.
United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (defining "use"); Brown v. Gardner, 513
U.S. 115, 117 (1994) (defining "injury"); Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political
Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 93 (1994) (defining "appeal"); Williamson v. United
States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994) (defining "statement"); Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v.
Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 255 (1994) (defining "or"); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225-26 & n.2, 228 (1994) (defining
"modify" and "required"); id. at 241, 242 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (defining
"modification" and "modify"); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 854-55 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (defining "punishment"); id. at 859 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (defining "punishment"); PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v.
Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 725 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(defining "discharge"); Posters N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 515
nn.1 & 3 (1994) (defining "bong" and "freebase"); United States v. Alvarez-
Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357-58 (1994) (defining "delay"); Landgraf v. USI Film
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Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269 n.23 (1994) (defining "retroactive statute"); United
States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 71 (1994) (defining "original" and "sentence");
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 12-13, 15, 19 (1994) (defining "moral evidence,"
"moral certainty" and "substantial"); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 580 n.12 (1994) (defining "parody"); Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
552 (1994) (defining "partiality"); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531,
537-38 (1994) (defining "market value"); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994)
(defining "cognizable"); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 428 n.8 (1994) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (defining "public domain"); ABF Freight System, Inc., v. NLRB, 510
U.S. 317, 328 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (defining "understand"); National
Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 257 (1994) (defining "affect");
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 112
(1993) (defining "provide"); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 781
(1993) (Souter, J., partial opinion of Court) (defining "business"); id. at 802 n.2
(Scalia, J., partial opinion of Court) (defining "boycott"); United States v. Dixon,
509 U.S. 688, 705 n.10 (1993) (defining "incidents of ownership" and "incident");
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 671 n.7 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) (defining
"segregate"); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7 (1993) (defining "fine"
and "forfeit"); id. at 624 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (defining "payment"); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (defining "scientific" and "knowledge"); Department of
Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 505 (1993) (defining "purpose"); Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 181 nn.37 & 38 (1993) (defining "return" and
"refouler"); id. at 191-92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (defining "refouler" and
"return"); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(defining "punishment"); Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Calif., Inc. v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 652 (1993) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (defining "clear error"); Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)
(defining "sacrifice" and "ritual"); Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 473 (1993)
(defining "provide for"); Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 412 n.9
(1993) (defining "aggregate"); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 269 n.4
(1993) (White, J., dissenting) (defining "relief," "remedy" and "remedial"); Smith v.
United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29, 231, 237-38 (1993) (defining "use," "to use,"
"to cane" and "in relation to"); id. at 241-42 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining
"use"); Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 210 (1993) (defining "claim");
Department of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 173 (1993) (defining
"confidential"); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1993) (defining
"conviction"); Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
508 U.S. 49, 61 (1993) (defining "genuine"); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507
U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (defining "cover"); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United
States, 507 U.S. 546, 571 n.1 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (defining "amortized"
and "depreciated"); Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471-72 (1993) (defining
"pitiless" and "cold-blooded"); id. at 484 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (defining "cold
blood"); Pioneer Investment Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507
U.S. 380, 388 (1993) (defining "neglect"); id. at 402-03 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (defining "excusable neglect"); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349,
357 (1993) (defining "base" and "based"); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197,
201 (1993) (defining "country"); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-79
(1993) (defining "conduct," "aid and abet" and "participate"); id. at 187-88 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (defining "conduct"); Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
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506 U.S. 263, 274 (1993) (defining "invidious"); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S.
224, 229-30 (1993) (defining "try," "sole" and "pardon"); Rowland v. California
Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199, 203 (1993) (defining "context" and "poverty"); id.
at 220 n.8 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (defining "affiant"); Commissioner v. Soliman,
506 U.S. 168, 174 (1993) (defining "principal"); id. at 191 n.15 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (defining "principal"); District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd.
of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129 (1992) (defining "relate to"); Mississippi v. Louisiana,
506 U.S. 73, 78 (1992) (defining "exclusive"); Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 30
(1992) (defining "collateral attack"); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
954 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (defining "stare decisis"); Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,
526 n.23 (1992) (Stevens, J., judgment of Court and opinion) (defining "contract"
and "tort"); id. at 535-36 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (defining "prohibition" and "require");
Estate of Coward v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992) (defining
"entitle"); United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 322 (1992) (defining
"testimony"); Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S.
214, 223 (1992) (defining "solicit" and "solicitation"); Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992) (defining "commercial"); Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (defining "relating to") United
States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235-36 n.6 (1992) (defining "personal injuries"); id.
at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (defining "personal injuries"); Foucha
v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 96 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (defining
"insanity"); Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 621 (1992) (defining
"sanction"); Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47, 53 (1992) (defining "assignee");
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 428 (1992) (Scalia, J.; dissenting) (defining
"redeem"); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (defining "witness") (quoting Maryland v. Craig,
497 U.S. 836, 863-64 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); Molzof v. United States, 502
U.S. 301, 307 (1992) (defining "punitive damages"); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501
U.S. 868, 920 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(defining "department"); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 482 (1991) (White, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part and concurring in judgment) (defining
"policy"); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(defining "representatives"); Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 244 (1991)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining "originate");
Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 124 (1991) (defining "institute"); Chapman v.
United States, 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991) (defining "mixture"); Farrey v.
Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 296-97 (1991) (defining "avoid" and "fix!'); California v.
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 621, 624 (1991) (defining "seizure"); United States v.
Centennial Sav. Bank FSB, 499 U.S. 573, 580 n.6 (1991) (defining "discharge");
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 536 (1991) (defining "bodily harm,"
"bodily injury," "corporel," "lesion" and "lesion corporelle"); Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S.
432, 436 n.6 (1991) (defining "attorney"); International Union v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 212 n.1 (1991) (White, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (defining "occupational"); Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S.
439, 447 n.7 (1991) (defining "right"); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of
Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 364 n.1 (1991) (defining "depreciation"); Moskal v. United
States, 498 U.S.103, 120-22 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining "counterfeit,"
"forge," "forged," and "false making"); FMC Corp v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 63
(1990) (defining "purportedly"); Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,
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through the end of the decade, the Court is on a pace to cite
dictionaries in 210 different opinions to define 260 different
terms in the 1990s. Thus, at the Court's present rate, the
decade of the 1990s will give rise to nearly half of all the
opinions in the Court's two-century history where a Justice
has relied on a dictionary.
D. Personnel
The first two Justices to cite a dictionary, Justice
Johnson in Patapsco Insurance Co. v. Coulter83 and Justice
Daniel in his dissent in Smith v. Turner,"M did so only once in
their thirty85 and eighteen 86 years on the Court, respective-
ly. Justice Miller, in Insurance Companies v. Wright,'87 was
the third Justice to rely on the dictionary and went on to cite
494 U.S. 872, 893 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (defining
"exercise"); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(defining "witness"); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 529-
30 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (defining "anonymous"); Sullivan v. Stroop,
496 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1990) (defining "child support"); United States v. Eichman,
496 U.S. 310, 317 n.7 (1990) (defining "defile" and "trample"); Board of Educ. v.
Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 237 (1990) (defining "curriculum"); Peel v.
Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1990)
(Stevens, J., judgment and plurality opinion) (defining "certificate") (quoting In re
Peel, 534 N.E.2d 980, 984 (Ill. 1989)); id. at 113 (Marshall, J., concurring in
judgment) (defining "certificate" and "certify"); Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 61
(1990) (defining "withholding"); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (defining "offence"); Fort Stewart Schools v. Federal Labor
Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641, 645 (defining "conditions"); Davis v. United States,
495 U.S. 472, 479 (1990) (defining "use"); Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411,
416 (1990) (defining "restitution"); Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 202 n.8
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defining "corporations"); NLRB v. Curtin
Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 814-15 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(defining "inference"); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 514 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (defining "compassion"); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 171-
72 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (defining "salary"); Sullivan v.
Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1990) (defining "adjustment" and "recovery"); Reves
v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 77 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (defining "maturity"); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S.
215, 259 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining
"regularly").
183. 28 U.S. 222, 230 (1830).
184. 48 U.S. 283, 501 n.* (1849) (Daniel, J., dissenting).
185. See THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ITs BEGINNINGS & ITS
JUSTICES 1790-1991, at 78 (1991) [hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT: ITS
BEGINNINGS].
186. See id. at 104.
187. 68 U.S. 456, 473 n.13 (1863).
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the dictionary in four other decisions88 in his twenty-eight
years on the Court.'89
Several notable members of the Court never cited
dictionaries during their tenure on the Court, including Jus-
tices Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo. Over the years, how-
ever, sixty-four Justices have cited to the dictionary at least
once. 9" Of this group, eighteen Justices-or more than one-
quarter-cited to a dictionary in only one opinion during
their Court tenure. 9' Other Justices, however, have relied on
the dictionary far more often.
During his thirty-four years on the Court, Justice
Brennan used the dictionary in thirty-one opinions to define
forty-three terms.9 No Justice appointed before Justice
Brennan comes close to matching this total.'93 However, the
number of times Justice Brennan relied on the- dictionary
pales in comparison to some current members of the Court.
Justice Scalia has relied on the dictionary more times
than any other Justice in the history of the Court. In his
twelve years on the Court, Justice Scalia has cited a diction-
ary in fifty opinions to define sixty-five terms.'94 Justice
Stevens is a distant second, having cited a dictionary in
thirty-five opinions to define forty-four terms during his
twenty-three year tenure on the Court.9
Moreover, when comparing frequency rates in terms of
usage per year, nearly every current member of the Court
has surpassed the previous record. Excluding present mem-
bers of the Court, Justice Blackmun cited a dictionary most
frequently, citing a dictionary on average in one opinion per
year to define one and a half terms per year.' Of the present
Court, only Chief Justice Rehnquist"' and Justice Kennedy'
188. See Kring v. State, 107 U.S. 221, 227 (1883) (defining "ex post facto");
Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 143-44 (1880) (Miller, J., dissenting)
(defining "suit"); Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664 (1874) (defining "tax'); Ex
Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 33, 387, 392-93 (1866) (Miller, J., dissenting) (defining
"attainder" and "punish").
189. See THE SUPREME COURT: ITS BEGINNINGS, supra note 185, at 120.
190. See generally infra Appendix B (chronicling individual Justices'
dictionary usage).
191. See generally infra Appendix B.
192. See infra Appendix B.
193. See infra Appendix B.
194. See infra Appendix B.
195. See infra Appendix B.
196. See infra Appendix B.
197. See infra Appendix B. During his 26 years on the Court (first as an
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have frequency rates lower than Justice Blackmun. Justices
Scalia, Thomas and Souter are the current members of the
Court who rely on dictionaries most frequently. During his
Court tenure, Justice Scalia has cited a dictionary in 4.17
opinions per year to define 5.42 terms per year;"' Justice
Thomas has a frequency rate of 3.57 opinions to define 4.14
terms per year °0 and Justice Souter has a frequency rate of
2.0 opinions to define 2.63 terms per year.0 ' At this pace, if
these three Justices each serve as long as Justice Blackmun,
Justice Scalia will have relied on the dictionary in 100
opinions to define 130 terms; Justice Thomas will have relied
on the dictionary in 86 opinions to define 99 terms and
Justice Souter will have relied on the dictionary in 48
opinions to define 63 terms.
E. Dictionaries Cited by the Court
Just as the use of dictionaries has varied from Justice to
Justice, the dictionaries relied on by the Justices also have
varied. Through the 1997-1998 term, the Court has relied on
approximately 120 different dictionaries overall.0 2 Certain
dictionaries, however, are used far more often than others.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary has been
Associate and then as Chief Justice), Justice Rehnquist has cited the dictionary in
25 cases to define 33 terms, resulting in "frequency of dictionary usage rates"
(hereinafter "frequency rates") of 0.96 cases per year and 1.27 terms per year. See
infra Appendix B (discussing Justice and Chief Justice Rehnquist's dictionary
usage).
198. See infra Appendix B. In his eleven years on the Court, Justice Kennedy
has cited a dictionary in seven cases to define nine terms, resulting in frequency
rates of 0.64 cases per year and 0.82 terms per year. See infra Appendix B
(discussing Justice Kennedy's dictionary usage).
199. See infra Appendix B.
200. See infra Appendix B.
201. See infra Appendix B.
202. See infra Appendix C (chronicling the frequency with which the Court
has used particular dictionaries). If editions of dictionaries were counted
separately, the number would be much larger. At times it is unclear to which
dictionary the Court is citing. For example, on several occasions the Court has
cited to Webster's without stating to which of the many versions and editions it is
citing. In other cases, the Justice authoring the decision did not indicate what
dictionary was cited. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J.) (plurality opinion) (defining "initiated" in "the ordinary dictionary
sense"); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(defining "hideous" by citing "[tihe dictionary"); McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate
Co., 283 U.S. 488, 491 (1931) (noting alternative definitions of "candy... as the
dictionary also suggests").
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the Court's most popular general usage dictionary, appear-
ing in 102 opinions through the 1997-1998 term. 20 Webster's
Second International Dictionary, the next most cited general
usage dictionary, has been relied on in a total of eighty-eight
opinions.2 4 Other frequently cited dictionaries are various
editions of the Oxford English Dictionary (forty-six opinions);
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (twenty-two
opinions) and Worcester's Dictionary (fifteen opinions).2 The
Century Dictionay, although used infrequently since 1945,
was an early favorite, having been cited in thirty-six
opinions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.
20 6
The most cited law dictionaries are the two most recent
editions of Black's Law Dictionary. Through the 1997-1998
term, the Justices have cited Black's sixth edition sixty-one
times and Black's fifth edition forty-six times.2" The next
most frequently cited law dictionary is Bouvier's LawDictionar .m various editions, having been cited in thirty-six
opinions."' The Justices have used a number of other law
dictionaries, but such use is rare and generally predates
Black's.20 For example, Burrill's Law Dictionary has been
cited four times, Blount's A Law Dictionary has been cited
three times and Brown's Law Dictionary has been cited
twice.
210
On a few occasions, the Court has relied on subject
matter dictionaries other than a law dictionary. For exam-
ple, in Shields v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 21 1 the
Court used The Car-Builder's Dictionary to define "running
board."12 And, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,1 0 Justice
Marshall in dissent used The New Grove Dictionary of Music
& Musicians to define "tonality."
21 4
203. See infra Appendix C.
204. See infra Appendix C.
205. See infra Appendix C.
206. See infra Appendix C.
207. See infra Appendix C.
208. See infra Appendix C.
209. See infra Appendix C.
210. See infra Appendix C.
211. 350 U.S. 318 (1956).
212. Id. at 326 n.2 (quoting THE CAR-BUiLDERs' CYCLOPEDIA (19th ed. 1953)).
213. 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at at 810 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting THE NEW GRovE
DICTIONARY OF MUSIC & MUSICIANS (S. Sadie ed., 1980)).
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III. A CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S GENERAL PROCESS FOR
USING DICTIONARIES
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin
of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used. 216
Although the Court has relied on dictionaries for nearly
170 years, there are few articulated principles to provide
guidance to the Court's use of dictionaries. Generally, how-
ever, the Court must go through several steps in using a
dictionary, each of which may alter the outcome of the case.
First, the Court must determine which word or phrase
should be defined. Second, the proper type of dictionary must
be selected (be it a general usage dictionary, a law dic-
tionary, a subject matter dictionary or a foreign language
dictionary). Third, once the type of dictionary is selected, the
Court must identify a specific dictionary of that type. Fourth,
once that specific dictionary is selected, the appropriate edi-
tion or editions must be selected. Finally, the appropriate
definition must be chosen. The Court has a great deal of
discretion in each step of this process and, at times, decisions
made during each step have determined the outcome of a
case.216 Unfortunately, each step in this process has resulted
in debate and confusion.
A. Selecting a Word
Although the decision regarding which word or phrase to
define may not appear to be difficult, it can, nonetheless,
cause serious disagreement among the Justices. Generally,
the issues in a given case should help define and narrow the
inquiry. For example, a defendant being criminally prose-
cuted may argue that she does not fall under the terms of the
relevant statute, and her attorney will focus on the relevant
word or phrase. The prosecution will no doubt respond, and
215. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.).
216. The fact that each step in this process can have a powerful influence on
the outcome of a case may explain why courts do not allow jurors to consult
dictionaries while they are deliberating. See, e.g., United States v. Aguirre, 108
F.3d 1284, 1288-90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 335 (1997); Yannacopoulos
v. General Dynamics Corp., 75 F.3d 1298, 1304 (8th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied;
United States v. Gillespie, 61 F.3d 457, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Kupau, 781 F.2d 740, 744-45 (9th Cir. 1986).
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the Court will identify the word or phrase to be defined.
As an example, federal law makes it a crime and pro-
vides for an enhanced sentence where a defendant "during
and in relation to any... [federal] drug trafficking crime...
uses or carries a firearm."217 If a defendant disposed of a
firearm at some point during a drug trafficking crime, the
defense might focus on the meaning of the word "during." If a
toy gun was used, the focus would be on the term "firearm."
And, if the defendant had the gun in the trunk of her car, the
focus might be on the term "carries."218
At times, however, the Court struggles over which word
it must define. For example, in County of Washington v.
Gunther,219 the Court addressed a discrimination claim by
female prison guards.220 At issue was the meaning of the
Bennett Amendment 21 to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, and whether sex-based wage discrimination claims
could be brought even though no member of the opposite sex
217. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994).
218. Compare United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 622 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding that the defendant had "carried" a firearm because he had it
within reach in the car), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 136 (1996), with United States v.
Molina, 102 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that if defendant moves a car
containing both guns and drugs, the "carrying" requirement is met regardless of
whether the firearm was within the defendantfs reach), and United States v.
Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1260 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant "carried"
the firearm even though it was out of reach because he had dominion and control
over it), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 443 (1996), overruled on other grounds, United
States v. Holland, 116 F.3d 1353 (10th Cir. 1997). The Court recently resolved
this issue, holding that "carries a firearm" applies "to a person who knowingly
possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove
compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies." Muscarello v.
United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1913-14 (1998). In Muscarello, both the majority
and the dissent relied on dictionaries to support their conclusions. See id. at 1914-
15 (defining "carry" and "carry arms or weapons"); id. at 1921 nn.2 & 5 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (defining "carry," "carry arms or weapons" and "carries a firearm").
219. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
220. Id. at 166.
221. The Bennett Amendment to Title VII provides:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter
for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining
the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to
employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the
provisions of section 206(d) of title 29.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994); see City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
711-12 & n.22 (1978) (noting that "[sihortly before the enactment of Title VII in
1964, Senator Bennett proposed an amendment providing that a compensation
differential based on sex would not be unlawful if it was authorized by [29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d), known as] the Equal Pay Act").
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held an equal and higher paying job.222 The Court noted that
the Bennett Amendment barred "sex-based wage discrimi-
nation claims under Title VII where the pay differential is
'authorized' by the Equal Pay Act."223 In determining the
meaning of the term "authorized," the Court looked to the
dictionary definition of "authorize" and concluded that the
only claims barred were those that were "affirmatively
authorized" by the Equal Pay Act. 24
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist also referred to the diction-
ary.215 Justice Rehnquist, however, used the dictionary to
define the term "authorized," which was used in the statute,
instead of the term "authorize," which was defined by the
majority.2 26 In part because "authorized" had a more permis-
sive definition, Justice Rehnquist came to a conclusion con-
trary to the majority's decision.227
Similarly, in United States v. James,228 the Justices dis-
agreed about the word to be defined. James involved damage
claims arising out of accidents by recreational users of fed-.•229 isu
eral flood control project reservoirs. The issue was whether
the United States was immune from damages under the
Flood Control Act of 1928,23 which provides that .'[n]o
liability of any kind shall attach to or rest on the United
States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at
222. See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 167-68.
223. Id. at 168-69.
224. Id. at 169 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 122 (5th ed. 1979)). The Court
reinforced its interpretation by citing to WESTEs'S THD NEW INL DICTIONARY.
See id. at 169 n.9 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 147 (1976)).
225. See id. at 198 (Rehnqusit, J. dissenting).
226. See id. at 198 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIoNARY 169 (4th ed. 1968)).
227. "Black's Law Dictionary 169 (4th ed. 1968) defines 'authorized' to mean
'to permit a thing to be done in the future.' " Id. at 198 n.10 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 169 (4th ed. 1968)). Justice
Rehnquist's reliance on the dictionary seems more legitimate than the majority's
because Rehnquist looked to a definition of the specific statutory term, whereas
the majority looked to a different tense of the statutory term. Nevertheless,
Justice Rehnquist, in making his argument, did not primarily rely on the
dictionary, and he criticized the Court's heavy reliance upon the dictionary defi-
nition of the term. Noting that the Court relied too heavily upon the dictionary,
Justice Rehnquist noted that "the Court should instead attempt to implement the
legislative intent of Congress." Id. at 198 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
228. 478 U.S. 597 (1986).
229. See id. at 599-602.
230. Mississippi River Flood Control Act (Flood Control Act of 1928), 33
U.S.C. §§ 702a-702m, 704 (1994).
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any place."'' " The Court held that the statute barred the
claims because "damages" included damage to persons.232
Quoting dictionaries for support,"' the Court found that the
language was clear but also looked to legislative history for
additional support.
23 4
In dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority for
defining "damages" when the statute used the term "dam-
age."235 Justice Stevens noted that "damage" traditionally is
used to describe a harm to property instead of harm to a
person, citing, among other sources, Bouvier's Law Diction-
ay.3 6 Justice Stevens also noted that the authority used by
the majority-including Black's Law Dictionary-also distin-
guished between "damage" and "damages."237
Gunther and James are just two examples of the Court's
inability to agree on the most basic issue implicated when
the Court uses a dictionary: what word must be defined? At
times, the disagreement has been even more subtle.3 8
Gunther and James, however, demonstrate that even the
simple process of isolating the specific term or phrase to be
defined can cause disagreement and controversy.
B. Selecting the Proper Type of Dictionary
After isolating the word to be defined, the Court must
determine what type of dictionary to use. Although general
usage dictionaries may be helpful to determine how a non-
technical term could be used, the general focus in editing
such dictionaries means that they are likely to be inadequate
to define legal terms of art. For example, the 1965 un-
abridged edition of Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionary apparently had no attorney as an editor, associate
231. James, 478 U.S. at 604 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 702c (1994)).
232. Id. at 605, 612.
233. Id. at 605 n.6 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 571
(1961); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 351 (5th ed. 1979)).
234. Id. at 606-12.
235. Id. at 615-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 615 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 749
(8th ed. 1914)).
237. Id. at 616 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
238. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 178 (1993) and id. at
187-88 (Souter, J., dissenting) (containing disagreement between majority and
dissenting opinions as to whether word "conduct" in RICO provision was used as
a verb or as a noun).
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editor, assistant editor or editorial assistant.239 Webster's
Third brought in two "outside consultants" to address issues
of "law": then Harvard Law School Dean and Professor
Erwin N. Griswold and Harvard Law School student and
lawyer Frank E. Tuit I.J2° Without slighting either of these
two individuals, it is doubtful that one law professor and one
lawyer could research and revise thousands of legal phrases
with the same precision of an entire board of editors for a
law dictionary.
Moreover, it is difficult to determine when a common
term becomes a term of art or, alternatively, even to distin-
guish between common terms and terms of art. Answering
such an inquiry should involve determining the purpose and
context of the phrase used, both of which may be issues that
are subject to deeply held differences of opinion. As a result,
the Court has periodically struggled with the question of
which type of dictionary to use.
For example, in Sullivan v. Stroop,242 the Court ad-
dressed the question of whether certain Social Security
payments were "child support payments."24 Specifically, the
Court in Stroop decided "whether 'child support payments'
was to be defined in accordance with its technical legal
meaning, which arguably is restricted to court-awarded pay-
ments from a parent or guardian, or its ordinary language
meaning, which arguably includes government benefits for
the purpose of child support as well."244 The Court found the
provision to be a term of art and therefore looked to the
technical meaning, citing Black's Law Dictionary, while not-
ing that even the ordinary language meaning of the term
supported the result.245 In dissent, however, Justice Stevens
rejected the term of art approach and relied on "ordinary
English usage," 6 which, presumably, would suggest reliance
239. WEBSTEI'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 8a-10a (3d ed. unabr. 1965).
240. Id. at 12a, 14a. By comparison, the areas of "Girl Scouts," "Girl Guiding"
and "Camp Fire Girls" each had one outside consultant as did 'Mosses and
Liverworts," "Pipe Organs" and "Rugs." Id. at 10a-14a.
241. See BOUvIER's LAW DICTIONARY xiv-xxviii (Rawles 3d Rev. 1914) (listing
54 attorneys who, among others, assisted in editing the 1867 edition of Bouvier's
Law Dictionary).
242. 496 U.S. 478 (1990).
243. Id. at 479-80.
244. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating
Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. 231,244.
245. See Sullivan, 496 U.S. at 482.
246. Id. at 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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on a general usage dictionary rather than a law dictionary.
Stroop shows that even selecting the type of dictionary to be
used can cause disagreement, primarily centering around
whether the word to be defined should be deemed a term of
art.
C. Selecting a Specific Dictionary
After determining which word or phrase is to be defined
and the type of dictionary to be used, the choice of which
specific dictionary should be relied upon has caused further
disagreement and has, at times, affected the outcome of the
case. Although the definition of a word may not vary much
from one dictionary to another, even slight definitional varia-
tions can have a significant impact on how a case is decided.
For example, in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,2 the majority and the dissent
used different dictionaries to arrive at different conclusions.
At issue in that case was whether the Eighth Amendment's
excessive fines clause applied to punitive damage awards in
cases between private parties.248 The majority held that the
Eighth Amendment did not apply,"9 citing several diction-
aries for the proposition that "at the time of the drafting and
ratification of the [Eighth] Amendment, the word 'fine' was
understood to mean a payment to a sovereign as a punish-
ment."25 In dissent, however, Justice O'Connor cited other
dictionaries to support the conclusion that, when the Eighth
Amendment was enacted, the meaning of the word "fine"
was ambiguous.25' Specifically, Justice O'Connor noted that,
"[in defining the word 'fine,' some 18thcentu. dictionaries
did not mention to whom the money was paid."
247. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
248. Id. at 262-63.
249. Id. at 274-76.
250. Id. at 265 & n.6 (citing 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 126b (1812); 2 T.
CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIoNARY (2d ed. 1771)
(nonpaginated); 1 T. TOMLINS, LAW DICTIONARY 796-99 (1836); 1 J. BOUVIER, LAW
DICTIONARY 525 (4th ed. 1852)). Justice Blackmun noted that the cited dic-
tionaries were consistent with CUNNINGHAM'S LAw-DICTIONARY, which defined
'fines for offences' as 'amends, pecuniary punishment, or recompence for an
offence committed against the King and his laws, or against the Lord of a
manor.' "Id. (quoting 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, supra).
251. Id. at 195 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
252. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting T. SHERIDAN, A DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796) (unpaginated) (stating that a fine was "a mulct
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Farmer v. Brennan25 3 (also an Eighth Amendment case)
provides another example. The majority in Farmer held,
without citing a dictionary, that "a prison official may be
held liable for denying humane conditions of confinement
only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of
serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it." 54 Two concurring Justices,
however, used different dictionaries to define the same word
to support their divergent positions. In one concurrence,
Justice Blackmun argued that the Court's definition of
"punishment" in a prior case (requiring a prison official to
intend harm) was unduly narrow.55 Citing dictionaries,
Justice Blackmun argued that "punishment" "does not ne-
cessarily imply a culpable state of mind on the part of an
identifiable punisher."256 In another concurrence, Justice
Thomas used definitions from different dictionaries to sup-
port his argument that "punishment" can only be imposed by
judges or juries, and not by jailors.257 Therefore he argued,
the Eighth Amendment should not apply at all.2. 
Another recent case involved a more direct dispute about
which dictionary should be used. In MCI Telecommunica-
tions Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 2519 the
[or] pecuniary punishment"); S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785) (unpaginated) (stating that a fine was "a mulct [or]
pecuniary punishment," a "penalty," or "money paid for any exemption or
liberty"); C. ICHARDSON, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 796
(1839) ("any thing (as a sum or money) paid at the end, to make an end,
termination or conclusion of a suit, of a prosecution")).
253. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
254. Id. at 847.
255. See id. at 854 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (discussing Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991)).
256. Id. at 854-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INT'L DICTIONARY 1843 (1961); WEBSTER'S NEW INTIL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1736 (1923)). Justice Blackmun noted that WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L
DICTIONARY defined "punishment" as [any pain, suffering, or loss inflicted on or
suffered by a person because of a crime or evil-doing." Id. at 855 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1736 (1923)).
257. See id. at 859 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1234 (6th ed. 1990); T. SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1780)). Justice Thomas noted that Sheridan defines "punishment" as
"[any infliction imposed in vengeance of a crime." Id. at 859 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (quoting T. SHERiDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1780)).
258. See id. at 859 (Thomas, J., concurring).
259. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
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Court considered whether a statute allowing the Federal
Communications Commission to "modify any requirement"
authorized that agency to make basic, fundamental changes
in the statutory regulatory scheme.26° Finding that the FCC
did not have authority to make such changes, Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, stated that "[v]irtually every diction-
ary we are aware of says that 'to modify' means to change
moderately or in minor fashion."261 Justice Scalia noted that
the petitioners relied on Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, which included among the meanings of "modify,"
"'to make a basic or important change in.' 262 That de-finition,
however, was dismissed as being "out-of-step" with the other
dictionaries that contained different definitions of the
term,263 and as being an aberration.264 Justice Scalia also
noted that the relevant statutory language was enacted in
1934, years before Webster's Third was first published in the
early 1960s.6 5
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the FCC's action
properly fit within the meaning of the word "modify."2 6 Al-
though he downplayed the role of dictionaries in statutory
interpretation,2 6 1 Justice Stevens nevertheless reasoned that
"[tlhe Court seizes upon a particular sense of the word
'modify' at the expense of another, long-established meaning
that fully supports the Commission's position."268 Justice
Stevens quoted Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, among oth-
ers, as defining "modify" to mean "to limit or reduce in
extent or degree."' 269
260. See id. at 225.
261. Id. (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236
(2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER'S THnM NEW INTL DICTIONARY 1452 (1976); 9 OxFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1989); BLACKS LAw DIcTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
262. Id. (quoting WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTIL DICTIONARY 1452 (1976)).
263. Id. at 226-27. "Webster's Third itself defines 'modify' to connote both
(specifically) major change and (specifically) minor change. It is hard to see how
that can be. When the word 'modify' has come to mean both 'to change in some
respects' and to change fundamentally' it will in fact mean neither of those
things." Id. at 227.
264. Id. at 228 n.3.
265. See id. at 228.
266. See id. at 241-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
267. "Dictionaries can be useful aids in statutory interpretation, but they are
no substitute for close analysis of what words mean as used in a particular
statutory context." Id. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
268. Id. at 241-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
269. See id. at 242 & n.5 (Stevens J., dissenting) (quoting WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 628 (4th ed. 1934); 9 OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952
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These examples demonstrate that the Court's selection
of a dictionary can determine the outcome of a case. Al-
though one commentator has argued that the more potential
definitions that the Court reviews in order to define a word,
the better,7 the Court's analysis to date and the broad range
of dictionaries used27' do not demonstrate that the Court is
following a particularly principled method in selecting spe-
cific dictionaries.
D. Selecting a Specific Dictionary Edition
Selecting the specific edition of a dictionary also can be
critical as well as controversial. In construing constitutional
provisions, Justice Scalia has suggested that the Court
should look at dictionaries from the time of the Consti-
tutional Convention in order to determine the meaning of a
phrase or clause.272 Justice Thomas has used similar reason-
ing in selecting dictionary editions to interpret the Constitu-
tion.23 In construing statutory provisions, there is some
consensus that the Court should look to dictionaries from the
time the relevant statute was enacted.274 More specifically, in
(2d ed. 1989); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236 (2d ed.
1987); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTL DICTIONARY 1452 (1981); WEBSTER'S NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 739 (1973); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 544 (1963); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1577 (2d ed.
1934); N. WEBSTER, AMERICAN DIcTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). In
the majority opinion, however, Justice Scalia noted that the versions of
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DCTIONARY published after 1949 are essentially
abridgments of the "out-of-step" WEBSTER'S THIR. Id. at 226-28 & n.3.
270. See Weis, supra note 4, at 973-76. That Note argues that, because mean-
ing is difficult to discern, the complicated process of defining words should not be
limited by reference to a single dictionary that contains few definitions. See id. at
974. Rather, "[ejach lawyer should be armed with dictionaries, novels, poems, and
anything else that might convince the judge." Id. at 973.
271. See infra Appendix C.
272. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 919-20 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 863-64 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 719 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) ("From the time of the founding
to the present, the word 'seizure' [as used in U.S. Const. Amend. IV] has meant a
'taking possession.' ").
273. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
274. See, e.g., Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307 (1992); Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 77 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing "[clontemporaneous editions of legal dictionaries" to
1999] USE OF DICTIONARIES 273
determining what Congress meant in enacting certain
statutory language, it has been suggested that the Court will
look to American dictionaries in existence at the time a
statute was enacted.275
Descriptive contemporaneous American dictionaries may
be helpful to address the question of how terms were
construed prior to a statute's enactment. 76 If it is reasonable
to presume that Congress consulted such dictionaries when a
statute was drafted,"7' contemporaneous American diction-
aries may provide insight into the definition and breadth
Congress intended for specific statutory language. On the
other hand, if it is appropriate to presume that Congress did
not consult a dictionary in drafting the provision in ques-
tion,278 contemporaneous American dictionaries may not pro-
vide much guidance. Moreover, the meanings of words
change over time2 79 and if the question is how an individual
define "maturity" as used in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Mallard v.
United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 301 (1989); Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 598 (1988)
(giving statutory language "its normal meaning" and citing a dictionary "from the
period during which the [statutory provision] was enacted"); McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350, 370-71 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing "law
dictionaries of the era" when statute was enacted).
275. In United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
construing the term "envelope" contained in section 3 of the Act of July 18, 1866
(dealing with authority of customs officials), Justice Stevens stated, "[con-
temporary American dictionaries emphasize the usage of the word as descriptive
of a package or wrapper as well as an ordinary letter."Id. at 629-30.
276. See National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472,
479-80 (1979) ("Those terms had commonly understood meanings before the stat-
ute was enacted.").
277. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 351 n.5 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in result) ("In the realm of statutory construction it is appropriate to
search for meaning in the congressional vocabulary in a lexicon most probably
consulted by Congress [that is, WEBSTER'S NEW INT' DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1934)
(unabridged)]").
278. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 247
(1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that Congress is not composed of
dictionary editors); Aprill, supra note 35, at 299 ("Legislators do not consult
dictionaries or incorporate by reference dictionary definitions in drafting
statutes.").
279. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500 n.10 (1985)
(quoting "lust" as defined in WEBSTER'S NEW INT DICTIONARY (2d ed. unabr.
1949) but "excluding the obsolete meanings"); see also BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
431 (Rawles 3d Rev. 1914) (defining "cat" as a whip "sometimes used for whipping
criminals" but not referring to a feline); id. at 866 (containing, as the sole entry
for "diet": "[a] general assembly is sometimes so called on the continent of
Europe").
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might construe a statute long after its enactment, it would
be appropriate to consult dictionaries published at or shortly
before the time of the facts giving rise to the litigation.28 In
any event, under the Court's current approach, even deter-
mining the proper edition of the dictionary may lead to
additional uncertainty.
E. Selecting a Specific Definition
Once the word to be defined and the specific dictionary to
be used have been selected, the Court is not then left with
the mechanical task of following a single definition set forth
in that dictionary. Indeed, most terms have multiple
definitions, requiring the reader to consider context and
other factors in selecting the proper definition. Unfor-
tunately, the Court has at times looked to the dictionary as
an end point, thereby avoiding the difficult task of selecting
between a variety of choices when attempting to define a
word in context. As a result, Justices have defined the same
word by using the same dictionary but have adopted dif-
ferent alternative definitions to reach contrary conclusions.
For example, in Will v. Michigan Department of State
Police,28' the Court held that neither the State of Michigan
nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons"
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.282 By statute, the word "person" gen-
erally "may extend and be applied to bodies politic and
corporate." 83 Justice White's majority opinion and Justice
Brennan's dissent in Will cited the same dictionaries to
support their conflicting views regarding whether "bodies po-
litic and corporate" included states. Specifically, Justice
White found that the dictionaries suggest "that the phrase
was used to mean corporations, both private and public
(municipal), and not to include the States," and accused the
dissent of reading the phrase too broadly." In dissent,
280. Even then, caution is required as contemporaneous dictionaries may
provide some (but likely could not provide all) of the possible alternative
meanings for a term. See Aprill, supra note 35, at 327 ("no dictionary can be
expected to report all usages, and no dictionary can be current as of its date of
publication").
281. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
282. See id. at 71.
283. See id. at 78 (quoting Dictionary Act of Feb. 25, 1871, § 2, 16 Stat. 431).
284. See id. at 69 (quoting 1 B. ABBOTr, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES
USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879); W. ANDERSON, A
DICTIONARY OF LAW 127 (1893); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (1891); 1 A. BURRILL,
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Justice Brennan wrote that "each and every dictionary cited
by the Court accords a broader realm-one that comfortably,
and in most cases explicitly, includes the sovereign-to this
phrase than the Court gives it today.""5 The difference in
interpretation hinged on whether the "precise" definition or
the more general definition was used."6
Muscarello v. United States"' is another example of the
Justices finding different meanings from the same source. In
Muscarello, the Court construed "uses or carries a firearm"
in a criminal statute imposing a mandatory prison term for
such acts "'during and in relation to' a 'drug trafficking
crime."'288 The majority, in an opinion written by Justice
Breyer, held that "uses or carries a firearm" "applies to a
person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a
vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk
of a car, which the person accompanies."289 Justice Ginsburg's
dissent, however, "read the words to indicate not merely
keeping arms on one's premises or in one's vehicle, but
bearing them in such manner as to be ready for use as a
weapon."29 In coming to these divergent conclusions, both
the majority and the dissent quoted the definition from
Black's Law Dictionary for the phrase "carry arms or
weapons."29' The majority found that Black's definition did
A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 212 (2d ed. 1871)).
285. Id. at 79 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 B. ABBOTr, DICTIONARY OF
TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879); W.
ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 127 (1893); BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 143 (1891);
1 A. BURRiLL, A LAW DICTIONARYAND GLOSSARY 212 (2d ed. 1871)).
286. See id. at 79 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For example, Justice Brennan
quoted one dictionary as stating, "the term body politic is often used in a general
way, as meaning the state or the sovereign power, or the city government,
without implying any distinct express incorporation." Id. (quoting 1 B. ABBOTT,
DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE
155 (1879)). However, Justice White quoted that same dictionary as defining the
term as the "most exact expression" for "public corporation." Id. at 69 n.9 (quoting
1 B. ABBOTr, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH
JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879)). Thus, the interpretation depended upon which
definition within the same dictionary was used.
287. 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998).
288. Id. at 1913 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994)).
289. Id. at 1913-14.
290. Id. at 1920 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 1915 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 214 (6th ed. 1990)); id. at
1921 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (6th ed.
1990)). The complete definition given is "[tlo wear, bear or carry them upon the
person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose of use, or for the purpose
of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in case of a conflict with
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"not purport to limit the 'carrying of arms' to the
circumstances" described and did not "deny that one may
also 'carry a weapon' tied to the saddle of a horse or placed in
a bag in a car." The dissent, however, noted "that the only
law dictionary the Court cites, Black's Law Dictionary,
defines 'carry arms or weapons' restrictively."293 Moreover,
the dissent found that Black's definition was "[s]urely a most
familiar meaning" of "carry arms or weapons." 4 These cases
show that, as with the other steps in the Court's general
process of using dictionaries, selecting a specific definition
for a term can be problematic, at times appears to lack
principled guidance and can determine the outcome of a
case.
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S USE OF SUBJECT MATTER
CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES INVOLVING DICTIONARIES
Almost any word or phrase may be rendered vague and ambiguous
by dissection with a semantic scalpel .... [But such an approach]
amounts to little more than verbal calisthenics.
29 5
Along with the Court's inconsistent approach to using
dictionaries, the Court has not expressly set forth many
guiding principles to decide when or how to use the
dictionary to define terms. Indeed, one commentator has
opined that "[nlo apparent pattern exists to the Court's cita-
tion of general and legal dictionaries."29" Furthermore, the
Court has suggested different approaches in construing con-
stitutional, statutory, contractual, judicial and foreign terms.
Unfortunately, analyzing the express principles set forth in
cases from these different subject matter areas does not yield
much additional guidance for when and how the Court uses
the dictionary to define terms.
another person." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 214 (6th ed. 1990).
292. Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1915.
293. Id. at 1921 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 1921 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
295. Cole v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 238, 240 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
296. Aprill, supra note 35, at 310.
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A. Constitutional Terms
It is perhaps significant that the Court has relied on
dictionaries in comparatively few cases interpreting the Con-
stitution. Moreover, as applicable here, there is little express
discussion of using the dictionary in defining constitutional
terms. This apparent reluctance to rely on a dictionary in
defining constitutional terms appears to be attributable to
an opinion by Justice Holmes.
In Gompers v. United States,97 the Court reversed crim-
inal contempt convictions arising out of a labor boycott and
rejected the proposition that the constitutional right to a jury
trial did not apply to contempt charges. 98 In doing so, Justice
Holmes observed:
[T]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formu-
las having their essence in their form; they are organic, living
institutions transplanted from English soil. The[ir] significance is
vital, not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the
words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the
line of their growth. 
2 9 9
In the constitutional realm, little of consequence has been
written since this opinion. In a dissenting opinion in Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,"' Justice
Brennan echoed Justice Holmes' view that "the dictionary is
hardly the final word on the meaning of constitutional
language."
301
More recently, Justices Scalia and Thomas have
advocated using dictionaries for historical guidance in con-
struing constitutional provisions. For example, in a concur-
ring opinion in United States v. Lopez,"°2 Justice Thomas
297. 233 U.S. 604 (1914).
298. Id. at 607, 610, 613; see also Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221
U.S. 418, 451 (1911) (holding that a proceeding in equity for civil contempt-
consisting of doing that which was forbidden by an injunction-must be dismissed
without prejudice where there has been a complete settlement between the
parties of all the matters involved in the original equity cause).
299. Gompers, 233 U.S. at 610.
300. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
301. Id. at 468 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Curiously, however, Justice
Brennan then added that it was "noteworthy that Webster's includes, as one of
the two accepted definitions of 'prohibit! [as used in the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause], 'to prevent from doing something.' " Id. (quoting WEBSTE'S
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIoNARY (1983)).
302. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not grant
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cited several dictionaries to define "commerce" as used in the
Commerce Clause."' In doing so, Justice Thomas relied on
dictionaries published around the time the Constitution was
drafted 30 4 as well as a more recent dictionary discussing the
etymology of the word 05 to argue that the Constitution uses
the word "commerce" in a narrower sense than the Court's
case law suggested."'
This use of the dictionary to define constitutional terms,
however, is an exception to the rule. The Court has only in-
frequently relied on the dictionary to determine what con-
stitutional terms mean or how such provisions should be
construed. As a result, little guidance for using dictionaries
to define constitutional terms has emerged.
B. Statutory Terms
Over the years, statutory construction generally has cen-
tered around the so-called "plain meaning" of statutory
terms. °7 Some cases state that, absent express congressional
Congress the authority to prohibit gun possession within 1000 feet of a school).
303. See id. at 585-86 (Thomas, J., concurring).
304. See id. (quoting 1 S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
361 (4th ed. 1773); N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(26th ed. 1789); T. SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(6th ed. 1796)); see also supra note 272 and accompanying text (citing cases where
Justice Scalia has suggested the Court look at dictionaries from the time of the
Constitutional Convention in order to interpret Constitutional provisions).
305. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585-86 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 3 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 552 (2d ed. 1989)).
306. See id.
307. A discussion of general construction principles is beyond the scope of this
article. Volumes-indeed shelves-have been written about general construction
principles used by, and advocated for, the Court. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen,
"Plain Meaning" Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction,
17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY 401 (1994); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries,
Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POLY 71 (1994); Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994); Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not
Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1993); Peter H. Carroll, HI, Literalism: The United States
Supreme Court's Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25
ST. MARY'S L.J. 143 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the
Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 231; Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POLYr 59 (1988); William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation:
A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOzO L. REV. 799, 804 (1985); Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons
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definition of terms or other similar guidance, °8 the Court
presumes that statutory terms carry their ordinary or
common meaning"--or at least that "ordinary, meanings are
not insignificant in statutory construction."3' Reflecting the
importance of context, however, the Court has noted that
"[t]he circumstances of the enactment of particular legis-
lation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend
words of common meaning to have their literal effect."
3 11
Because of this emphasis on textual construction and the
so-called "plain meaning" of words, dictionaries have played
an increasingly larger role in statutory interpretation."2 Yet,
in construing statutory provisions, the Court has not been
consistent in when and how it decides to cite dictionaries.
Rather, in determining what Congress intended to do by
using certain language, differing views have developed
regarding the proper role of dictionaries.
For example, Justice Harlan wrote that "[i]n the realm of
statutory construction it is appropriate to search for meaning
in the congressional vocabulary in a lexicon most probably
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). The focus of
the discussion in this Article is limited to the few construction principles set forth
by the Court in turning to the dictionary to construe statutory terms or phrases.
308. See Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199 (1993).
309. See, e.g., Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership,
507 U.S. 380, 394-95 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Smith v. United States,
507 U.S. 197, 199-200 (1993); United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984);
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1979); Perrin v. United States, 444
U.S. 37, 42 (1979); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962); see also
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Ojur job is
to determine whether the ordinary meaning [applies], and if it does not, to ask
whether there is any solid indication in the text or structure of the statute that
something other than ordinary meaning was intended.").
310. Burlington Northern, Inc. v. United States, 459 U.S. 131, 143 n.8 (1982)
(emphasis added).
311. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259,266 (1981) (citations omitted); cf Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410-11 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Court should determine whether any possible meaning of the term to be
construed "suits [the Court's] preconception" of the statute's scope, "and if it does
not, to ask whether there is any solid indication in the text or structure of the
statute that something other than ordinary meaning was intended").
312. "Since [United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989)],
more and more disputes about the meaning of statutes are greeted with citations
to dictionaries." Randolph, supra note 307, at 71-72; see also supra Part II.C
(discussing Court's increasing reliance upon dictionaries in recent years); Aprill,
supra note 35, at 277 (noting that several commentators have remarked on the
Court's increasing use of dictionaries for statutory interpretation); Thomas W.
Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WAsH. U. L.Q.
351, 355 (1994).
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consulted by Congress: 'Webster's Dictionary."'13 In another
case, the Court stated that "[elven trained lawyers may find
it necessary to consult law dictionaries, treatises, and
judicial opinions before they may say with any certainty
what some statutes may compel or forbid."14 On the other
hand, Justice Brennan observed that the Congress enacting
the McCarran-Ferguson Act "was composed of neither
insurance experts nor dictionary editors, "315 negating any
presumption that the Act was drafted in part by referring to
the dictionary. Thus, there is precedent supporting both the
proposition that Congress does and that Congress does not
have the knowledge of a dictionary editor and that, if such
knowledge is attributable, Webster's Dictionary is the source
of which Congress has knowledge.
Where the Court decides that certain statutory language
represents a "term of art," there is some suggestion that the
approach for relying on a dictionary differs from using a
dictionary to define ordinary terms. In a dissent construing a
procedural rule, Justice Brennan wrote that "[clontrary to
the Court's approach, the purposes of the Rule, not diction-
ary definitions, have guided courts in construing this term of
art. 3 16 Three years later, the Court wrote that dictionaries
are of little help in construing terms of art, observing that
"[w]here a phrase in a statute appears to have become a
term of art ... any attempt to break down the term into its
constituent words is not apt to illuminate its meaning."
1
When the Court finds that a term is to be used in its
"common"' or ordinary sense (and not as a term of art), the
Court at times has looked at the context and usage of the
term to see how it should be defined. For example, in con-
struing the term "under" as used in the Equal Access to
313. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 351 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring
in result).
314. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975) (finding "crime against nature" was
not vague and rejecting claim that a facially vague statute cannot be saved by
construction).
315. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 247 (1979)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf. Aprill, supra note 35, at 299 ("legislators do not
consult dictionaries or incorporate by reference dictionary definitions in drafting
statutes").
316. United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102, 125 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority's construction of "disclose" used in Fed. R.
Crim. P. 6(e)).
317. Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 483 (1990).
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Justice Act,318 the Court noted that "[the word 'under' has
many dictionary definitions and must draw its meaning from
its context."319 Stated differently, it is a "fundamental prin-
ciple of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language it-
self) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in
isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is
used."32 ° Similarly, at least at times, the Court recognizes
that the meaning of a term "depends on the purpose with
which it is used in the statute and the legislative history of
that use,"32' noting that "[w]ords, like syllables, acquire
meaning not in isolation but within their context."322
Although the dictionary can be "a necessary, and sometimes
sufficient, aid to the judge confronted with the task of con-
struing an opaque act of Congress," 23 in most cases, the
Court "must probe more deeply to avoid a patently bizarre
result."
24
Consistent with these isolated proclamations, the Court
generally recognizes that usage and meaning are not
necessarily synonymous: "One definition of a word does not
express its whole meaning or necessarily determine the
intention of its use."3 25 A corollary to this proposition is that
alternative dictionary definitions "each making some sense
under the statute . . . indicate that the statute is open to
interpretation. Few phrases in a complex scheme of regula-
tion are so clear as to be beyond the need for interpretation
when applied in a real context." 26 In such a case, "[r]ather
318. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(i) (1988).
319. Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991).
320. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993).
321. Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 507 (1941) (construing "sale" after
citing dictionary for proposition that word can have many meanings).
322. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281, 319 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part & dissenting in part); accord Reves v. Ernest & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 178
(1993) ("context is important).
323. Board of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 270-71 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
324. Id.
325. Osborne v. San Diego Land & Town Co., 178 U.S. 22, 38 (1900); see also
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1915 (1998) (finding that dictionary
definitions did "not purport to limit the 'carrying of arms' to the circumstances"
described).
326. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407,
418 (1992) (citation omitted). Justice Stevens echoed this thought:
Instead of mechanically repeating earlier dictionary definitions of the
word 'relate' as its only guide to decision in an important and difficult
area of statutory construction, the Court should pause to consider,
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than 'make a fortress out of the dictionary,' the Court should
instead attempt to implement the legislative intent of Con-
gress. 3 27 Similarly, the Court recently observed that when
"[if] aced with a choice between our own precedent and Black's
Law Dictionary, we adhere to the former." 8
The Court also appears to acknowledge that there is a
temporal component to defining statutory terms. If the issue
to be determined is how an ordinary person would construe
the phrase, the definition when the facts underlying the
litigation occurred should be the proper focus. If, however,
the focus is the intended legislative scope, the meaning of the
term at the time the statute was enacted should be the
proper focus. Not surprisingly, there is precedent to support
both of these alternatives.32
Perhaps due in part to the general and uncertain scope
and application of these guiding principles, some Justices,
including most notably Justice Frankfurter, have questioned
whether dictionaries should be used at all.3 ' Justice
Frankfurter found that specific statutory language usually
was adopted for a reason and could not be defined without
examining context. Specifically, he observed that statutory
language could.not be construed "as though we were dealing
with words in a dictionary rather than statutory direc-
first, the wisdom of the basic rule disfavoring federal pre-emption of
state laws, and second, the specific concerns identified in the legislative
history as the basis for federal pre-emption.
District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 138
(1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
327. Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 198 n.10 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148
F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), affd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945)).
328. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S.
380, 396 n.14 (1993).
329. Compare Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 61-62 n.3 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (examining what a jury of lay persons would have understood at the
time the provision was enacted; "There is not the slightest question that a jury of
lay-persons would have understood the phrase [malice in the 1870s as requiring
actual ill-will, desire to injure, or other improper motive on the part of the
defendant.... [Wanton] would have been understood by laymen to require some
sort of evil or dissolute intention"), with Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 351
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result) (referring to WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY to
determine how Congress intended the meaning of a term).
330. Curiously, however, Justice Frankfurter also wrote the opinion
containing the most extensive use of the dictionary in the history of the Court. See
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 517, 519-27 nn.42-48 & app. (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment).
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tions."331 Justice Frankfurter further wrote that a statutory
scheme was
not merely a collection of words for abstract annotation out of the
dictionary. The process of judicial construction must be mindful of
the history of the legislation, of the purpose which infused it, of
the difficulties which were encountered in effectuating this pur-
pose, of the aims of those most active in relieving these diffi-
culties.
33 2
Justice Stevens, who frequently cites the dictionary, 3
recently echoed this point by harshly criticizing the Court's
reliance on dictionary definitions.
Against all these arguments the Court interposes Noah Webster's
famous dictionary. It is a massive tome but no match for the
weight the Court would put upon it. The Court relies heavily on
the dictionary's definition of "curriculum." That word, of course, is
not the Act's; moreover, the word "noncurriculum" is not in the
dictionary. Neither Webster nor Congress has authorized us to
assume that "noncurriculum" is a precise antonym of the word
"curriculum." "Non-plus," for example, does not mean "minus" and
it would be incorrect to assume that a "nonentity" is not an
"entity" at all.334
These divergent opinions show that, when construing statu-
tory provisions, the Court's analysis of when and how to use
a dictionary lacks consistency and does little to provide any
real guidance.
C. Judicial Terms
From time to time, the Court must decipher what an-
other court meant in using specific language. In Arave v.
Creech,335 the Court created a presumption for such occasions
by making an analogy to statutory construction: 'We assume
that legislators use words in their ordinary, everyday senses,
331. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 849-50 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., on denial
of petition for rehearing).
332. Reed v. Pennsylvania R.R., 351 U.S. 502, 510 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
333. See infra Appendix B.
334. Board of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 291 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (construing Equal Access Act, 20
U.S.C. § 4071-72 (1984)).
335. 507 U.S. 463 (1993).
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and there is no reason to suppose that judges do other-
wise."336 In Creech, the Court found that an aggravating
factor for capital sentencing--"utter disregard for human
life"-as construed by Idaho courts was not unconstitu-
tionally vague.337 In doing so, the Court relied in part on the
dictionary definitions used by the Idaho courts in interpre-
ting the meaning of that phrase.338
Unsatisfied, Justice Blackmun dissented, noting that
"[v]ague terms do not suddenly become clear when they are
defined by reference to other vague terms."339 Justice
Blackmun observed that the very thrust of a vagueness chal-
lenge precludes using a dictionary: "The entire point of the
challenge is that the language's susceptibility to a variety of
interpretations is what makes it (facially) unconstitution-
al." If it is necessary to use a dictionary, then the language
of the aggravating factor does not have one clear meaning.
The majority points out that the first definition in Webster's
Dictionary under the entry "cold-blooded" is "marked by absence of
warm feelings: without consideration, compunction, or clemency."
If Webster's rendition of the term's ordinary meaning is to be
credited, then Idaho has singled out murderers who act without
warm feelings: those who act without consideration, compunction,
or clemency. Obviously that definition is no more illuminating
than the adjective "pitiless" as defined by the majority. What
murderer does act with consideration of compunction or clemen-
cy?
341
Although noting that "cold-blooded" is a term of art, Justice
Blackmun questioned whether that determination could al-
ter the analysis, finding that "[t]he line between the 'ordin-
ary' and the 'legal' meaning of cold-blooded.., is not always
336. Id. at 472.
337. Id. at 471.
338. See id. at 476. The Court reasoned that the term "cold-blooded" provided
sufficient narrowing under the Eighth Amendment because not all murders are
"cold-blooded," and thus not all murderers would be eligible for the death penalty
under that aggravating factor. Id. at 475-76. The Court noted that "cold-blooded"
means "emotionless," and that some murders are not "cold-blooded" because some
murderers do exhibit emotion, such as anger. See id. at 476.
339. Id. at 489 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 693-94 n.16 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Cartwright v.
Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1489 (10th Cir. 1987))).
340. Id. at 482.
341. Id. at 481-82 (citations omitted).
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obvious."342 Thus, dictionary definitions broadened rather
than narrowed the possible construction of the phrase. Fur-
thermore, the legal, as opposed to ordinary, meaning of the
phrase (if such a dichotomy could exist) did not alter the
ultimate analysis.43 Unfortunately, as Creech demonstrates,
the Court's approach to using dictionaries in construing
judicial language suffers from the same flaws, and perhaps
even more uncertainty, than the approach used in construing
statutory terms.
D. Contractual Terms
In construing contract language, the Court seldom cites
to the dictionary and, on at least one occasion, suggested
that such reliance would be improper. The Court in United
Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co.3"
held that contractually contemplated arbitration should have
been ordered.345 In a concurrence, Justice Brennan eschewed
reliance on a dictionary:
The meaning of the arbitration promise is not to be found simply
by reference to the dictionary definitions of the words the parties
use, or by reference to the interpretation of commercial arbitration
clauses. Words in a collective bargaining agreement, rightly
viewed by the Court to be the charter instrument of a system of
industrial self-government, like words in a statute, are to be
understood only by reference to the background which gave rise to
their inclusion.
Thus, following this view, the dictionary must yield to the
342. Id. at 484 n.13.
343. Perhaps as a result of this type of debate, the Court's struggle to define
and clarify aggravating factors generally has led to inconsistent results. See
generally Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance
in Capital Cases-The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REV. 941 (1986); see
also Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of
Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 345, 363-68 (1997); Michael Mello, Florida's "Heinous, Atrocious or
Cruel" Aggravating Circumstance: Narrowing the Class of Death-Eligible Cases
Without Making It Smaller, 13 STETSON L. REv. 523 (1984); Terrill Pollman,
Maynard v. Cartwright: Channeling Arizona's Use of the Heinous, Cruel, or
Depraved Aggravating Circumstance To Impose the Death Penalty, 32 ARIZ. L.
REV. 193 (1990).
344. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
345. Id. at 564, 569.
346. Id. at 570 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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surrounding circumstances and, presumably, other evidence
of the parties' intentions. There is little to suggest that the
Court has any other express view on using a dictionary to
construe contract terms. "'
E. Foreign Terms
Although the Court often looks to dictionaries to define
foreign terms-usually Latin "terms of art"--it frequently
relies on English language dictionaries to determine how the
term has been construed, rather than using foreign language
dictionaries for a translation.348 On a few occasions, however,
the Court has relied on foreign language dictionaries to
translate terms into English. Although this particular con-
text might appear to provide a fairly mechanical and uncon-
troversial use of the dictionary, quite the opposite has oc-
curred.
In 1830, the first time the Court cited a dictionary, it de-
fined "prevariquez" by referring to "[t]he best French dic-
tionary we have." 9 More than a century later, in a dissent in
Ullmann v. United States,35° Justice Douglas unremarkably
cited to Saint-Edme, Dictionnaire De La Penalitg Dans
Toutes Les Parties Du Monde Connu to define "trainer sur la
claie," the long version of 'la claie," which translates to "the
means used to drag the condemned to execution."5 ' More
347. But cf Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank, 88 U.S. 294 (1874) (relying on
dictionary to construe contract term "cattle" to include "hogs").
348. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 954 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (relying
on BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990) to define "stare decisis");
Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 409 n.17 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (relying
on BLACK'S LAw DICTIoNARY 1023 (5th ed. 1979) to define "per curiam"); Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 & n.l1 (1985) (relying on
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979) to define "in pari delicto potior est
conditio defendentis"); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez,
458 U.S. 592, 600 n.8 (1982) (relying on BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) to
define "parens patriae"); Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 441 U.S. 434,
442 (1979) (relying on BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968) to define '"mobilia
sequuntur personam); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 n.10 (1950)
(relying on THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933) to define "habeas corpus").
349. Patapsco Ins. Co. v. Coulter, 28 U.S. 222, 230 (1830) (defining
"prevariquez" in case involving an insurance claim by a shipper against a carrier
for loss of cargo); see also supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
350. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
351. Id. at 453 n.8 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Ullmann concerned the
petitioner's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege during a grand jury
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recently, the Court, in the context of three cases, has demon-
strated somewhat inconsistent approaches to using foreign
language dictionaries.
In Air France v. Saks,52 the Court considered a claim
brought by a passenger for injuries incurred while on an air-
plane and, in the process, struggled to define the word
"accident" as used in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.353
The specific issue in Saks was whether a change in air pres-
sure that caused the airline passenger to lose the ability to
hear was an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17.
After finding that the text of the Convention did not define
"accident,"35 the Court considered sources showing the
term's French legal meaning, stating that it should "give the
specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the
shared expectations of the contracting parties."356 Those
sources, including French dictionaries, showed that "acci-
dent" could mean either "the event of a person's injury" or,
sometimes, "a cause of injury."357
Saks then adopted the latter of these two definitions,
finding that "[tihe text of the Convention consequently sug-
gests that the passenger's injury must be caused by an
unexpected or unusual event." Only then did the Court
consider the negotiating history of the Warsaw Convention,
the parties' conduct and judicial interpretations.359 Conclud-
investigation of alleged members of the Communist party. Id. at 423-24. The
Court upheld the contempt conviction, but Justice Douglas argued in dissent that
the disclosure that a person is a Communist excommunicates him from society.
Id. at 453. As part of this argument, Justice Douglas addressed penalties in
France that produce infamy in law. Id. at 452-53.
352. 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
353. See id. at 399-400.
354. See id.
355. Id. at 399.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 400 n.3 (citing M. LEGRAND, DIcnIoNNAnE USUAL DE DRorr (1931)).
The source for the proposition that "accident" is sometimes used to describe the
cause of the injury was GRAND LAROUSSE DE LANGUE FRANQAISE (1971). See Saks,
470 U.S. at 400. Reliance on this source ignores the proposition that language
usage may have changed since the Warsaw Convention was drafted and ratified
in the 1920s and 1930s. Therefore, the 1971 dictionary is a questionable source-
as a matter of temporal remoteness-to determine "the shared expectations of the
contracting parties." Id. at 399. Cf Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.
491, 501 n.10 (1985) (indicating that the meaning of a word can change over
time).
358. Saks, 470 U.S. at 400.
359. Id.
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ing that these sources were consistent with the dictionary-
based definition, the Court found that the airline was not
liable."
Less than a decade later, the Court again construed
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and, in the process,
retreated from the primary reliance on foreign language
dictionaries in Saks. In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,"'
passengers sued an airline for infliction of emotional distress
due to the loss of power on a flight.362 That dispute required
the Court to decide whether "lesion corporelle" in the French
text of the Article included purely emotional distress." In
holding that purely emotional distress was not included, the
Court acknowledged that a bilingual dictionary suggested
that the Article did not cover such injuries."' The Court,
however, criticized reliance on the dictionary in Saks, finding
"that dictionary definitions may be too general for purposes
of treaty interpretation."3 5 Rather, Floyd considered French
legislation, judicial decisions and scholarly writing to
determine "whether French jurists' contemporary under-
standing of the term 'lesion corporelle' differed from its
translated meaning."366 These sources did not suggest a dif-
ferent meaning, 6 7 nor did the context of Article 17. 8
"[B]ecause a broader interpretation of 'lesion corporelle'
reaching purely mental injuries is plausible, and the term is
both ambiguous and difficult," the Court then turned to
other sources.369 The negotiating history,30 the "primary pur-
360. Id. Curiously, the negotiating history of the Convention appeared to take
a back seat to the dictionary definition even though extensive minutes of the
negotiations were available to the Court. Id.
361. 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
362. Id. at 534-35.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 534-36 (citing J. JERAUTE, VocABLAiRE FRANgAIS-ANGLAIS ET
ANGLAIS FRANgAIS DE TERMS ET LocuTIoNs JURIDIQUES 205 (1953); 3 GRAND
LAROUSSE DE LA LANGUE FRANQAISE 1833 (1987)).
365. Id. at 537 (citations omitted). The Court's concerns were, however,
"partly allayed" because "the dictionary translation accords with the wording used
in the 'two main translations of the 1929 Convention in English.' " Id. at 537
(quoting R. MANKLwIcz, THE LIABILITY REGImE OF THE INT'L AIR CARRIER 197
(1981)).
366. Id. at 537-38.
367. Id. at 537-40.
368. Id. at 540-43.
369. Id. at 532 (citation omitted).
370. See id.
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pose of the contracting parties to the Convention"371 and the
'"conduct' and 'interpretation' of the signatories' 37 2 which
indicated that "lesion corporelle" should not include purely
emotional injuries. The Court rejected a contrary case from
another signatory country because it was "not persuaded by
that court's reasoning" '373 and because following that foreign
court's decision "would be controversial for most signatory
countries." '74 Accordingly, and with little reliance on the
dictionary, the Court concluded that "lesion corporelle" did
not include purely mental injuries."'
Two years later, in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,
Inc.,376 the Court used an approach substantially similar to
Floyd. In Sale, individual Haitians and organizations repre-
senting interdicted Haitians argued that Article 33 of the
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees limits the power of the President of the United States to
order the United States Coast Guard to repatriate certain
aliens intercepted on international waters. 7 In ascertaining
the meaning of "expel or return ('refouler')," the Court looked
at the terms in the Immigration and Nationality Act as
interpreted by other cases. The Court then noted that the
suggestion from those sources "that 'return' has a legal
meaning narrower than its common meaning-is reinforced
by the parenthetical reference to 'refouler' . . . .""' Although
referring to French dictionary definitions of "refouler,"3 ° the
Court examined the views of commentators and the
negotiating history of the Convention in holding that Article
33 does not apply to aliens interdicted in international
371. Id. at 546-47.
372. Id. at 546 (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 403 (1985)).
373. Id. at 551; see also id. at 549-50 (citing the Supreme Court of Israel's
decision in Cie Air France v. Teichner, 39 Revue Frangaise de Droit Aerien, at
243, 23 Eur. Tr.L., at 102).
374. Id. at 552.
375. Id. at 534, 552.
376. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
377. Id. at 177-87.
378. Id. at 180. The Immigration and Nationality Act used the words "'deport
or return' " which showed "an obvious parallel" to the language of the United
Nations Convention. Id.
379. Id. at 180-81.
380. Id. at 180-82 nn. 37-38 (citing THE NEW CASSELL'S FRENCH DICTIONARY
440 (1973) and LAROUSSE MODERN FRENCH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 545 (1978)). The
Court noted that "refouler" is not an exact synonym for the English word "return."
See id. at 180.
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waters.381
In construing foreign terms, then, the Court has offered
some guidelines for the proper use of dictionaries. The
Floyd/Sale view rejects Saks' primary reliance on diction-
aries because that approach yields translations that may be
"too general."382 Moreover, and again unlike Saks, the
Floyd/Sale approach recognizes that foreign language
dictionaries are inadequate to translate terms because those
definitions do not reflect context or the purpose behind the
term to be construed.383 Thus, under the Floyd/Sale view,
foreign language dictionaries can aid in defining terms "[t]o
the extent that they are relevant" in the context of the
precise inquiry.84 Floyd/Sale, however, directs that numer-
ous other sources-such as context, conduct and history-are
far more telling than the mere mechanical reference to a
dictionary to define foreign terms.385
V. ANALYSIS
DICTIONARY, n. A malevolent literary device for cramping the
growth of a language and making it hard and inelastic..p 
A. The Lack of Judicial Guidelines for Using Dictionaries
The Court has relied on dictionaries to define words and
phrases for nearly 170 years, and yet there are few real
guidelines for when such use is proper or how the dictionary
should be used generally. Rather, the Court's approach in
using dictionaries has varied and is inconsistent on many
levels. Opinions relying upon a dictionary have differed in
several major respects in determining the appropriate defi-
nition, in selecting the proper dictionary, in selecting the
proper edition and even in agreeing on the proper word to be
defined. 87
381. Id. at 182-87.
382. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 531 (1991).
383. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 182-87; Floyd, 499 U.S. at 537.
384. Sale, 509 U.S. at 181-82.
385. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 180-87; Floyd, 499 U.S. at 537-43.
386. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEvIL's DICTIONARY 71 (Forum Books ed., 1948).
387. See supra Parts 1I.A (selecting the proper word to be defined), III.B
(selecting the proper type of dictionary), II1.C (selecting the proper dictionaries),
HI.D (selecting the proper edition).
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The Court's decision of which dictionary definition to use
has at times dictated the outcome of the case.38 Moreover,
with some frequency, both the majority and the dissent have
relied on dictionaries to support diametrically opposed con-
clusions.389 In general, the Court's reliance on the dictionary
has not been principled and, on occasion, has been attributed
to the differing views of individual Justices. 9 ' The unfor-
tunate result is that the Court's approach to using diction-
aries has neither added much certainty to the law nor given
a reliable indication of how the Court will address thorny
interpretation issues in a variety of contexts.
This lack of consistency, and the resulting lack of clarity
and predictability, reflect the inherent limitations of diction-
aries and also the fact that using dictionaries to define a
word requires more than mechanically pointing to the only
meaning that a word could have in any context. 9' The
confusion surrounding the Court's use of dictionaries also
may be the result of the frailties of language generally. Only
uncommunicated thoughts or ideas are capable of perfect
clarity. The Constitution, statutes and contracts, however,
must be communicated and, accordingly, must suffer the
ambiguities, misunderstandings and defects inherent in the
communication process.
The Court's task is further complicated because it is
often asked to determine the impossible: what a group of
388. See supra text accompanying notes 281-94; Randolph, supra note 307, at
72-73 (citing cases).
389. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1914-15 (1998)
(defining "carry" and "carry arms or weapons"); id. at 1920, 1921 nn.2, 5
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (defining "carry," "carry arms or weapons" and "carries
a firearm"); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29, 231, 237-38 (1993)
(defining "to pse," "to cane" and "in relation to"); id. at 241-42 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (defining "use"); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69
n.9 (1989) (defining "body politic" and "public corporation"); id. at 78-80 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (defining "bodies politic and corporate," "body politic," "corporation
sole" and "body politic or corporate").
390. See Aprill, supra note 35, at 321 ("Justice Scalia's use of dictionaries as a
tool of textualism appears instrumental indeed, invoked only when it produces
the desired result."); id. at 334 (noting that the citation to dictionaries, and the
failure to cite dictionaries, often may "represent strategic moves intended not only
to make judicial subjectivity look objective, but also to narrow congressional
power and administrative discretion whenever possible").
391. See Aprill, supra note 35, at 298, 303 ("Dictionaries will differ in the
definitions they include for a single word... [and] general dictionaries exhibit
serious deficiencies not only for technical legal terms, but also for the use of
common words in a legal context.").
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individuals (for example, the drafters of the Constitution,
Congress or contracting parties) meant collectively by select-
ing certain words. Such a determination can never be made
with any certainty even in ideal situations. Accordingly, pre-
sumptive construction principles have evolved to add some
certainty in these difficult situations, such as the maxim
that the individual (and often idiosyncratic) intent of each
participant generally must yield to the collective (and
usually objective) view of the language actually used.392
In the end, the Court is the final arbiter of the meaning
of the statutory, decisional and contractual communications.
In order to make this task possible at all, the Court must
rely on the words of the message sent in order to determine,
as appropriate, what the sender meant or what a receiver
could understand that message to mean. 93 If anything, the
Court's inconsistent use of dictionaries suggests that diction-
aries simply cannot provide the precision required to define
terms adequately.
B. Dictionaries Cannot Provide the End Point for the
Court's Analysis
1. General Usage Dictionaries Cannot Provide the End
Point in Defining Terms. General usage dictionaries, like all
392. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 113-23 (1982); see also Hotchkiss v. National
City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("A contract has, strictly speaking,
nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties.") (L. Hand.,
J.), affd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), affd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913) (quoted in E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 113).
393. This focus on the sender, the message and the receiver is not novel.
"There are three basic elements in communication: the source or sender, the
message, and the destination or receiver.... Effective communication requires
efficiency on the part of all three." SCOTT M. CUTLip & ALLEN H. CENTER,
EFFEcTIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS 190 (5th ed. 1982). This generally accepted theory of
communications is referred to in a variety of different formulations, including the
"SMCR" (or Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver) theory as well as the "SMCRE"
(Source-Message-Channel-Receiver-Effects) theory. See id. at 198 fig.9-3 (citing
EvERETT M. ROGERS & W. FLOYD SHOEMAKER, COMMUNICATION OF INNOVATIONS 20
(1971)); see also ALEXIS S. TAN, MASS COMMUNICATION THEORIES AND RESEARCH 60
fig.4-1 (1981) (citing CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL
THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1949)); id. at 67-71, 68 fig.4-4. The theory apparently
originated with two electrical engineers-Messrs. Shannon and Weaver-when
addressing "technical problems of electronic communication," but may be applied
"to most forms of human communication." Id. at 55.
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dictionaries, fall somewhere in the prescriptive/descriptive
continuum. 94 Because a prescriptive dictionary purports to
set forth how words should be used, such a dictionary could
be a proper ending point to define a term only if the Court
presumes that the sender, in drafting the message, or the
receiver, in construing that message, followed the diction-
ary's prescription of how a word should be used. The Court
has, at times, rejected such an approach."5 Even if the
Court could presume adherence to prescriptive definitions,
such an approach would fail because the same word may be
defined differently in different prescriptive dictionaries.
These differences occur for reasons ranging from different
editorial boards having differences of opinion to concerns
about violating copyright laws. Moreover, the Court could
not use a prescriptive dictionary as an end point in defining
a word if alternative definitions of the term were offered in
a specific dictionary. In light of these practical barriers, and
because the prescriptive approach only reflects how a word
should be used, a prescriptive dictionary cannot definitively
show what a sender meant in sending a message or how a
receiver construed a message.
Nor can the Court definitively rely on descriptive diction-
aries as an end point in defining a word. A descriptive dic-
tionary sets forth definitions showing what a word may
mean generally, not what a word does mean in context. Ac-
cordingly, although a descriptive dictionary may set forth
possible alternative definitions for a term, it cannot provide
the definitive definition for what that term actually means in
a specific context. Differing definitions for a word in different
dictionaries and alternative definitions of a word in the same
dictionary would further confound an attempt to use a
descriptive dictionary as an end point in defining a word.396
394. See generally supra Part I.C.
395. See, e.g., Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership,
507 U.S. 380, 396 n.14 (1993) ("Faced with a choice between our own precedent
and Black's Law Dictionary, we adhere to the former."); Washington County v.
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 198 n.10 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that
"[r]ather than 'make a fortress out of the dictionary,' the Court should instead
attempt to implement the legislative intent of Congress" (quoting Cabell v.
Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), affd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945)));
Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 247 (1979)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Congress that enacted the McCarran-
Ferguson Act "was composed of neither insurance experts nor dictionary editors").
396. See Aprill, supra note 35, at 327 ("Alternative dictionary meanings,
whether in the same dictionary or different ones, may very well contradict one
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Finally, descriptive dictionaries inherently suffer from
issues of time lag and cannot immediately include new
usage or slang."7 As a result, descriptive dictionaries cannot
be relied on to describe all possible meanings of a word
comprehensively and accurately."8 For these reasons,
whether prescriptive or descriptive, the general usage
dictionary cannot provide the end point of the Court's
analysis in defining terms.
2. Law Dictionaries Cannot Provide the End Point in
Defining Terms. Definitive reliance on law dictionaries to
define terms suffers from defects similar to such reliance on
general usage dictionaries. In addition, many terms in a
law dictionary are legal terms and, frequently, terms of art.
Thus, the definitions provided in a law dictionary are
either: (1) based on case law or usage (such as statutory
terms) or (2) created anew by the dictionary's editorial
board.399 If based on case law or usage, the best source for a
definition is the decision or usage in context. Prior decisions
and usage, defining the term in context, should be far more
instructive than the definitions in a law dictionary, which
another because dictionary definitions are descriptive and not prescriptive.").
397. See Aprill, supra note 35, at 287-92.
398. A related issue arises when the Court determines that it must define a
term that it cannot find in the dictionary and, undaunted, attempts to use a
combination of definitions in its interpretation. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens ex
rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 289-91 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (construing
Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-72 (1984)).
Neither Webster nor Congress has authorized us to assume that "non-
curriculum" is a precise antonym of the word 'curriculum." "Non-plus,"
for example, does not mean "minus" and it would be incorrect to as-
sume that a "nonentity" is not an "entity" at all. Purely as a matter of
defining a newly-coined word, the term "noncurriculum" could fairly be
construed to describe either the subjects that are "not a part of the
current curriculum" or the subjects that "cannot properly be included
in a public school curriculum." Either of these definitions is perfectly
"sensible" because both describe subjects "that are not related to the
body of courses offered by the school." When one considers the basic
purpose of the Act, and its unquestioned linkage to our [prior] decision
... the latter definition surely is the more "sensible."
Id. (citations omitted); see supra notes 279 & 357 (discussing fact that meanings
of words can change over time); supra notes 323-24, 334 and accompanying text
(discussing Board of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)).
399. See Preface to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at vi (2d ed. 1910) (acknow-
ledging that it contains "many" entries "in which the definition had to be written
entirely de novo").
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are general paraphrases that lack any context."0 And if,
rather than being based on case law or usage, the law
dictionary definition was created anew, one might ask
whether that definition should be afforded any weight at
all.4
0
'
Apart from issues regarding the source for the
definitions, law dictionaries have been characterized as
painfully descriptive and, at times, merely "a bagful of de-
finitions.,40 ' Accordingly, although perhaps a good resource
for law students and lawyers unfamiliar with a term in the
abstract, law dictionaries are not particularly helpful to the
Court in determining the precise meaning of a term in con-
text. The attorneys involved in a case become familiar with,
and presumably address, the specific conduct, context, his-
tory and other relevant sources of information to help define
a term as it applies to a specific case. These participants
should help form the inquiry and provide the context re-
quired for the Court to define disputed terms.0 3
Finally, like general usage dictionaries, law dictionaries
may not take into account regional differences which, at
400. An analogy is judicial notice of case law. Clearly, the Court may take
judicial notice of judicial decisions. However, it is doubtful that the Court would
take judicial notice of a decision by relying on a paraphrased rendition or sum-
mary, particularly where the actual decision was available. See Fed. R. Evid.
201(b) (requiring that "[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned") (emphasis
added).
401. Moreover, one commentator suggests that Black's Law Dictionary has an
inherent state law bias. "To the extent that the definitions in Black's Law
Dictionary derive from state court decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court may well be
permitting these state courts to shape federal law, although the legal holdings of
the state courts have no precedential effect for the meaning of federal statutes."
Aprill, supra note 35, at 312.
402. Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 436.
403. Cf. 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 544 (Supp. 1998).
The definitions supplied by the parties to a contract are entitled to
greater weight than is any particular definition in any dictionary; this
is because the dictionary maker is stating the usages of other men in
many other contexts, while the parties are prescribing their own usage
in the specific context of their own transaction. Dictionary makers have
no control over the contexts in which the words they define have been
used by men, the dead as well as the living; the parties to a contract
are constructing their own context in a living transaction the elements
of which are better known to themselves than to any others.
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times, can be profound. "Regional variation is so rich that it
is sometimes difficult to determine exactly what is standard,
or if there is any standard at all."44 For example, in Georgia,
a person who receives a prison sentence but does not serve
jail time is referred to as being "probated, 40' 5 but in Oregon
such a person is placed "on probation"4 6 and wills are "pro-
bated."' Law dictionaries generally do not capture these
geographic variations and subtleties. For all of these reasons,
law dictionaries cannot provide the definitive end point for
the Court in defining terms. As even Black's Law Dictionary
has warned, "a legal dictionary should only be used as a
'starting point' for definitions.
C. Dictionaries Can Provide an Aid in Beginning the
Definition Process
Although dictionaries cannot provide the end point in
defining terms, dictionaries are a proper and useful source in
determining what a word may mean. Whether prescriptive
or descriptive, dictionaries are designed to reflect usage to
some degree. Accordingly, dictionaries may be useful to help
fully delineate all possible alternatives of what words or
phrases may mean." Stated differently, the dictionary prop-
erly is a legitimate source, indeed perhaps a primary source,
that can be used to identify what the sender could have
meant or what a receiver could have understood a message
to mean. With this in mind, when the Court begins the ana-
lysis, it should use the dictionary to help gather the possible
definitions for a word and then narrow those possibilities in
light of context, underlying facts, legislative purpose, prior
decisions, scientific literature and other potentially helpful
sources. Although in some instances, the Court appears to
have used such an approach,410 the analysis generally is
404. Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 439. The regional difference examples cited
here are based on those suggestions in Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 439.
405. Jackson v. State, 498 S.E.2d 780, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
406. State v. Balukovic, 956 P.2d 250, 253 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
407. Davis v. Somers, 915 P.2d 1047, 1048 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
408. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1302 (6th ed. 1990). See also Aprill, supra note
35, at 309.
409. See Aprill, supra note 35, at 313 (noting that "dictionary definitions can
be a beginning point for determining the meaning of the word in a statute, but
should not be an end point").
410. "Mhe meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be
drawn from the context in which it is used." Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129,
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unstated. More frequently, the Court strays from this
analytical framework and relies too heavily on dictionaries to
provide an end point and an answer for what an important
term must mean. For many other salutary reasons, and to
clarify the current confusion, the Court should explain that
the dictionary may be a starting point but that other sources
will provide definitive guidance in defining key terms.
First, using the dictionary as a beginning (but not an end
point) in the Court's analysis accurately reflects the limita-
tions of dictionaries and would eradicate many of the issues
the Court has struggled with over the years. Although the
Court would still have to agree on what word should be
construed, limiting the use of the dictionary to the beginning
of the definitional process would curtail the long-standing
and unresolved disputes over the proper type of dictionary to
use, the specific dictionary or edition to use and the specific
definition to use.41' Further, by clearly establishing that dic-
tionaries are only to be used as a starting point, it will
perhaps be easier for the Court to set up specific guidelines,
where necessary, to resolve these other related issues.
Second, using the dictionary as a beginning point is
consistent with the approach taken in some Court deci-
sions.41 Using dictionaries as a starting point also is
consistent with the approach sometimes advocated by sever-
132 (1993). As another example, the majority in Burton v. United States, inter-
preting the word "interested" in a criminal statute, noted that dictionaries and
cases illustrate that the word has different meanings, "[blut its meaning here is to
be ascertained by considering the subject matter of the statute in which the word
appears." 202 U.S. 344, 371 (1906). In dissent, however, Justice Brewer gave
weight to dictionary definitions. Id. at 396 (quoting BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
and BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY).
411. See text accompanying supra Part III (discussing problems with the
Court's general process for using the dictionary).
412. See, e.g., Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1993) (stating that
it is a "fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language
itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be
drawn from the context in which it is used"); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 418 (1992) (citation omitted) (stating that
alternative dictionary definitions "each making some sense under the statute...
indicate[ ] that the statute is open to interpretation. Few phrases in a complex
scheme of regulation are so clear as to be beyond the need for interpretation when
applied in a real context"); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1991) ("The
word 'under' has many dictionary definitions and must draw its meaning from its
context."); see also Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates
Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 394-95 (1993) ("Faced with a choice between
our own precedent and Black's Law Dictionary, we adhere to the former.").
1999] 297
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
al current members of the Court, including Justices who fre-
quently rely on dictionaries.41 Accordingly, expressly using
dictionaries as a beginning point would add clarity to the
analysis while, at the same time, doing little violence to
precedent.
Third, using dictionaries as a beginning point in the
Court's analysis would eliminate express or implied specu-
lation about whether a sender or receiver relied on a pre-
scriptive or descriptive dictionary, relied on a general or sub-
ject matter dictionary or even consulted a dictionary at all.
This approach also would reflect the idea that dictionaries
are symbols of "the myth of precision"414 and cannot provide a
precise guide to what a word actually means in context.
Fourth, by focusing on context, conduct, purpose, history
and other relevant sources to narrow the possible definitions,
the Court will be better able to properly construe a message
to reflect what the sender meant or what a receiver
understood a message to mean. For example, one commen-
tator4? 1 5 identified Smith v. United States41 as a case where
using the dictionary as an end point perhaps impermissibly
altered the Court's conclusion. In Smith the Court decided
whether the Federal Tort Claims Act,"' which contains an
exemption for torts "arising in a foreign country,"418 applies
in the sovereignless region of Antarctica. Using a 1945 edi-
tion of Webster's Dictionary, the Court found that "country"
was a "region or tract of land," meaning that Antarctica was
exempt.41 Had the Court used Black's Law Dictionary,
however, it would have defined "country" as the plaintiff had
claimed: "The territory occupied by an independent nation or
413. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 512 U.S. 218, 240 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Dictionaries can be useful
aids in statutory interpretation, but they are no substitute for close analysis of
what words mean as used in a particular statutory context."); K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, 486 U.S. 281, 319 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("Words, like syllables, acquire meaning not in isolation but within their
context.").
414. Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 439.
415. See Randolph, supra note 307, at 73.
416. 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
417. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 2671-80 (1994) (also codified as amended in
other scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
418. Id. § 2680(k).
419. Smith, 507 U.S. at 201 (quoting WEBSTER's NEW INTL DIcToNARY 609
(2d ed. 1945)).
298 [Vol. 47
USE OF DICTIONARIES
people."42 ° Unlike Smith, the approach advocated here would
start by looking to dictionaries-and any other source that
could provide potentially relevant definitions-and then
selecting a definition from those alternatives after consider-
ing context, underlying facts, legislative history and other
relevant factors.
Fifth, dictionaries may provide some insight in determin-
ing how a term may have been used long ago. For example,
more than 120 years ago in Decatur Bank v. St. Louis
Bank,4 21 the Court construed the word "cattle" to include
"hogs."422 In citing a then-contemporaneous dictionary, the
Court noted that the word cattle also is "'a collective name
for domestic quadrupeds generally, including not only the
bovine tribe, but horses, asses, mules, sheep, goats and
swine."'4 Nearly seventy years ago, after citing Decatur
Bank, the Court in Ash Sheep Co. v. United States,424
construed "cattle" to include "sheep."425 In Ash Sheep, the
Court noted that the applicable statute had been enacted
nearly a century earlier and that relevant authority-in-
cluding a then-contemporaneous dictionary-stated that
sheep were included within the definition of cattle when the
statute was enacted.42' Thus, the Court relied on a dictionary
contemporaneous with the enactment of the statute to
determine what the sender (Congress) may have wanted the
message (the statute) to mean. The approach advocated here
recognizes that dictionaries properly may be used for such
historical references.
Sixth, the benefits of using dictionaries as a beginning
point applies with equal force if the Court is attempting to
interpret what the sender meant or how a term could be
construed by the receiver. For example, the Fourteenth
420. Randolph, supra note 307, at 73 & n.22. Interestingly, however, the 1990
edition of BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY is cited in this article to define statutory
language first enacted in 1948, with the author noting that he "would have cited
an older edition, but one was not handy." Id.
421. 88 U.S. 294 (1874).
422. Decatur Bank, 88 U.S. at 299-301. "In its limited sense [cattle] is used to
designate the different varieties of homed animals but it is also frequently used
with a broader signification as embracing animals in general which serve as food
for man." Id. at 299-300.
423. Id. at 299 (quoting WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY).
424. 252 U.S. 159 (1920).
425. Id. at 169.
426. Id. at 167-69 (citing "the 1837 edition of Webster;" "Webster's New
International Dictionary" and "The Standard Dictionary").
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Amendment requires that a criminal statute must be
sufficiently definite so that ordinary people can distinguish
between lawful and unlawful conduct.4 Accordingly, if a
statute makes it a crime to "possess" an item, the Court may
need to determine whether a person reading the statute
would understand that certain conduct violated the statute.
In this sense, using dictionaries may provide some guidance
in understanding whether "ordinary people" would be able to
"understand what conduct is prohibited."28 Specifically, by
applying the approach advocated here, dictionaries may help
in determining what an individual being prosecuted
potentially could understand the word "possess" to mean in
the statute.
Seventh, although eliminating some misleading and
unnecessary use of dictionaries in defining terms, the
approach advocated here still preserves a place for the dic-
tionary in the Court's analysis. Dictionaries can be valuable
resources in determining the history, origin and potential
meaning of a term. However, as the Court observed nearly a
century ago, "one definition of a word does not express its
whole meaning or necessarily determine the intention of its
use."429 Using dictionaries at the beginning of the definitional
process, rather than at the end, properly exploits dictionaries
as a source of potential meaning while, at the same time,
reflects the inherent limits of dictionaries.
Finally, although this approach still retains a role for
dictionaries, perhaps the greatest benefit is that it may
eliminate some use of dictionaries by the Court. If defini-
tional alternatives are clear, then the Justices need not
reach for their dictionaries in attempting to define a term.
Usage, context, purpose and other considerations apart from
dictionary definitions may delineate the possible alternative
definitions of a term being construed. When that is the case,
dictionaries add little to the analysis. Thus, the approach
advocated here may help to curtail the recent and dramatic
increase in the Court's use of dictionaries.
427. See Kolender v. Thompson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); see also id.
(criminal statute must adequately define the criminal offense "in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement").
428. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.
429. Osborne v. San Diego Land & Town Co., 178 U.S. 22, 38 (1900).
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CONCLUSION
Tehe dictiona7 is not the source definitively to resolve legalquestions. . ...
The United States Supreme Court has relied on
dictionaries to define key terms for nearly 170 years but has
failed to set forth much guidance on how dictionaries should
be used. The scattershot approach used by the Court has
resulted in inconsistent analysis and conclusions, which
have added little certainty to the law. Indeed, the Court's use
of the dictionary has at times involved almost comical de-
bates.4"' Unfortunately, the adverse consequences of these
inconsistencies are becoming more pronounced as the Court
relies on dictionaries more and more frequently.
Recognizing that dictionaries are "the last resort of the
baffled judge," ' and rather than making "a fortress out of
the dictionary," 3 the Court should limit the role of diction-
aries in its analysis. Specifically, the Court should rely on
dictionaries in beginning its definition of terms to help fully
exhaust all possible definitions of what the sender may have
meant the message to mean, or how the receiver could have
construed the message. Then, the Court should use other
factors such as context, conduct, purpose and history to de-
termine the appropriate meaning. This approach properly
reflects the limits of dictionaries, the importance of
construing language in context and, if correctly applied,
should result in decisions accurately reflecting the appro-
priate definition of the term to be defined. Moreover, this
approach may slow or reverse the Court's increasing reliance
on dictionaries. Finally, this approach recognizes that, when
430. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 n.9 (1986).
431. For example, in a tax case, the Court cited a dictionary to address the
perplexing issue of whether a jigsaw puzzle was a "puzzle" or a "game." White v.
Aronson, 302 U.S. 16, 17-18 & nn. 2 & 3 (1937). In concluding that jigsaw puzzles
actually were puzzles, the Court concluded that "[aimple evidence disclosed that
in commercial usage jigsaw picture puzzles were never regarded as games; also
that the trade recognized a definite distinction between puzzles and games. We
must assume that Congress had knowledge of these things." Id. at 20. It is
doubtless true that only an assumption would support the conclusion of such
congressional awareness.
432. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
433. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), affd, 326
U.S. 404 (1945).
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defining words, the Court cannot merely lean on the diction-
ary as a simple crutch in order to resolve the issue. Rather,
by focusing on context, conduct, purpose, history and other
similar factors, the Court will reach the most reasoned result
by directly facing "the intolerable wrestle with words and
meanings."4
434. T.S. ELIOT, Four Quartets: East Coker, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND
PLAYS 1909-1950, at 125 (1962).
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Appendix A
TERMS DEFINED By THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
THROUGH THE 1997-1998 TERM
AAA
Abandonment
Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580, 598 (1911) (Hughes, J.)
DE MARAGY, INTL DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 186 (1896) (White,
J.)
DE MARAGY, INT'L DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
Absinthe
Ernhardt v. Steinhardt, 153 U.S. 177, 182 (1894) (Fuller, C.J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Abusive
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972) (Brennan, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Accident
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399-400 & n.3 (1985) (O'Connor,
J.)
GRAND LAROUSSE DE LA LANGUE FRANQAISE (1971)
LE GRAND, DICTIONNAiRE USUAL DE DROIT (1931)
Acquire
Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 820 (1974) (Blackmun,
J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1966)
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Act
Wilson Bros., Inc. v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 191, 212 (1901) (Shiras, J.,
dissenting)
ANDERSON'S LAW DICTIONARY (1996)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Adjustment
Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1990) (Scalia, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Administer
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 528 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1957)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1991)
Advocacy
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 665 (1925) (Sanford, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Affect
National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 257
(1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1966)
Affiant
Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 220 n.8 (1993)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951)
Aggregate
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 411 n.9 (1993)
(White, J.)
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1983)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
APPENDIX A: TERMS DEFINED
Aid and Abet
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 178 (1993) (Blackmun, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Alizarin
Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 299
(1884) (Blatchford, J.)
WATT'S DICTIONARY OF CHEMISTRY (1866)
Alternative
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 n.10 (1940)
(Roberts, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Amicus Curiae
McCoy v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 450 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Amortization Plan
Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Schlitz Brewing Co.,
513 U.S. 414, 426 (1995) (Breyer, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Amortized
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 571
n.1 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Anarchist
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292-93
(1904) (Fuller, C.J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
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Anarchy
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292-93
(1904) (Fuller, C.J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
-Huxley-
Anonymous
Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 529-30
(1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Any
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (O'Connor, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Appeal
Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S.
88, 93 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Application
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 118 S. Ct. 1618, 1624 (1998)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1991)
Appropriate
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983) (Rehnquist,
J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Arbitrary
United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243-44 n.14 (1947)
(Burton, J.)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1944)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1945)
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Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5, 17 & n.13 (1938) (Black, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1939)
Arbitrator
Gordon v. United States, 74 U.S. 188, 194 & n.7 (1868) (Grier, J.)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
Ardent Spirits
Sarlls v. United States, 152 U.S. 570, 572 (1894) (Shiras, J.)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
Arrestment
Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., 211 U.S. 239,
246 (1908) (Day, J.)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Artifice
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696 n.13 (1980) (Stewart, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTVL DICTIONARY (1934)
Assignee
Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47, 53 (1992) (Thomas, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Attainder
Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 387 (1866) (Miller, J., dissenting)
TOMLIN'S LAW DICTIONARY
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Attorney
Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 436 n.6 (1991) (Stevens, J.)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2d College ed. 1982)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Compact ed. 1981)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1975)
Authorize
Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 169 n.9 (1981)
(Brennan, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Authorized
Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 198 n.10 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)
Automobile
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 406 n.20 (1985) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Avoid
Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 296 (1991) (White, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
BBB
Banishment
United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 269-70 (1905) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
RAPALIJE & LAWRENCE'S LAW DICTIONARY
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Banks
Oulton v. Savings Inst., 84 U.S. 109, 118-19 n.14 (1872) (Clifford,
J.)
MCCULLOCH'S COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY
Banks of Deposit
Bank for Say. v. Collector, 70 U.S. 495, 512-13 & nn.7 & 8 (1865)
(Clifford, J.)
MCCULLOCH'S COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY
Banks for Savings
Bank for Sav. v. Collector, 70 U.S. 495, 512-13 & nn.7 & 8 (1865)
(Clifford, J.)
MCCULLOCH'S COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY
Base
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993) (Souter, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1987)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Based
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993) (Souter, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Belonging
Board of Dirs. of the Chicago Theological Seminary v. Illinois
ex rel. Raymond, 188 U.S. 662, 673 (1903) (Peckham, J.)
WEBSTER'S INT'L DICTIONARY
Blasphemer
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 538 app. (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
ENTICK, NEW SPELLING DICTIONARY (1786)
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Blasphemy
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 520 n.28, 524-25
nn.43-45, 534-40 app. (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
judgment)
ASH, THE NEW & COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1775)
BAILEY, UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1742)
BAILEY, UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1730)
BARCLAY, A COMPLETE & UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1782)
BELL, A DICTIONARY & DIGEST OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND (1861)
BLOUNT, A LAw-DICTIONARY (1670)
BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION &
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (11th ed. 1866)
BROWN, A LAW DICTIONARY (Sprague ed., 1875)
BUCHANAN, A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1769)
BULLOKAR, THE ENGLISH EXPOSITOR (14th ed. 1731)
COLES, AN ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1732)
CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAw-DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1771)
DEFOE, A COMPLEAT ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1735)
DYCHE, THE NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1777)
ENTICK, NEW SPELLING DICTIONARY (1786)
GORDON & MARCHANT, A NEW COMPLETE ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(1760)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1755)
KENRICK, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1773)
KERSEY, A GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1721)
MARTIN, A NEW UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1754)
PHILLIPS, THE NEW WORLD OF WORDS (3d ed. 1671)
RICHARDSON, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1839)
RIDER, A NEW UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1759)
SCOTT, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1797)
SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(6th ed. 1796)
STAUNTON, AN ECCLESIASTICAL DICTIONARY (1861)
Board of Trade
National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472,
480 n.10 (1979) (Blackmun, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTIL DICTIONARY (1913)
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Bodies Politic and Corporate
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 78 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)
BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION &
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (11th ed. 1866)
CYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF LAW (1901)
Bodily Harm
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 536 (1991) (Marshall,
J.)
JERAUTE, VOCABULAIRE FRANQAIS-ANGLAIS ET ANGLAIS-FRANQAIS
DE TERMES ET LOCUTIONS JURIDIQUES (1953)
Bodily Injury
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 536 (1991) (Marshall,
J.)
JERAUTE, VOCABULAIRE FRANQAIS-ANGLAIS ET ANGLAIS-FRANQAIS
DE TERMES ET LOCUTIONS JURIDIQUES (1953)
Body Politic
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 n.9 (1989)
(White, J.)
ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS & PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR
ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE (1879)
ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW (1893)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (1891)
BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY & GLOSSARY (2d ed. 1871)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 79
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS & PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR
ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (1891)
ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW (1893)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (1891)
BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY & GLOSSARY (2d ed. 1871)
(1879)
1999]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Bong
Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 515 nn.1 &
3 (1994) (Blackmun, J.)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
Boycott
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 801 (1993)
(Scalia, J., partial opinion of Court)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541-42 n.l1
(1978) (Powell, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
Business
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 781 (1993)
(Souter, J., partial opinion of Court)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1942)
CCC
Camper
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 406 n.20 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Candy
McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 491 (1931)
(Stone, J.)
No specific dictionary listed
Capricious
United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243 n.14, 246 (1947)
(Burton, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1945)
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Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5, 17 & n.13 (1938) (Black, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1939)
Caricature
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1988) (Rehnquist,
C.J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (2d ed. unabr. 1979)
Carry
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1914, 1915 (1998)
(Breyer, J.)
THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY (1988)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY (C. Onions ed., 1966)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.
unabr. 1987)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 n.5 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
Carry Arms or Weapons
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1915 (1998) (Breyer,
J.)
THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY (1988)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY (C. Onions ed. 1966)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.
unabr. 1987)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1920, 1921 n.2 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Carries A Firearm
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
Cattle
Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159, 169 (1920) (Clarke,
J.)
STANDARD DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank, 88 U.S. 294, 299 n.2 (1874)
(Davis, J.)
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
Caucasian
United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 211 & n.1
(1923) (Sutherland, J.)
Dictionary of Races, Senate Document 662, 61st Cong., 3d
Sess. 1910
Centavo
Serralles v. Esbri, 200 U.S. 103, 111 (1906) (Peckham, J.)
STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1895)
Certificate
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91,
103-04 (1990) (Stevens, J., judgment & plurality opinion) (quoting
In re Peel, 534 N.E.2d 980, 984 (Ill. 1989))
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91,
113 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Certified Public Accountant
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91,
113 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
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Certify
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91,
113 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Challenge
City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 479 & n.6 (1987) (Powell, J.,
concurring in judgment in part & dissenting in part)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1980)
Chamber of Commerce
National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472,
480 n.10 (1979) (Blackmun, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1913)
Child Support
Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 482 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH USAGE (2d ed. 1987)
Civil Action
Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 894 (1989) (White, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Claim
Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 210 (1993) (Souter, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Clear Error
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers
Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 652 (1993) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part & concurring in judgment)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
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Cognizable
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (Thomas, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Coining
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 584 (1870) (Chase, C.J.,
dissenting)
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY
Cold Blood
Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 484 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Cold-Blooded
Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471-72 (1993) (O'Connor, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
WEBSTER'S TIMD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Collateral Attack
Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 30 (1992) (O'Connor, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Collect Debt
Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294 (1995) (Breyer, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Color
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 211 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)
Combination Printing
Paramount Publix Corp. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S.
464, 471 & n.1 (1935) (Stone, J.)
ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF PHOTOGRAPHY (1896)
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Commerce
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)
A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796)
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1789)
Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 501 n.1 (1849) (Daniel, J.,
dissenting)
RICHARDSON'S DICTIONARY
Commercial
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)
(Scalia, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Common Law
Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,
429 U.S. 363, 380 n.8 (1977) (quoting Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 102 (1901)) (Rehnquist, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 102 (1901)
(Brewer, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
Community
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193 n.9 (1964) (Brennan, J.,
judgment & plurality opinion)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
Commutation
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 273 n.8 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)
1999]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Compassion
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 514 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1952)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW IN'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1957)
Compensation
Regents of Univ. of California v. Public Employment Relations Bd.,
485 U.S. 589, 598 (1988) (O'Connor, J.)
WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (C.
Goodrich ed., 1849)
Compilation
John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153 (1989)
(Blackmun, J.)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Complaint
Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 745 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1957)
Concert
Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 299 n.10 (1996) (Stevens,
J.)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
WEBSTER'S THID NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Concurrent
Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 396-97 n.2 (1920) (McKenna,
J., dissenting)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
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Concurrent Jurisdiction
Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 398 (1920) (McKenna, J.,
dissenting)
BouvIER's LAW DICTIONARY
Conditions
Fort Stewart Schools v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S.
641, 645 (1990) (Scalia, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1957)
Condition Precedent
Washingtonian Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 47 & nn.10 & 11
(1939) (Black, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933)
Condition Subsequent
Washington Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 47 & nn.10 & 11
(1939) (Black, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933)
Conduct
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-79 (1993) (Blackmun,
J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 187-88 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Confidential
Department of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 173 (1993)
(O'Connor, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
BUFFALO LAWREVIEW
Congress
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 857-58 n.7 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)
A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed.
1796)
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773)
Consider
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2189
(1998) (Souter, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
Consideration
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2189
(1998) (Souter, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
Conveyance
Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406, 411 (1983) (White,
J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (P. Gove ed., 1976)
Context
Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199, 203 (1993)
(Souter, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1942)
Contract
Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 526 n.23 (1992)
(Stevens, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Contrivance
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 nn.20 & 21 (1975)
(Powell, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1934)
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Contrive
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 nn.20 & 21 (1975)
(Powell, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
Conviction
Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1993) (Scalia, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Copyright
American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 290-91
(1907) (Day, J.)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (Rawle's Rev.)
Corporel
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 536 (1991) (Marshall,
J.)
JERAUTE, VOCABLuAEu FRANgAIS-ANGLAIS ET ANGLAiS-FRANgAIS
DE TERMES ET LOCUTIONS JURIDIQUES (1953)
Corporation
Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 202 n.8 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)
ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW (1893)
BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION &
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (11th ed. 1866)
Corporation Sole
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 79-80 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)
BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY & GLOSSARY (2d ed. 1871)
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Corruptly
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 616 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
Counterfeit
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTVL DICTIONARY (1945)
United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 549 n.14 (1938) (Black, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1914)
Country
Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1945)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1945)
Course
The Britannia, 153 U.S. 130, 148 (1894) (Brown, J., dissenting)
IMPERIAL DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Court
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1279, 1288
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
Cover
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (White,
J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
322
APPENDIX A: TERMS DEFINED
Covert
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 240 n.2 (1979) (Powell, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1953)
Criteria
Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113 (1988) (Scalia, J.)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Criterion
Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 134 n.7 (1988)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1966)
Creation
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 598-99 (1987) (Powell, J.,
concurring)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1981)
Curriculum
Board of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 237
(1990) (O'Connor, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Curtilage
Davis v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 221 & n.6 (1986) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
DDD
Damage
United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 615 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914)
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American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 450 n.6 (1947)
(Reed, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
Damages
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 265 nn.6 & 7, 267 n.10 (1989) (Blackmun, J.)
BLOUNT, A LAW-DICTIONARY (1670)
BOUVIER, LAW-DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1852)
CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1771)
TOMLIN'S LAW DICTIONARY (1836)
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 292 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part)
BLOUNT, A LAW-DICTIONARY (1670)
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 913-14 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 605 n.6 (1986) (Powell, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 615 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914)
American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 450 n.6 (1947)
(Reed, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Debauchery
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 17 n.4 (1946) (Douglas, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY (Rev. ed.)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
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Debt For
Cohen v. De la Cruz, 118 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1998) (O'Connor, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(3d ed. 1992)
Dedicate
California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519, 527 (1978)
(White, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Defile
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 n.7 (1990) (Brennan,
J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Defraud
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 370-371 (1987) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)
ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW (1893)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (1897)
BURRILL'S LAW DICTIONARY (1859)
Delay
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357-58 (1994)
(Thomas, J.)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
Department
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 920 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1828)
Depreciated
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 571
n.1 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
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Depreciation
Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 364 n.1
(1991) (Kennedy, J.)
McGRAw-HILL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS (3d ed. 1983)
Depredation
Deal v. United States, 274 U.S. 277, 283 (1927) (McReynolds, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Deprive
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 549 n.4 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring in result)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1945)
Derivative Suit
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 529 n.4 (1984)
(Brennan, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Design
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
501 (1982) (Marshall, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1957)
Device
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696 n.13 (1980) (Stewart, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 nn.20 & 21 (1975)
(Powell, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
Discharge
PUT) No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511
U.S. 700, 725 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1991)
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United States v. Centennial Say. Bank FSB, 499 U.S. 573, 580 n.6
(1991) (Marshall, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 286
n.10 (1946) (Douglas, J.)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Discipline
Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6,
493 U.S. 67, 97 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting
in part)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.
1987)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Disclaimer
Jewett v. Comm'r, 455 U.S. 305, 323 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Disclose
United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102, 109 n.4 (1987)
(Stevens, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1977)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Discovers
Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 308 n.3 (1961)
(Warren, C.J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1958)
Dispute
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery, 303 U.S. 552, 564 n.1
(1938) (McReynolds, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
1999]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Diversion
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 n.16 (1972)
(Marshall, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Doctrine of Laches
Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 687 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Doubt
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818, 823
(1998) (Scalia, J.)
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993)
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(3d ed. 1992)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTIL DICTIONARY (1949)
Draft
Seeberger v. Wright & Lawther Oil & Lead Mfg. Co., 157
U.S. 183, 185 (1895) (Brown, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
IMPERIAL DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S INT'L DICTIONARY (1890)
Draught
Seeberger v. Wright & Lawther Oil & Lead Mfg. Co., 157
U.S. 183, 185 (1895) (Brown, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
IMPERIAL DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S INT'L DICTIONARY (1890)
Drug
United States v. An Article of Drug... Bacto-Unidisk.. ., 394 U.S.
784, 800 n.20 (1969) (Warren, C.J.)
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (24th ed. 1965)
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Duty
Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 445 & n.18 (1868) (Swayne,
J.)
TOMLIN'S LAW DICTIONARY
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S.
564, 637 n.20 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th
ed. 1789)
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785)
EEE
Editor
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 721 (1877) (Field, J.)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Efficient
Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 516 (1981) (Brennan,
J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1934)
Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 532 n.4 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
Election
Foster v. Love, 118 S. Ct. 464, 467 (1997) (Souter, J.)
AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1869)
Eligible
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1955
(1998) (Scalia, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1949)
1999] 329
BUFFALO LAWREVIEW
Embargo
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 184 (1988) (Brennan,
J.)
BERENYI, THE MODERN AMERICAN BUSINESS DICTIONARY (1982)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1984)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Embed
Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 134 (1942)
(Stone, C.J.)
OXFORD DICTIONARY
"Webster"
Embryo
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 & n.20, 159, 160 & n.59 (1973)
(Blackmun, J.)
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (24th ed. 1965)
Emplane
Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405
U.S. 707, 710 n.1 (1972) (Brennan, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Employ
Tennessee Coal, Iron & Rail Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321
U.S. 590, 598 n.11 (1944) (Murphy, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr.)
Employed
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 342 (1997) (Thomas, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
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Employee
NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995)
(Breyer, J.)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Encumbrance
Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 312 (1975)
(White, J., dissenting)
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914)
Endeavors
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 610-11 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Endorsement
Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763
(1995) (Scalia, J.)
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Ensure
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2180-
81 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d College ed. 1992)
Entertainment
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 306 n.7 (1969) (Brennan, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Entitle
Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 519 U. S. 248, 255
(1997) (O'Connor, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
1999]
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Estate of Coward v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992)
(Kennedy, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Envelope
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 629-30 n.5 (1977) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1869)
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY (1860)
Equitable
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 133 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Equity
Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 nn.14 & 15 (1947) (Vinson,
C.J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr.)
Establishment
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
Ethnic
BPOE Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 411 U.S. 924, 926 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from dismissal for lack of substantial
federal question)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY
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Evade
Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 501 n.1 (1945) (Stone,
C.J., dissenting)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Evolution
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 598-99 (1987) (Powell, J.,
concurring)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1981)
Ex Post Facto
Kring v. State, 107 U.S. 221, 227 (1883) (Miller, J.)
TOMLIN'S LAW DICTIONARY (1835)
Excessive
United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2037 (1998) (Thomas,
J.)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 786 n.37 (1948) (Burton, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1938)
Excise
Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 617-19 (1902) (Brewer, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
BouVIER's LAW DICTIONARY
CENTURY DICTIONARY
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S INT'L DICTIONARY
Exclusive
Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 78 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1942)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U.S. 453, 470-71
(1906) (Day, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Excusable Neglect
Pioneer Investment Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S.
380, 402-03 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Exempt
American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp.,
461 U.S. 402, 421 (1983) (Marshall, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Exercise
Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 893
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES (J. Murry
ed., 1897)
Expressly
Magone v. Heller, 150 U.S. 70, 74 (1893) (Gray, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
FFF
False Making
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 121-22 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1948)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
APPENDIX A: TERMS DEFINED
Fear
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 n.11 (1987) (Stevens,
J.) (quoting Matter of Acosta, Interim Decision No. 2986, at 14)
(Mar. 1, 1985))
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (16th ed. 1971)
Feasible
American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-09
(1981) (Brennan, J.)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1957)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
719 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Felony
Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 303 (1895) (Brewer, J.)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Fetus
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 & n.20, 159, 160 & n.59 (1973)
(Blackmun, J.)
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (24th ed. 1965)
Filthy
Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 483 n.4 (1962) (Harlan,
J., judgment & plurality opinion)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (unabr. 1956)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
Finding of Fact
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1988)
(Brennan, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
1999]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Fine
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7 (1993) (Blackmun,
J.)
A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791)
A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780)
A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1702)
SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1780)
WALKER, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791)
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 292, 297 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
BLOUNT, A LAW-DICTIONARY (1670)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785)
RICHARDSON, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1839)
SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(6th ed. 1796)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
Fines for Offences
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 265 nn.6 & 7 (1989) (Blackmun, J.)
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1852)
CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1771)
TOMLIN'S LAW DICTIONARY (1836)
Firm
United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 261 n.5 (1966) (White, J.)
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1948)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951)
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914)
CLARK & GOTTFIED, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS & FINANCE (1957)
CROWELL'S DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS & FINANCE (rev. ed. 1930)
DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS & INDUSTRY (Schwartz ed., 1954)
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW (1959)
DICTIONARY OF FOREIGN TRADE (Henius 2d ed. 1947)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
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Fix
Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 296 (1991) (White, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
For
AVCO Corp. v. United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement
Workers, 118 S. Ct. 1626, 1629 (1998) (Scalia, J., opinion of
Court)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Forfeit
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7 (1993) (Blackmun,
J.)
A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791)
A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780)
KERSEY, A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1702)
A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1702)
Foreiture
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7 (1993) (Blackmun,
J.)
SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1780)
WALKER, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791)
Forge
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1945)
Forged
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1945)
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Forthwith
Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 680 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Freebase
Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 515 nn.1 &
3 (1994) (Blackmun, J.)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
Freight
The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 130 (1894) (Brown, J.)
ANDERSON'S LAW DICTIONARY (1996)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
BURRiL'S LAW DICTIONARY
CENTURY DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
GGG
Game
White v. Aronson, 302 U.S. 16, 17 nn.2 & 3 (1937) (McReynolds,
J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY
Gang
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453-54 & n.3 (1939) (Butler,
J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY & ENCYCLOPEDIA (1902)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1915)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Garnishment
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 348 (1969) (Black,
J., dissenting)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
APPENDIX A: TERMS DEFINED
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 533 app. n.* (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
MATHEWS, A SURVEY OF ENGLISH DICTIONARIES (1933)
Genuine
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 61 (1993) (Thomas, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 533 app. n.* (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
MATHEWS, A SURVEY OF ENGLISH DICTIONARIES (1933)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Gerrymander
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 n.3 (1986) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
Good Will
Regents of Univ. of California v. Public Employment Relations Bd.,
485 U.S. 589, 610 & n.4 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
HHH
Habeas Corpus
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 n.10 (1950) (Jackson, J.)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
Harm
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 697 (1995) (Stevens, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1966)
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1970)
19991 339
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Harsh
Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5, 17 & n.13 (1938) (Black, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1939)
Have
Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207
(1997) (Scalia, J.)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Hawkers
Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296, 306 (1895) (Gray, J.)
TOmLIN'S LAW DICTIONARY
Head
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 503 n.20 (1982) (Marshall, J.)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1980)
Health
United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971) (Black, J.)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Hearing
United States v. Patterson, 150 U.S. 65, 68 (1893) (Brewer, J.)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
Hematoma
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 657 n.9 (1977) (Powell, J.)
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (23d ed. 1976)
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Hideous
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)
No specific dictionary listed
High Seas
United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 270 (1893) (Gray, J.,
dissenting)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
III
Imbecile
Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 140 n.* (1952) (Minton, J.,
dissenting)
FAIRCHILD, DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY (1944)
Immediate
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Courtney, 186 U.S. 342, 346 (1902)
(White, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Imminent
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996) (O'Connor,
J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d
ed. 1934)
19991
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Impost
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S.
564, 637-38 n.20 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th
ed. 1789)
BARCLAY'S UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (B. Woodward rev.,
1782)
BLOUNT, A LAW DICTIONARY (1670)
A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796)
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
Impound
United States v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 253, 264 (1980) (Blackmun,
J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914)
In
Dumn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S. 465, 470
(1997) (Stevens, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
In Limine
Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984) (Burger, C.J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
In Pari Delicto Potior Est Conditio Defendentis
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306-
07 & n.11 (1985) (Brennan, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
In Relation To
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29, 231, 237-38 (1993)
(O'Connor, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1939)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.
1950)
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Incident
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 705 n.1O (1993) (Scalia, J.)
A LAW DICTIONARY (1883)
Incidents Of Ownership
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 705 n.10 (1993) (Scalia, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Include
Montello Salt Co. v. Utah, 221 U.S. 452, 464-65 (1911) (McKenna,
J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Including
P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 77 n.7 (1979) (Powell, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1973)
Income
Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 374-75 (1987) (Scalia, J.)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 673 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206-07 (1920) (Pitney, J.)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
CENTURY DICTIONARY
STANDARD DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Incompetency
Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399, 407 (1958) (Burton,
J.) (quoting Horosko v. Mt. Pleasant Sch. Dist., 6 A.2d 866, 868,
869-70 (Pa. 1939))
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed.)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (Rawles 3d rev., 1914)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' STANDARD DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Indecent
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 n.14 (1978) (Stevens,
J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1966)
Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 483 n.4 (1962) (Harlan, J.,
judgment & plurality opinion)
WEBSTER'S THIMD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1956)
Inference
NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 814-15
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Inferiour
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 719 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785)
Initiated
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.)
No specific dictionary listed
Injure
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 710 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1991)
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Injury
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 117 (1994) (Souter, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1957)
Insanity
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 96 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914)
Institute
Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 124 (1991) (Souter, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.
unabr. 1987)
Institution
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 371 n.9 (1964) (White, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Instrumentality
United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2034, 2036 n.9 (1998)
(Thomas, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Insurance
Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211
(1979) (Stewart, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1958)
Nationsbank of N. Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513
U.S. 251, 264 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
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Intended
Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701, 729 n.12 (1949)
(Burton, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1938)
Intent
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517, 521 n.l1 (1979)
(Brennan, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1974)
Intention
United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 311 n.2 (1969) (Harlan,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)
Interest
Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 315 n.2 (1986)
(Blackmun, J.)
2 PALGRAVE'S DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (H. Higgs ed.,
1925)
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983) (Blackmun, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1979)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INV'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 396 (1906) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 745 (1996) (Scalia, J.)
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW (J. Merrill ed.,
1890)
A LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1856)
A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY (2d ed. 1860)
LAW LEXICON OR DICTIONARY OF JURISPRUDENCE (2d Amer. ed.
1860)
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Interested
Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 371 (1906) (Harlan, J.)
STROUD'S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY
Interference
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,243 n.* (1978)
(Stevens, J., concurring)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Intervene
Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 329 (1912) (Day, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Intrauterine Device
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 630 n.2 (1985) (White, J.)
URDANG DICTIONARY OF CURRENT MEDICAL TERMS (1981)
Invents
Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 308 n.3 (1961)
(Warren, C.J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY
Invidious
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 274
(1993) (Scalia, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND INT'L DICTIONARY (1954)
Involving
Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995)
(Breyer, J.)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
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Irregularity
Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 128 (1989) (Scalia,
J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND INT'L DICTIONARY (1950)
Islands
Stewart v. United States, 316 U.S. 354, 362 n.6 (1942) (Roberts, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
JJJ
Jurisdiction
United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 480 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
KKK
Knowledge
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590
(1993) (Blackmun, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
LLL
Lay-off
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 286-87
nn.10 & 11 (1946) (Douglas, J.)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
Legacy
United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 184 (1923) (quoting Orton
v. Orton, 42 N.Y. 486 (1867)) (Sutherland, J.)
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
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Legislative Officer
Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 113 (1916) (White, C.J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (1897)
Lesser Offense
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 708-09 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)
Lesion
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 536 (1991) (Marshall,
J.)
GRAND LAROUSSE DE LA LANGUE FRANgAISE (1987)
JERAUTE, VOCABULAIRE FRANQAIS-ANGLAIS ET ANGLAIS-FRANQAIS
DE TERMES ET LOCUTIONS JURIDIQUES (1953)
Lesion Corporelle
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 536 (1991) (Marshall,
J.)
JERAUTE, VOCABULAIRE FRANgAIS-ANGLAIS ET ANGLAIS-FRANQAIS
DE TERMES ET LOCUTIONS JURIDIQUES (1953)
Lewd
Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 483 n.4 (1962) (Harlan, J.,
judgment & plurality opinion)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1956)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
Lewdly
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 60 n.3 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1869)
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY (1860)
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Liable
Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 296 (1895) (Brown, J.)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Licentious
City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2173 (1997) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
Likely
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 334, 335 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Limitation
Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. 290, 300 & n.++ (1866) (Clifford, J.)
BouviER's LAW DICTIONARY
Liquors
Hollender v. Magone, 149 U.S. 586, 589 (1893) (Brewer, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Lithograph
Arthur v. Moller, 97 U.S. 365, 367-68 (1878) (Hunt, J.)
MCELRATH'S COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
Lottery
Homer v. United States, 147 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1893) (Blatchford,
J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
IMPERIAL DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
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Lust
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500 n.10 (1985)
(White, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1949)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 5th ed. 1981)
MMM
Magazines
Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88, 96 (1904) (Brown, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY
Magistrate
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 349 n.7 (1972) (Powell,
J.)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY (1966)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1957)
Major
Bragdon v. Abbot, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2215 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1994)
Make
United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 48 (1937) (McReynolds, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Malice
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 60 n.3 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)
ABBOTT'S LAW DICTIONARY (1879)
STORMONTH'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1885)
WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1869)
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY (1860)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199 n.1 (1979) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Malt Liquor
Sarls v. United States, 152 U.S. 570, 572 (1894) (Shiras, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Manifest
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836
(1995) (Kennedy, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Manipulate
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 nn.20 & 21 (1975)
(Powell, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
Manipulation
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 7 & n.5 (1985)
(Burger, C.J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
Manufacture
American Fruit Growers Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)
(McReynolds, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Market
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) (Scalia,
J.)
OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1955)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
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Market Value
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1994) (Scalia,
J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Material
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 786 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 128 (1997) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Maturity
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 77 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933)
CYCLOPEDIC LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1922)
Maximum
United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997) (Thomas, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1958)
Merchand
Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 501 n.1 (1849) (Daniel,
J., dissenting)
RICHARDSON'S DICTIONARY
Merchantile
Toxaway Hotel Co. v. J.L. Smathers & Co., 216 U.S. 439, 448
(1910) (Lurton, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Metals
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 537 (1903) (Brown,
J.)
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY
Mine
Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U.S. 11, 12 (1885) (Matthews, J.)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Mines
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 535 (1903) (Brown,
J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
JACOB'S LAw DICTIONARY
Mineral
Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U.S. 11, 12 (1885) (Matthews, J.)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Minerals
Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 610 (1978)
(Marshall, J.) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S.
526, 530 (1903))
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 535 (1903) (Brown,
J.) (quoting Rosse v. Waiman, 14 Mees. & W. 859, 872 (Parke, J.))
CENTURY DICTIONARY
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY
Mixture
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991) (Rehnquist,
C.J.)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
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Mobilia Sequuntur Personum
Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 441 U.S. 434, 442 (1979)
(Blackmun, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)
Modification
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
241 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933)
Modify
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
225, 226-28, n.5 (1994) (Scalia, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICITONARY (2d ed. 1989)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH USAGE (2d ed. 1987)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1991)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1973)
WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1963)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1949)
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1934)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
242 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH USAGE (2d ed. 1987)
WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1963)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1934)
Money
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 584 (1870) (Chase, C.J.,
dissenting)
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY
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Monopoly
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 & n.6
(1933) (Roberts, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Moral Certainty
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 12-13, 14-15 (1994) (O'Connor, J.)
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(3d ed. 1992)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.
1983)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1979)
Moral Evidence
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1994) (O'Connor, J.)
COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1991)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1979)
Moral Turpitude
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 n.7 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
BOUvIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (Rawles 3d rev., 1914)
Motion
Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 126 n.4 (1996) (Thomas,
J.)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH USAGE (2d ed. 1987)
Motor Home
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 406 n.20 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
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Movement
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 188 n.* (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
NNN
Necessary
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 515 n.13
(1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., judgment & plurality opinion)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Neglect
Pioneer Investment Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380,
388 (1993) (White, J.)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Hackfeld & Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1905) (Day,
J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
STANDARD DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY
No
Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 808 (1998) (Scalia, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Note
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
468 U.S. 137, 164-65 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Notwithstanding
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1241 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
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Nunnery
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 438 n.3 (1975) (Marshall,
J., dissenting)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
000
Obscene
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 n.2 (1973) (Burger, C.J.)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1969)
Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 483 n.4 (1962) (Harlan,
J., judgment & plurality opinion)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1956)
Objective
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818, 824
(1998) (Scalia, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
Occupational
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 212
n.1 (1991) (White, J., concurring in part & concurring in judgment)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Of
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 182 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
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Offence
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
DICTIONARIUM BRITANNICUM (Bailey ed., 1730)
KERSEY, A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1702)
SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1780)
WALKER, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
Office
Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 113 (1916) (White, C.J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY
Officer
Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 113 (1916) (White, C.J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
WALKER, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791)
Oid
Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg.Co., 220 U.S. 446, 454-
55 (1911) (McKenna, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Omit
Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 32 (1958) (Harlan, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1939)
On Account Of
O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 83 (1996) (Breyer, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Operate
United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1887 (1998) (Souter J.)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1958)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co v. Coughran, 303 U.S. 485, 491
(1938)
(McReynolds, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Opprobrious
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974) (Brennan,
J.) (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972))
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972) (Brennan, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1961)
Or
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 255 (1994)
(Blackmun, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 334, 335 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Ore
Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U.S. 11, 12 (1885) (Matthews, J.)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Organize
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 305-07 n.7 (1957) (Harlan, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1947)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Original
United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 71 (1994) (Rehnquist,
C.J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
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Originate
Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 244 (1991) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
Oven
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 324 n.2 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
WEBSTER'S THMn NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Owner
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 298-99 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Ownership
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 298-99 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
PPP
Packer
Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Halliburton, 306 U.S. 550, 552 & n.4 (1939)
(Butler, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1935)
Pardon
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 232 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 273 n.8 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)
1999]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Parens Patriae
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S.
592, 600 n.8 (1982) (White, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Parody
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 n.12 (1994)
(Souter, J.)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
Partiality
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 552 (1994) (Scalia, J.)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
Participate
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1955
(1998) (Scalia, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-79 (1993) (Blackmun,
J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Pattern
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989)
(Brennan, J.)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
Payment
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 624 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part & concurring in judgment)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
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Peace
City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2174 n.1 (1997)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part)
WEBSTER'S, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
Peer
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 571 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in judgment)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1958)
Per Curiam
Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 409 n.17 (1987) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Periodical
Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88, 96 (1904) (Brown, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Person
Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2098 (1998) (Stevens,
J.)
WEBSTER'S THIM NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Personal Injuries
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235-36 n.6 (1992)
(Blackmun, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 243 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Picketing
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 482 (1988) (O' Connor, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Pilots
Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 69 U.S. 450, 461-62 n.12 (1864) (Field, J.)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
Pitiless
Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471-72 (1993) (O'Connor, J.)
WEBSTER'S THnRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Plain
Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 516 (1981) (Brennan,
J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
Policy
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 n.9 (1986)
(Brennan, J.)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY (1966)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1979)
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 499-500 (1986)
(Powell, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1979)
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 482 (1991) (White, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part & concurring in judgment)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 n.6 (1985)
(Rebnquist, J.)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
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Pornography
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 n.2 (1973) (Burger, C.J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1969)
Potential
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 402 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1958)
Pound Troy
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 601 & n.150 (1870) (Chase, C.J.,
dissenting)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
Poverty
Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199, 203 (1993)
(Souter, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1942)
Present
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 118 S. Ct. 1618, 1624 (1998)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1991)
Presume
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517, 521 n.11 (1979)
(Brennan, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1974)
Prevariquez
Patapasco Ins. Co. v. Coulter, 28 U.S. 222, 230 (1830) (Johnson, J.)
"The best French dictionary we have"
Price lEarnings Ratio
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 337 (1996) (Souter, J.)
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY & FINANCE (1992)
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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Primarily
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441,
446 (1947) (Douglas, J.)
OXFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Prime Mover
Coverdale v. Arkansas-Lousiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604, 607
n.1 (1938) (Reed, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1935)
Principal
Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 174 (1993) (Kennedy, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 191 n.15 (1993) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1966)
Print
Arthur v. Moller, 97 U.S. 365, 368 (1878) (Hunt, J.)
MCCULLOCH'S DICTIONARY OF COMMERCE
Prison
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 581 n.9 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Private
Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press,
489 U.S. 749, 763-64 & n.16 (1989) (Stevens, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
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Procedure
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 80 (1995)
(O'Connor, J.)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH USAGE (2d ed. 1987)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Proclamation
Lapeyre v. United States, 84 U.S. 191, 195 & n.++ (1872) (Swayne,
J.)
COWEL'S LAW DICTIONARY
JACOB'S LAW DICTIONARY
Profane
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 524-25, 537-38 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
BARCLAY, A COMPLETE & UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1782)
KENRICK, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1773)
Profession
United States v. Laws, 163 U.S. 258, 266 (1896) (Peckham, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
Prohibit
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439, 468 n.4 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Prohibition
Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 535-36 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part
& dissenting in part)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
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Promote
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836
(1995) (Kennedy, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Prompt
Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 335 (1986) (White, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unab. 1976)
Propaganda
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 477-78 n.10 (1987) (Stevens, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (College ed. 1968)
Property
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979) (Burger, C.J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 n.14 & 15 (1947) (Vinson,
C.J.)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr.)
Prophaneness
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 538 app. (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (1792)
Proprietary
Ferguson v. Arthur, 117 U.S. 482, 487 (1886) (Blatchford, J.)
IMPERIAL DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
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Proprietor
Ferguson v. Arthur, 117 U.S. 482, 487 (1886) (Blatchford, J.)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Prospectus
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 575-76 (1995)
(Kennedy, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910)
Prostitution
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 17 nn.3, 4 (1946)
(Douglas, J.)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
Proximate
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 717, 732-33 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(2d ed. 1949)
Provide
John Hancock lMut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank,
510 U.S. 86, 112 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Provide For
Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 473 (1993) (Thomas, J.)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1981)
Pruriency
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 496 (1985) (White,
J.) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957))
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1949)
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (Brennan, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1949)
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Prurient
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500 n.10 (1985)
(White, J.) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20
(1957))
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unab. 4th ed. 1976)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (unabr. 1949)
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (Brennan, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1949)
Public Corporation
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 n.9 (1989)
(White, J.)
ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS & PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR
ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE (1879)
ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW (1893)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (1891)
BURRiLL, A LAW DICTIONARY & GLOSSARY (2d ed. 1871)
Public Domain
Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 428 n.8 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Punish
Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 392-93 (1866) (Miller, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Punishment
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 854-55 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1923)
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Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)
A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780)
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791)
CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (1771)
A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780)
JACOB, THE LAW-DICTIONARY: ExPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS,
AND PRESENT STATE, OF THE ENGLISH LAW (1811)
A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (1771)
SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1780)
WALKER, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
Punitive Damages
Molzofv. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307 (1992) (Thomas, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933)
CYCLOPEDIC LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1940)
Purportedly
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 63 (1990) (O'Connor, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Purpose
Department of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 505 (1993)
(Blackmun, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Pursuant
Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 218 n.* (1968) (White, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1957)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Pursuant To
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U.S. 379, 383 n.3
(1937) (McReynolds, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1935)
Puzzle
White v. Anderson, 302 U.S. 16, 17 nn.2 & 3 (1937) (McReynolds,
J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
QQQ
Quickening
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 & n.20, 159, 160 & n.59 (1973)
(Blackmun, J.)
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (24th ed. 1965)
RRR
Race
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1987)
(White, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY & CYCLOPEDIA (1911)
DONALD, CHAMBER'S ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1871)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1830)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1841)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(W. Wheeler ed., 1887)
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1916)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1986)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
Rate
Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 745 (1996) (Scalia, J.)
WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
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Rating
Insurance Cos. v. Wright, 68 U.S. 456, 473 n.13 (1863) (Miller, J.)
MCCULLOCH'S COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY
Reasonable
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 576, 577 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part & concurring in judgment))
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Recklessness
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 60 n.3, 62 n.4 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)
STORMONTH'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1885)
Recovery
Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1990) (Scalia, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Redeem
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 428 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Smyth v. United States, 302 U.S. 329, 365 n.1 (1937) (McReynolds,
J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Redress
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 85 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
Re fouler
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 181 nn.37 & 38
(1993) (Stevens, J.)
LAROUSSE MODERN FRENCH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1978)
NEW CASSELL'S FRENCH DICTIONARY (1973)
1999]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 191-92 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)
DICTIONNAIRE LAROUSSE (1981)
Refund
United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 417 (1938) (Black, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (unabr.)
Refuse Matter
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 234 (1966)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Regularly
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 259 (1990) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Relate
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 n.16 (1983)
(Blackmun, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Relate To
District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S.
125, 129 (1992) (Thomas, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Relating To
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)
(Scalia, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
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Relief
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 269 n.4 (1993) (White, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Religion
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 648-49 & n.5 (1989)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785)
SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(6th ed. 1796)
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 351-52 & n.5 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring in result)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1934)
Remedial
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 269 n.4 (1993) (White, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Remedial Action
United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2034, 2036 n.9 (1998)
(Thomas, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Remedy
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 269 n.4 (1993) (White, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 516 (1981) (Brennan,
J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 532 n.4 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
1999]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Chelentis v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918)
(McReynolds, J.)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
Representatives
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Request
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490
U.S. 296, 301 (1989) (Brennan, J.)
ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS & PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR
ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE (1879)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (1891)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Require
Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 535-36 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part
& dissenting in part)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Required
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
226-27 (1994) (Scalia, J.)
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993)
Respect
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 648-49 & n.5 (1989)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1989)
SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(6th ed. 1796)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1988)
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Restitution
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 416 (1990) (Marshall, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Retail
Roland Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657, 673 (1946) (Burton, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1938)
Retroactive Statute
Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269 n.23 (1994)
(Stevens, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Return
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 181 nn.37 & 38
(1993) (Stevens, J.)
LAROUSSE MODERN FRENCH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1978)
NEW CASSELL'S FRENCH DICTIONARY (1973)
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 191 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 219 (1905) (Brewer, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
STANDARD DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Right
Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 447 n.7 (1991) (White, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Chelentis v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918)
(McReynolds, J.)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
1999] 377
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Ritual
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 534 (1993) (Kennedy, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
Roach
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 501 n.18 (1982) (Marshall, J.)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1980)
LINGEMAN, DRUGS FROM A TO Z: A DICTIONARY (1969)
Robbery
Deal v. United States, 274 U.S. 277, 283 (1927) (McReynolds, J.)
BOUvIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
Running Board
Shields v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 350 U.S. 318, 326 n.2
(1956) (Reed, J., dissenting)
THE CAR-BUILDER'S DICTIONARY (1879)
Rubberoid
Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U.S. 446,
454-55 (1911) (McKenna, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
SSS
Sacrifice
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 534 (1993) (Kennedy, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
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Sacrilege
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 520 n.28, 524 n. 43-
45, 525-26 n. 47, 526-27 n. 48, 534-40 app. (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in judgment)
ASH, THE NEW & COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1775)
BAILEY, UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1742)
BAILEY, UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1730)
BARCLAY, A COMPLETE & UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1782)
BELL, A DICTIONARY & DIGEST OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND (1861)
BLOUNT, A LAW-DICTIONARY (1670)
BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION &
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (11th ed. 1866)
BROWN, A LAW DICTIONARY (Sprague ed., 1875)
BUCHANAN, A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1769)
BULLOKAR, THE ENGLISH EXPOSITOR (14th ed. 1731)
BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (1792)
COCKER, ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1724)
COCKERAM, ENGLISH DICTIONARIE (10th ed. 1651)
COLES, AN ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1732)
CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1771)
DEFOE, A COMPLEAT ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1735)
DYCHE, THE NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICITIONARY (1777)
ENTICK, NEW SPELLING DICTIONARY (1786)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1913)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1895)
GORDON & MARCHANT, A NEW COMPLETE ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(1760)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1755)
KENRICK, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1773)
KERSEY, A GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1721)
MARTIN, A NEW UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1754)
RICHARDSON, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1839)
RIDER, A NEW UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1759)
SCOTT, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1797)
SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(6th ed. 1796)
STAUNTON, AN ECCLESIASTICAL DICTIONARY (1861)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1934)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1909)
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WEBSTER'S INT'L DICTIONARY (1890)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828)
WEBSTER'S COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1806)
Sacrilegious
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 520 n.28, 525-26
n.47, 534-35, 538 app. (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
judgment)
BAILEY, UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1730)
COCKERAM, ENGLISH DICTIONARIE (10th ed. 1651)
DYCHE, THE NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICITIONARY (1777)
ENTICK, NEW SPELLING DICTIONARY (1786)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1937)
PHILLIPS, THE NEW WORLD OF WORDS (3d ed. 1671)
WEBSTER'S COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1806)
WEBSTER'S INTL DICTIONARY (1890)
WEBSTER'S NEW INVL DICTIONARY (1909)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
Salary
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 171-72 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1957)
Sale
Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 507 (1941) (Stone, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Salmonid
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 366 n.6
(1989) (Stevens, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
APPENDIX A: TERMS DEFINED
Salvage Value
Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 106 n.7 (1960)
(Clark, J.)
KOHLER, A DICTIONARY FOR ACCOUNTANTS (1952)
Sanction
Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 621 (1992) (Souter, J.)
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Sauce
Boggle v. Maggone, 152 U.S. 623, 626 (1894) (Gray, J.)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Scab
Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283 (1974)
(Marshall, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part & concurring in judgment)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
Scheme
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696 n.13 (1980) (Stewart, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
Scientific
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590
(1993) (Blackmun, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Seaworthiness
Martin v. Steamship Southwark, 191 U.S. 1, 8 (1903) (Day, J.)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
1999]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Segregate
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 671 n.7 (1993) (White, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1983)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Seizure
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (Scalia, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1856)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
Seminary
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 872
n.1 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
Seniority
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 605 n.12, 606
n.15 (1980) (Stevens, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 612-13 nn.3 & 4
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (1969)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY (1966)
ROBERTS' DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1966)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
Sentence
United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 71 (1994) (Rehnquist,
C.J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
APPENDIX A: TERMS DEFINED
Service of Process
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700
(1988) (O'Connor, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Servitude
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 961-62 (1988) (Brennan,
J., concurring)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1913)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1944)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1869)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1910)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d
ed. 1949)
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (Brewer, J.)
'W\ebster"
Shall
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 432-33 n.9 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J.)
DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (2d ed. 1995)
MELLINKOFF'S DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE (1992)
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 439 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Sheriff
McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama, 520 U.S. 781, 794 (1997)
(Rehnquist, C.J.)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (Rawles 3d rev., 1914)
1999]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Ship
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 512 (1945)
(Murphy, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Shows
Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 700 (1995) (Stevens, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1942)
Slave
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (Brewer, J.)
"Webster"
Slavery
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (Brewer, J.)
"Webster"
Smuggler
Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 461 (1899) (Brown, J.,
dissenting)
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY
Smugglers
Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 461 (1899) (Brown, J.,
dissenting)
BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (1792)
Smuggling
Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 461-62 (1899) (Brown, J.,
dissenting)
BELL'S DICTIONARY OF SCOTTISH LAW
BROWN'S LAW DICTIONARY (1874)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
IMPERIAL DICTIONARY
STANDARD DICTIONARY
TOMLIN'S LAW DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
384
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Sole
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
Solicit
Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S.
214, 223 (1992) (Scalia, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Solicitation
Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S.
214, 223 (1992) (Scalia, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Specifically
Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 38 (1996)
(Breyer, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Speedy
Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 516 (1981) (Brennan,
J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
Spirituous Liquors
Sarls v. United States, 152 U.S. 570, 572 (1894) (Shiras, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Stare Decisis
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 954 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in judgment in part & dissenting in part)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
1999] 385
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
State
Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186, 254 (1996)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1957)
Statement
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994) (O'Connor,
J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 808 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
opinion of the Court)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Statute
John P. King Mfg. Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277 U.S. 100,
102-03 (1928) (Van DeVanter, J.)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (Rawle's Rev.)
United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 445 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
Steal
United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 412 (1957) (Burton, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951)
Stolen
United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 412 & n.8 (1957) (Burton, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1953)
Subject To
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (Scalia, J.)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
386
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Substantial
Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 118 (1997)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1985)
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 19 (1994) (O'Connor, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564 (1988) (Scalia, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1945)
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 576-77 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part & concurring in judgment))
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 98 n.16 (1981) (Brennan, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Suit
Case of the Sewing Machine Cos., 85 U.S. 553, 585 n.++ (1873)
(Clifford, J.)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 143 (1880) (Miller, J.,
dissenting)
BOUvIER's LAW DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
Supreme Being
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 & n.2 (1965) (Clark, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1958)
Surrender
Keppel v. Tiffin Sav. Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 383 (1905) (White, J.)
STANDARD DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S INTL DICTIONARY
388 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Keppel v. Tiffin Sav. Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 362 (1905) (Day, J.,
dissenting)
STANDARD DICTIONARY
System
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 605 n.12, 606
n.15 (1980) (Stevens, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
TTT
Take
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 717, 732-33 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d
ed. 1949)
Take Into Consideration
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2189
(1998) (Souter, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
Tax
Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664 (1874) (Miller, J.)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Temperance
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 491 n.4 (1996)
(Stevens, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Terminate
EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988)
(Marshall, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
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Termination
EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988)
(Marshall, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Testimony
United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 322 (1992) (Thomas, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 720 n.2 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Theft
United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 412 n.8 (1957) (Burton, J.)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d rev. ed. 1914)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTVL DICTIONARY (1953)
Theism
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 & n.2 (1965) (Clark, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1958)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1949)
Tidelands
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476-77 n.6
(1988) (White, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
To Cane
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29, 231, 237-38 (1993)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.
1950)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1939)
390 BUFFALO LAWREVIEW
To Carry On
Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1885) (Woods,
J.)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
To Print
Arthur v. Moller, 97 U.S. 365, 367-68 (1878) (Hunt, J.)
MCELRATH'S COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
To Profane
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 524-25 nn.44 & 45,
538 app. (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
BARCLAY, A COMPLETE & UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1782)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE
FUNK & WAGNALLS' STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1895)
To Smuggle
Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 461 (1899) (Brown, J.,
dissenting)
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY
To Use
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1993) (O'Connor, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.
1950)
Tonality
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 810 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting)
THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC & MUSICIANS (S. Sadie ed.,
1980)
APPENDIX A: TERMS DEFINED
Tonnage
Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238, 243 (1876) (Swayne,
J.)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
COWEL'S LAW DICTIONARY (1708)
Tort
Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 526 n.23 (1992)
(Stevens, J., judgment of the Court & opinion)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Town
Town of Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1887) (Bradley, J.)
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY
OGrLVIE'S DICTIONARY
RICHARDSON'S DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Tradesman
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 892 n.6 (1961) (Stewart, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1958)
Trainer sur la Claie
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 453 n.8 (1956) (Douglas,
J., dissenting)
SAINT-EDME, DICTIONNAIRE DE LA PENALIT. DANS TOUTES LES
PARTIES DU MONDE CONNU (1825)
Trample
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 n.7 (1990) (Brennan,
J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
19991
BUFFALO LAWREVIEW
Trust
Mallinckrodt Chemical Workers v. Missouri ex rel. Jones, 238 U.S.
41, 53 (1915) (Pitney, J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Try
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1993) (Rehnquist,
C.J.)
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1796)
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1785)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
uUU
Understand
ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 328 (1994) (Scalia,
J., concurring)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
Unequivocal
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 n.9 (1979) (Burger, C.J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Unjust
Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5, 17 & n.13 (1938) (Black, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1939)
Unreasonable
Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5, 17 & n.13 (1938) (Black, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1939)
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Use
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (O'Connor, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d
ed. 1949)
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29, 231, 237-38 (1993)
(O'Connor, J.)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1939)
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241-42 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1939)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1939)
Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 479 (1990) (O'Connor, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Useful Life
Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 106 n.7 (1960)
(Clark, J.)
KOHLER, A DICTIONARY FOR ACCOUNTANTS (1952)
Vvv
Veto
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 925 n.2 (1983) (Burger, C.J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Viable
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 & n.20, 159, 160 & n.59 (1973)
(Blackmun, J.)
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (24th ed. 1965)
Victualling House
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 297 n.17 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring)
STROUD, JUDICIAL DICTIONARY (1903)
394 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Vile
Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 483 n.4 (1962) (Harlan, J.,
judgment & plurality opinion)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1956)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
Village
Town of Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1887) (Bradley, J.)
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY
OGILVIE'S DICTIONARY
RICHARDSON'S DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WWW
Wanton
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 60 n.3 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)
STORMONTH'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1885)
WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1869)
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY (1860)
Wantonly
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 60 n.3 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1869)
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY (1860)
Watch
O'Hara v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 269 U.S. 364, 371 (1926)
(Sutherland, J.)
DANA, DICTIONARY OF SEA TERMS
APPENDIX A: TERMS DEFINED
White Slave
United States v. Beach, 324 U.S. 193, 197 n.2 (1945) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Willful
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 137 (1988)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974, 977 n.7 (1998) (Ginsburg, J.)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
With Reference To
Banco Mexicano de Commercio e Industria v. Deutsche Bank, 263
U.S. 591, 601 (1924) (McKenna, J.)
STANDARD DICTIONARY
Withholding
Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 61 (1990) (Marshall, J.)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Witness
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part & concurring in judgment) (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting))
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 221 n.2 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)
CUNNNGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1771)
1999]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Work
Tennessee Coal, Iron & Rail Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321
U.S. 590, 598 n.11 (1944) (Murphy, J.)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr.)
Working Conditions
Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 201 & n.21 (1974)
(Marshall, J.)
DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (3d ed. 1965)
Worsted
United States v. Klumpp, 169 U.S. 209, 212 (1898) (Fuller, C.J.)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Wrench
Schumacher v. Cornell, 96 U.S. 549, 554 (1877) (Swayne, J.)
KNIGHT'S MECHANICAL DICTIONARY
XXX
YYY
zzz
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
CITING DICTIONARIES THROUGH THE 1997-1998 TERM
AAA
BBB
Associate Justice Hugo Black (1937-1971)
6 cases (0.18/year) and 11 terms (0.32/year)
United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971)
(Health)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 348 (1969) (Black
J., dissenting)
(Garnishment)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
Washington Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 47 & nn.10 & 11
(1939) (Black J., dissenting)
(Condition Precedent)
(Condition Subsequent)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933)
Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5, 17 & n.13 (1938) (Black, J.,
dissenting)
(Unreasonable)
(Capricious)
(Unjust)
(Harsh)
(Arbitrary)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1939)
397
398 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 417 (1938)
(Refund)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (unabr.)
United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 549 n.14 (1938)
(Counterfeit)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1914)
Associate Justice Harry Blackmun (1970-1994)
24 cases (1.00/year) and 36 terms (1.50/year)
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 255 (1994)
(Or)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 854-55 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)
(Punishment)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1923)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 515 nn.1 &
3 (1994)
(Bong)
(Freebase)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 428 n.8 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)
(Public Domain)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590
(1993)
(Scientific)
(Knowledge)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Department of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 505 (1993)
(Purpose)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
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Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 191-92 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(Refouler)
DICTIONNAIRE LAROUSSE (1981)
(Return)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7 (1993)
(Fine)
(Forfeit)
A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791)
A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780)
KERSEY, A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1702)
A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1702)
SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1780)
WALKER, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791)
Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 484 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)
(Cold Blood)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-79 (1993)
(Aid and Abet)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
(Conduct)
(Participate)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 535-36
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment
in part & dissenting in part)
(Prohibition)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
(Require)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235-36 n.6 (1992)
(Personal Injuries)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
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Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 529-30
(1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(Anonymous)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153 (1989)
(Compilation)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 265 nn.6 & 7, 267 n.10 (1989)
(Damages)
(Fines for Offences)
BLOUNT, A LAW-DICTIONARY (1670)
BOUVIER, LAW-DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1852)
CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1771)
TOMLIN'S LAW DICTIONARY (1836)
Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 315 n.2 (1986)
(Interest)
2 PALGRAVE'S DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (H. Higgs ed.
1925)
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 n.16 (1983)
(Relate)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983)
(Interest)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1979)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 323 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)
(Disclaimer)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
United States v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 253, 264 (1980)
(Impound)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914)
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National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472,
480 n.10 (1979)
(Chamber of Commerce)
(Board of Trade)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1913)
Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 441 U.S. 434, 442 (1979)
(Mobilia Sequuntur Personum)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)
Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 820 (1974)
(Acquire)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1966)
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 & n.20, 159, 160 & n.59 (1973)
(Quickening)
(Embryo)
(Fetus)
(Viable)
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (24th ed. 1965)
Associate Justice Samuel Blatchford (1882-1893)
3 cases (0.27/year) and 4 terms (0.36/year)
Homer v. United States, 147 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1893)
(Lottery)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
IMPERIAL DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
Ferguson v. Arthur, 117 U.S. 482, 487 (1886)
(Proprietary)
IMPERIAL DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
(Proprietary)
(Proprietor)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 299
(1884)
(Alizarin)
WATT'S DICTIONARY OF CHEMISTRY (1866)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Associate Justice Joseph Bradley (1870-1892)
1 case (0.05/year) and 2 terms (0.09/year)
Town of Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1887)
(Town)
(Village)
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY
OGILVIE'S DICTIONARY
RICHARDSON'S DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Associate Justice William Brennan, Jr. (1956-1990)
31 cases (0.91/year) and 43 terms (1.26/year)
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 n.7 (1990)
(Defile)
(Trample)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 202 n.8 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)
(Corporations)
ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW (1893)
BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION &
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (11th ed. 1866)
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 514 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Compassion)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1952)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1957)
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989)
(Pattern)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
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Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 79 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Body Politic)
ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS & PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR
ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE (1879)
ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW (1893)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (1891)
(Body Politic or Corporate)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
(Bodies Politic and Corporate)
BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION &
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (11th ed. 1866)
CYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF LAW (1901)
(Body Politic)
(Corporation Sole)
BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY & GLOSSARY (2d ed. 1871)
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490
U.S. 296, 301 (1989)
(Request)
ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS & PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR
ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE (1879)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (1891)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1988)
(Finding of Fact)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 961-62 n.9 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Servitude)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1944)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1913)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d
ed. 1949)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1910)
WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1869)
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Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 576, 577 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part & concurring in judgment)
(Substantial)
(Reasonable)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
McCoy v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 450 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Amicus Curiae)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 298-99 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Owner)
(Ownership)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439, 468 n.4 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Prohibit)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 184 (1988)
(Embargo)
BERENYI, THE MODERN AMERICAN BUSINESS DICTIONARY (1982)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 673 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)
(Income)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 n.9 (1986)
(Policy)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY (1966)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1979)
Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 745 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)
(Complaint)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (unabr. 1957)
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Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306-
07 & n.11 (1985)
(In Pari Delicto Potior Est Conditio Defendentis)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 529 n.4 (1984)
(Derivative Suit)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-09
(1981)
(Feasible)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1957)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 169 n.9 (1981)
(Authorize)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1976)
Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 516 (1981)
(Plain)
(Speedy)
(Efficient)
(Remedy)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 98 n.16 (1981)
(Substantial)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 720 n.2 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)
(Testimony)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517, 521 n.l1 (1979)
(Presume)
(Intent)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1974)
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Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974) (quoting
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972))
(Opprobrious)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405
U.S. 707, 710 n.1 (1972)
(Emplane)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972)
(Abusive)
(Opprobrious)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 211 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Color)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 306 n.7 (1969)
(Entertainment)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193 n.9 (1964) (Brennan, J.,
judgment & plurality opinion)
(Community)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957)
(Prurient)
(Pruriency)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1949)
Associate Justice David Brewer (1889-1910)
9 cases (0.43/year) and 11 terms (0.52/year)
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906)
(Slavery)
(Slave)
(Servitude)
"Webster"
APPENDIX B: JUSTICES
Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 396 (1906) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting)
(Interest)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
BOUVIER'S LAw DICTIONARY
United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 269-70 (1905) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting)
(Banishment)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
RAPALJE & LAWRENCE'S LAW DICTIONARY
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 219 (1905)
(Return)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
STANDARD DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 617-18 (1902)
(Excise)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
CENTURY DICTIONARY
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S INT'L DICTIONARY
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 102 (1901)
(Common Law)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 303 (1895)
(Felony)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
United States v. Patterson, 150 U.S. 65, 68 (1893)
(Hearing)
BouviER's LAW DICTIONARY
Hollender v. Magone, 149 U.S. 586, 589 (1893)
(Liquors)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
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Associate Justice Stephen Breyer (1994-present)
7 cases (1.75/year) and 9 terms (2.25/year)
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1914, 1915
(1998)
(Carries A Firearm)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(Carry Arms Or Weapons)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
(Carry)
THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY (1988)
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY (C. Onions ed., 1966)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.
unabr. 1987)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1986)
O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 83 (1996)
(On Account Of)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 38 (1996)
(Specifically)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995)
(Employee)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294 (1995)
(Collect Debt)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Schlitz Brewing Co.,
513 U.S. 414, 426 (1995)
(Amortization Plan)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
(Involving)
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Associate Justice Henry Brown (1891-1906)
7 cases (0.47/year) and 13 terms (0.87/year)
Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88, 96 (1904)
(Periodical)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
(Periodical)
(Magazines)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 537 (1903) (quoting
Rosse v. Waiman, 14 Mees. & W. 859, 872 (Parke, J.))
(Mines)
(Minerals)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
(Mines)
JACOB'S LAW DICTIONARY
(Metals)
(Minerals)
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY
Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 461-62 (1899) (Brown, J.,
dissenting)
(Smuggling)
BELL'S DICTIONARY OF SCOTTISH LAW
BROWN'S LAW DICTIONARY (1874)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
IMPERIAL DICTIONARY
STANDARD DICTIONARY
TOMLIN'S LAW DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
(Smugglers)
BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (1792)
(Smuggler)
(To Smuggle)
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY
Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 296 (1895)
(Liable)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
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Seeberger v. Wright & Lawther Oil & Lead Mfg. Co., 157 U.S. 183,
185 (1895)
(Draft)
(Draught)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
IMPERIAL DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S INT'L DICTIONARY (1890)
The Britannia, 153 U.S. 130, 148 (1894) (Brown, J., dissenting)
(Course)
IMPERIAL DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 130 (1894)
(Freight)
ANDERSON'S LAW DICTIONARY (1996)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
BURRILL'S LAW DICTIONARY
CENTURY DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
Chief Justice Warren Burger (1969-1986)
7 cases (0.41/year) and 8 terms (0.47/year)
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 7 & n.5 (1985)
(Manipulation)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984)
(In Limine)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 925 n.2 (1983)
(Veto)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)
(Hideous)
No specific dictionary listed
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Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979)
(Property)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 n.9 (1979)
(Unequivocal)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 n.2 (1973)
(Obscene)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
(Obscene)
(Pornography)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1969)
Associate Justice Harold Burton (1945-1958)
6 cases (0.46/year) and 9 terms (0.69/year)
Beilan v. Board of Public Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 407 (1958) (quoting
Horosko v. Mt. Pleasant Sch. Dist., 6 A.2d 866, 868, 869-70 (Pa.
1939) and construing Pennsylvania law)
(Incompetency)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed.)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (Rawles 3d rev., 1914)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' STANDARD DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 412 & n.8 (1957)
(Steal)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(Theft)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d rev. ed. 1914)
(Stolen)
(Theft)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1953)
Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701, 729 n.12 (1949)
(Burton, J., dissenting)
(Intended)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1938)
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Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 786 n.37 (1948)
(Excessive)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1938)
United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243 n.14, 246 (1947)
(Aribitrary)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1944)
(Aribitrary)
(Capricious)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1945)
Roland Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657, 673 (1946)
(Retail)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1938)
Associate Justice Pierce Butler (1923-1939)
2 cases (0.13/year) and 2 terms (0.13/year)
Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Halliburton, 306 U.S. 550, 552 & n.4 (1939)
(Packer)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1935)
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 454-55 & n.3 (1939)
(Gang)
CENTURY DICTIONARY & CYCLOPEDIA (1902)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1915)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
WYLD'S UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
CCC
Chief Justice Salmon Chase (1864-1873)
1 case (0.11/year) and 3 terms (0.33/year)
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 584, 601 & n.++ (1870) (Chase,
C.J., dissenting)
(Pound Troy)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
(Coining)
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(Money)
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY
Associate Justice Tom Clark (1949-1967)
2 cases (0.11/year) and 4 terms (0.22/year)
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 n.2 (1965)
(Theism)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1949)
(Supreme Being)
(Theism)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1958)
Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 106 n.7 (1960)
(Salvage Value)
(Useful life)
KOHLER, A DICTIONARY FOR ACCOUNTANTS (1952)
Associate Justice John Clarke (1916-1922)
1 case (0.17/year) and 1 term (0.17/year)
Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159, 169 (1920)
(Cattle)
STANDARD DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INT't DICTIONARY
Associate Justice Nathan Clifford (1858-1881)
4 cases (0.17/year) and 5 terms (0.22/year)
Case of the Sewing Machine Cos., 85 U.S. 553, 586 n.++ (1873)
(Suit)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Oulton v. Savings Inst., 84 U.S. 109, 118-19 n.* (1872)
(Banks)
MCCULLOCH'S COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY
Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. 290, 300 & n.++ (1866)
(Limitation)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
1999] 413
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Bank for Say. v. Collector, 70 U.S. 495, 512-13 & nn.* & + (1865)
(Banks of Deposit)
(Banks for Savings)
MCCULLOCH'S COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY
DDD
Associate Justice Peter Daniel (1842-1860)
1 case (0.06/year) and 2 terms (0.11/year)
Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 501 n.1 (1849) (Daniel, J.,
dissenting)
(Commerce)
(Merchand)
RICHARDSON'S DICTIONARY
Associate Justice David Davis (1862-1877)
1 case (0.07/year) and 1 term (0.07/year)
Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank, 88 U.S. 294, 299 n.* (1874)
(Cattle)
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
Associate Justice William Day (1903-1922)
7 cases (0.37/year) and 7 terms (0.37/year)
Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 329 (1912)
(Intervene)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., 211 U.S. 239, 246
(1908)
(Arrestment)
BouVIER's LAW DICTIONARY
CENTURY DICTIONARY
American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 290-91
(1907)
(Copyright)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (Rawle's Rev.)
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Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U.S. 453, 470-71
(1906)
(Exclusive)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Hackfeld & Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1905)
(Neglect)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
STANDARD DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Keppel v. Tiffin Say. Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 383 (1905) (Day, J.,
dissenting)
(Surrender)
STANDARD DICTIONARY
Martin v. Steamship Southwark, 191 U.S. 1, 8 (1903)
(Seaworthiness)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
Associate Justice William Douglas (1939-1975)
6 cases (0.17/year) and 8 terms (0.22/year)
BPOE Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 411 U.S. 924, 926 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from dismissal for lack of substantial
federal question)
(Ethnic)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 182 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part)
(Of)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 453 n.* (1956) (Douglas,
J., dissenting)
(Trainer sur la Claie)
SAINT-EDME, DICTIONNAIRE DE LA PENALIT DANS TOUTES LES
PARTIES Du MONDE CONNU (1825)
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Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441,
446 (1947)
(Primarily)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 17 n.4 (1946)
(Debauchery)
CENTURY DICTIONARY (Rev. ed.)
(Prostitution)
(Debauchery)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 286-87
nn.10 & 11 (1946)
(Discharge)
(Lay-off)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(Discharge)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
EEE
FFF
Associate Justice Stephen Field (1863-1897)
2 cases (0.06/year) and 2 terms (0.06/year)
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 721 (1877)
(Editor)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 69 U.S. 450, 461-62 n.* (1864)
(Pilots)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
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Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter (1939-1962)
2 cases (0.09/year) and 8 terms (0.35/year)
United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 445 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)
(Statute)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 520 n.28, 524-26 nn.
43-45 & 47, 526-27, nn.48 & 49, 534, 535-36, 537, 538, 539 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Sacrilege)
BULLOKAR, THE ENGLISH ExPOSITOR (14th ed. 1731)
COCKER, ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1724)
(Sacrilegious)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1937)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
ASH, THE NEW & COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1775)
BAILEY, UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1742)
BELL, A DICTIONARY & DIGEST OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND (1861)
BLOUNT, A LAW-DICTIONARY (1670)
BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION &
LAWS OF THE UNTED STATES OF AMERICA (11th ed. 1866)
BROWN, A LAW DICTIONARY (Sprague ed., 1875)
BUCHANAN, A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1769)
COLES, AN ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1732)
CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1771)
DEFOE, A COMPLEAT ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1735)
GORDON & MARCHANT, A NEW COMPLETE ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(1760)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1755)
KERSEY, A GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1721)
MARTIN, A NEW UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1754)
RICHARDSON, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1839)
RIDER, A NEW UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1759)
SCOTT, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1797)
SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(6th ed. 1796)
STAUNTON, AN ECCLESIASTICAL DICTIONARY (1861)
(Sacrilege)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
(To Profane)
BARCLAY, A COMPLETE & UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1782)
(Prophaneness)
(Sacrilege)
BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (1792)
(Sacrilege)
(Sacrilegious)
COCKERAM, ENGLISH DICTIONARiE (10th ed. 1651)
WEBSTER'S COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1806)
WEBSTER'S INT'L DICTIONARY (1890)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1909)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
(Sacrilege)
(To Profane)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1913)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1895)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilegious)
PHILLIPS, THE NEW WORLD OF WORDS (3d ed. 1671)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
(Profane)
KENRICK, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1773)
(General reference and no specific cite)
MATHEWS, A SURVEY OF ENGLISH DICTIONARIES (1933)
(Sacrilegious)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
BAILEY, UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1730)
DYCHE, THE NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICITIONARY (1777)
(Blasphemy)
(Blasphemer)
(Sacrilege)
(Sacrilegious)
ENTICK, NEW SPELLING DICTIONARY (1786)
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Chief Justice Melville Fuller (1888-1910)
3 cases (0.14/year) and 4 terms (0.18/year)
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292-93
(1904)
(Anarchy)
"Huxley"
(Anarchist)
(Anarchy)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
United States v. Klumpp, 169 U.S. 209, 212 (1898)
(Worsted)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Ernhardt v. Steinhardt, 153 U.S. 177, 182 (1894)
(Absinthe)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
GGG
Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (1993-Present)
6 cases (1.2/year) and 7 terms (1.4/year)
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1920, 1921 n.2 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(Carry Arms or Weapons)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
(Carry)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974, 977 n.7 (1998)
(Wiful)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 133 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(Equitable)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 432-33 n.9 (1995)
(Shall)
DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (2d ed. 1995)
MELLINKOFF'S DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE (1992)
Nationsbank of N. Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513
U.S. 251, 264 (1995)
(Insurance)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank,
510 U.S. 86, 112 (1993)
(Provide)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Associate Justice Arthur Goldberg (1962-1965)
1 case (0.33/year) and 1 term (0.33/year)
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 297 n.17 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring)
(Victualling House)
STROUD, JUDICIAL DICTIONARY (1903)
Associate Justice Horace Gray (1882-1902)
4 cases (0.20/year) and 4 terms (0.20/year)
Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296, 306 (1895)
(Hawkers)
TOMLIN'S LAW DICTIONARY
Boggle v. Maggone, 152 U.S. 623, 626 (1894)
(Sauce)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 270 (1893) (Gray, J.,
dissenting)
(High Seas)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
[Vol. 47420
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Magone v. Heller, 150 U.S. 70, 74 (1893)
(Expressly)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Associate Justice Robert Grier (1846-1870)
1 case (0.04/year) and 1 term (0.04/year)
Gordon v. United States, 74 U.S. 188, 194 & n.* (1868)
(Arbitrator)
BOJVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
HHH
Associate Justice John Harlan (1877-1911)
1 case (0.03/year) and 1 term (0.69/year)
Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 371 (1906)
(Interested)
STROUD'S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY
Associate Justice John Harlan (1955-1971)
7 cases (0.44/year) and 11 terms (0.69/year)
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 571 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in judgment)
(Peer)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 351-52 & n.5 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring in result)
(Religion)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1934)
United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 311 n.2 (1969) (Harlan,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Intention)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)
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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 234 (1966)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)
(Refuse Matter)
WEBSTER'S TH=D NEW INTL DICTIONARY
Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 483 n.4 (1962) (Harlan,
J., judgment & plurality opinion)
(Obscene)
(Lewd)
(Indecent)
(Filthy)
(Vile)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1956)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 32 (1958)
(Omit)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1939)
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 305-07 n.7 (1957)
(Organize)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1947)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Associate Justice Charles Hughes (1910-1916)
1 case (0.17/year) and 1 term (0.17/year)
Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580, 598 (1911)
(Abandonment)
DE MARAGY, INT'L DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
Associate Justice Ward Hunt (1873-1882)
1 case (0.11/year) and 3 terms (0.33/year)
Arthur v. Moller, 97 U.S. 365, 367-68 (1878)
(Print)
McCuLLOCH'S DICTIONARY OF COMMERCE
(To Print)
(Lithograph)
MCELRATH'S COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
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(Lithograph)
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
III
JJJ
Associate Justice Robert Jackson (1941-1954)
2 cases (0.15/year) and 3 terms (0.23/year)
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 n.7 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting)
(Moral Turpitude)
(Turptitude)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (Rawles 3d rev., 1914)
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 n.10 (1950)
(Habeas Corpus)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
Associate Justice William Johnson (1804-1834)
1 case (0.03/year) and I term (0.03/year)
Patapasco Ins. Co. v. Coulter, 28 U.S. 222, 230 (1830)
(Prevariquez)
"The best French dictionary we have"
KKK
Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy (1987-Present)
7 cases (0.64/year) and 9 terms (0.82/year)
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836
(1995)
(Promote)
(Manifest)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
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Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 575-76 (1995)
(Prospectus)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910)
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 534 (1993)
(Sacrifice)
(Ritual)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 174 (1993)
(Principal)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
Estate of Coward v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992)
(Entitle)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 96 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)
(Insanity)
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914)
Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 364 n.1
(1991)
(Depreciation)
MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS (3d ed. 1983)
LLL
Associate Justice Horace Lurton (1910-1914)
1 case (0.25/year) and I term (0.25/year)
Toxaway Hotel Co. v. J.L. Smathers & Co., 216 U.S. 439, 448
(1910)
(Merchantile)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
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MMM
Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall (1967-1991)
19 cases (0.79/year) and 29 terms (1.21/year)
United States v. Centennial Say. Bank FSB, 499 U.S. 573, 580 n.6
(1991)
(Discharge)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 530-31, 536 (1991)
(Lesion)
GRAND LAROUSSE DE LA LANGUE FRANQAISE (1987)
(Bodily Harm)
(Bodily Injury)
(Lesion)
(Corporel)
(Lesion Corporelle)
JERAUTE, VOCABULAIRE FRANQAIS-ANGLAIS ET ANGLAIS-FRANQAIS
DE TERMES ET LOCUTIONS JURIDIQUES (1953)
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91,
113 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)
(Certificate)
(Certify)
(Certified Public Accountant)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 61 (1990)
(Withholding)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 416 (1990)
(Restitution)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 810 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting)
(Tonality)
THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC & MUSICIANS (S. Sadie ed.,
1980)
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426 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 137 (1988)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)
(willful)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988)
(Termination)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
(Terminate)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 409 n.17 (1987) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)
(Per Curiam)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp.,
461 U.S. 402, 421 (1983)
(Exempt)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 501 n.18, 503 n.20 (1982)
(Design)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1957)
(Roach)
(Head)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1980)
(Roach)
LINGEMAN, DRUGS FROM A TO Z: A DICTIONARY (1969)
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
719 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Feasible)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
? ???? ?????
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APPENDIX B: JUSTICES
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 612-13 nn.3 & 4
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Seniority)
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (1969)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY (1966)
ROBERTS' DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1966)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 610
(1978) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 530
(1903))
(Minerals)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 438 n.3 (1975) (Marshall,
J., dissenting)
(Nunnery)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 273 n.8 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)
(Commutation)
(Pardon)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)
Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283 (1974)
(Scab)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 201 & n.21 (1974)
(Working Conditions)
DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (3d ed. 1965)
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 n.16 (1972)
(Diversion)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
1999] 427
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Associate Justice Stanley Matthews (1881-1889)
1 case (0.13/year) and 3 terms (0.38/year)
Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U.S. 11, 12 (1885)
(Mine)
(Mineral)
(Ore)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Associate Justice Joseph McKenna (1898-1925)
4 cases (0.15/year) and 6 terms (0.22/year)
Banco Mexicano de Commercio e Industria v. Deutsche Bank, 263
U.S. 591, 601 (1924)
(With Reference To)
STANDARD DICTIONARY
Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 396-98 & n.2 (1920)
(McKenna, J., dissenting)
(Concurrent Jurisdiction)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
(Concurrent)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Montello Salt Co. v. Utah, 221 U.S. 452, 464-65 (1911)
(Include)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U.S. 446,
454-55 (1911)
(Rubberoid)
(Oid)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Associate Justice James McReynolds (1914-1941)
9 cases (0.33/year) and 12 terms (0.44/year)
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery, 303 U.S. 552, 564 n.1
(1938) (McReynolds, J., dissenting)
(Dispute)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
428 [Vol. 47
APPENDIX B: JUSTICES
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co v. Coughran, 303 U.S. 485, 491
(1938)
(Operate)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Smyth v. United States, 302 U.S. 329, 365 n.1 (1937) (McReynolds,
J., dissenting)
(Reedem)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
White v. Anderson, 302 U.S. 16, 17 nn.2 & 3 (1937)
(Puzzle)
(Game)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 48 (1937)
(Make)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U.S. 379, 383 n.3
(1937)
(Pursuant To)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1935)
American Fruit Growers Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)
(Manufacture)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Deal v. United States, 274 U.S. 277, 283 (1927)
(Depredation)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
(Robbery)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
Chelentis v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918)
(Right)
(Remedy)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
1999] 429
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Associate Justice Samuel Miller (1862-1890)
5 cases (0.18/year) and 6 terms (0.21/year)
Kring v. State, 107 U.S. 221, 227 (1883)
(Ex Post Facto)
TOMLIN'S LAW DICTIONARY (1835)
Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 143 (1880) (Miller, J.,
dissenting)
(Suit)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664 (1874)
(Tax)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 387, 392-93 (1866) (Miller, J.,
dissenting)
(Attainder)
TOMLIN'S LAW DICTIONARY
(Punish)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Insurance Cos. v. Wright, 68 U.S. 456, 473 n.* (1863)
(Rating)
MCCULLOCH'S COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY
Associate Justice Sherman Minton (1949-1956)
1 case (0.14/year) and 1 term (0.14/year)
Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 140 n.* (1952) (Minton, J.,
dissenting)
(Imbecile)
FAIRCHILD, DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY (1944)
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Associate Justice Frank Murphy (1940-1949)
3 cases (0.33/year) and 4 terms (0.44/year)
United States v. Beach, 324 U.S. 193, 197 n.2 (1945) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting)
(White Slave)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTVL DICTIONARY
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 512 (1945)
(Murphy, J., dissenting)
(Ship)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Tennessee Coal, Iron & Rail Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321
U.S. 590, 598 n.11 (1944)
(Work)
(Employ)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr.)
NNN
000
Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (1981-present)
25 cases (1.47/year) and 30 terms (1.76/year)
Cohen v. De la Cruz, 118 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1998)
(Debt For)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(3d ed. 1992)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 118 (1997)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)
(Substantial)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1985)
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)
(Any)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 519 U. S. 248, 255
(1997)
(Entitle)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996)
(Imminent)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTIL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d
ed. 1934)
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995)
(Use)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d
ed. 1949)
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 710 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(Injure)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1991)
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 80 (1995)
(Procedure)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH USAGE (2d ed. 1987)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994)
(Statement)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 12-13, 15, 19 (1994)
(Moral Evidence)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d
ed. 1992)
COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1991)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
(Moral Certainty)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.
1983)
(Moral Evidence)
(Moral Certainty)
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1979)
(Moral Certainty)
(Substantial)
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WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29, 231, 237-38 (1993)
(To Use)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
(To Use)
(To Cane)
(In Relation To)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.
1950)
(Use)
(To Cane)
(In Relation To)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1939)
Department of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 173 (1993)
(Confidential)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471-72 (1993)
(Cold-Blooded)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
(Pitiless)
(Cold-Blooded)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Pioneer Investment Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S.
380, 402-03 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(Excusable Neglect)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 30 (1992)
(Collateral Attack)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 63 (1990)
(Purportedly)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Board of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 237
(1990)
(Curriculum)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 479 (1990)
(Use)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 893
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(Exercise)
A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES (J. Murry
ed., 1897)
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 297 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part)
(Fine)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785)
RICHARDSON, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1839)
SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(6th ed. 1796)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
(Damages)
(Fine)
BLOUNT, A LAW-DICTIONARY (1670)
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 482 (1988)
(Picketing)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700
(1988)
(Service of Process)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Regents of Univ. of California v. Public Employment Relations Bd.,
485 U.S. 589, 598 (1988)
(Compensation)
WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (C.
Goodrich ed., 1849)
434 [Vol. 47
APPENDIX B: JUSTICES
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399-400 n.3 (1985)
(Accident)
LE GRAND, DICTIONNAIRE USUAL DE DROIT (1931)
GRAND LAROUSSE DE LA LANGUE FRANQAISE (1971)
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 164-65 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(Note)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
pPP
Associate Justice Rufus Peckham (1896-1909)
3 cases (0.23/year) and 3 terms (0.23/year)
Serralles v. Esbri, 200 U.S. 103, 111 (1906)
(Centavo)
STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1895)
Board of Dirs. of the Chicago Theological Seminary v.
Illinois ex rel. Raymond, 188 U.S. 662, 673 (1903)
(Belonging)
WEBSTER'S INT'L DICTIONARY
United States v. Laws, 163 U.S. 258, 266 (1896)
(Profession)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
Associate Justice Mahlon Pitney (1912-1922)
2 cases (0.20/year) and 2 terms (0.20/year)
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206-07 (1920)
(Income)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
CENTURY DICTIONARY
STANDARD DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
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Mallinckrodt Chemical Workers v. Missouri ex rel. Jones, 238 U.S.
41, 53 (1915)
(Trust)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Associate Justice Lewis Powell, Jr. (1972-1987)
13 cases (0.87/year) and 17 terms (1.13/year)
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 598-99 (1987) (Powell, J.,
concurring)
(Creation)
(Evolution)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1981)
City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 479 & n.6 (1987) (Powell, J.,
concurring in judgment in part & dissenting in part)
(Challenge)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1980)
United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 605 n.6 (1986)
(Damages)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 n.3 (1986) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Gerrymander)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
Davis v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 221 & n.6 (1986) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)
(Curtilage)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 499-500 (1986)
(Powell, J., dissenting)
(Policy)
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1979)
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Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 549 n.4 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring in result)
(Deprive)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1945)
P.C. Pfeiffer Co v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 77 n.7 (1979)
(Including)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1973)
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 240 n.2 (1979)
(Covert)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1953)
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541 n.l1
(1978)
(Boycott)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 657 n.9 (1977)
(Hematoma)
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (23d ed. 1976)
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 nn.20 & 21 (1975)
(Device)
(Contrivance)
(Contrive)
(Manipulate)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 349 n.7 (1972)
(Magistrate)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY (1966)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1957)
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Associate Justice Stanley Reed (1938-1957)
3 cases (0.16/year) and 4 terms (0.21/year)
Shields v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 350 U.S. 318, 326 n.2
(1956) (Reed, J., dissenting)
(Running Board)
THE CAR-BUILDER'S DICTIONARY (1879)
American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 450 n.6 (1947)
(Damage)
(Damages)
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604, 607
n.1 (1938)
(Prime Mover)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1935)
Associate and Chief Justice William Rehnquist (1972-
present)
25 cases (0.96/year) and 33 terms (1.27/year)
Bragdon v. Abbot, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2215 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)
(Major)
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1994)
McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama, 520 U.S. 781, 794 (1997)
(Sheriff)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914)
Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 687 (1995)
(Doctrine of Laches)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
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Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S.
88, 93 (1994)
(Appeal)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 71 (1994)
(Original)
(Sentence)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 257
(1994)
(Affect)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1966)
Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201 (1993)
(Country)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1945)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1945)
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1993)
(Try)
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785)
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1796)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1785)
(Try)
(Sole)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
(Pardon)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 78 (1992)
(Exclusive)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1942)
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 954 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in judgment in part & dissenting in part)
(Stare Decisis)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 244 (1991) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Originate)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991)
(Mixture)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 482 (1990)
(Child Support)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH USAGE (2d ed. 1987)
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 77 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Maturity)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933)
CYCLOPEDIC LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1922)
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 515 n.13
(1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., judgment & plurality opinion)
(Necessary)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1988)
(Caricature)
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (2d ed. unabr. 1979)
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)
(Establishment)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 n.6 (1985)
(Policy)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
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United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 480 (1984)
(Jurisdiction)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983)
(Appropriate)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983)
(Initiated)
No specific dictionary listed
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 60 n.3, 62 n.4, 85 (1983) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting)
(Malice)
ABBOTT'S LAW DICTIONARY (1879)
(Redress)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
(Malice)
(Wanton)
(Recklessness)
STORMONTH'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1885)
(Malice)
(Wanton)
(Wantonly)
(Lewdly)
WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1869)
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY (1860)
(Redress)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 198 n.10 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(Authorized)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 708-09 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting)
(Lesser Offense)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)
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Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,
429 U.S. 363, 380 n.8 (1977) (quoting Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 102 (1901))
(Common Law)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
Associate Justice Owen Roberts (1930-1945)
3 cases (0.20/year) and 3 terms (0.20/year)
Stewart v. United States, 316 U.S. 354, 362 n.6 (1942)
(Islands)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 n.10 (1940)
(Alternative)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 & n.6
(1933)
(Monopoly)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
SSS
Associate Justice Edward Sanford (1923-1930)
1 case (0.14/year) and I term (0.14/year)
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 665 (1925)
(Advocacy)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Associate Justice Antonin Scalia (1986-present)
50 cases (4.17/year) and 65 terms (5.42/year)
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2180-
81 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(Ensure)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d College ed. 1992)
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1241 (1998)
(Notwithstanding)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1955
(1998)
(Eligible)
(Participate)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
AVCO Corp. v. United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement
Workers, 118 S. Ct. 1626, 1629 (1998) (Scalia, J., opinion of Court)
(For)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1279, 1288
(1998)
(Court)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 808 (1998)
(No)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818, 823
(1998)
(Doubt)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(3d ed. 1992)
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993)
(Doubt)
(Objective)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2173, 2174 n.1 (1997)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part)
(Peace)
(Licentious)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 128 (1997) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)
(Material)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)
(Subject to)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207
(1997)
(Have)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 745 (1996)
(Interest)
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW (J. Merrill ed.,
1890)
A LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1856)
A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY (2d ed. 1860)
LAW LEXICON OR DICTIONARY OF JURISPRUDENCE (2d Amer. ed.
1860)
(Rate)
WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (C.
Goodrich ed., 1949)
Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763
(1995)
(Endorsement)
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 717, 732-33 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Harm)
AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1970)
(Proximate)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
(Take)
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OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
(Take)
(Proximate)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d
ed. 1949)
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 610-11, 616 (1995) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Corruptly)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
(Endeavors)
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995)
(Market)
OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1955)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
225-26 & n.2, 228 (1994)
(Modify)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH USAGE (2d ed. 1987)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1991)
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1934)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1949)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1973)
WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1963)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
(Modify)
(Required)
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993)
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1994)
(Market Value)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 552 (1994)
(Partiality)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 328 (1994)
(Scalia, J., concurring)
(Understand)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 802 n.2 (1993)
(Scalia, J., partial opinion of Court)
(Boycott)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 705 n.10 (1993)
(Incident)
A LAW DICTIONARY (1883)
(Incidents of Ownership)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 624 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part & concurring in judgment)
(Payment)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241-42 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(Use)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1939)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1939)
Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1993)
(Conviction)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 274
(1993)
(Invidious)
WEBSTER'S SECOND INT'L DICTIONARY (1954)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1954)
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Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S.
214, 223 (1992)
(Solicitation)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
(Solicit)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)
(Commercial)
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)
(Relating To)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 243 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment)
(Personal Injuries)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 428 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Redeem)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 920 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(Department)
WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1828)
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Representatives)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991)
(Seizure)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1856)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 119-22 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(False Making)
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1948)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
(Forged)
(Counterfeit)
(Forge)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTVL DICTIONARY (1945)
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Offence)
DICTIONARIUM BRITANNICUM (Bailey ed., 1730)
KERSEY, A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1702)
SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1780)
WALKER, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(Witness)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
Fort Stewart Schools v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S.
641, 645 (1990)
(Conditions)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1957)
NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 814-15
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Inference)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 171-72 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment)
(Salary)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1957)
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Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1990)
(Adjustment)
(Recovery)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 128 (1989)
(Irregularity)
WEBSTER'S SECOND INT'L DICTIONARY (1950)
Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113 (1988)
(Criteria)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 913-14 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(Damages)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 719 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Inferiour)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785)
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564 (1988)
(Substantial)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1945)
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 324 n.2 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Oven)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
K Mart Corp v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(Embargo)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1984)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 334, 335 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Likely)
(Or)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 374 (1987) (Scalia, J., judgment of
Court & opinion)
(Income)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Associate Justice George Shiras, Jr. (1892-1903)
2 cases (0.18/year) and 5 terms (0.45/year)
Wilson Bros., Inc. v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 191, 212 (1901) (Shiras, J.,
dissenting)
(Act)
ANDERSON'S LAW DICTIONARY (1996)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Sarlls v. United States, 152 U.S. 570, 572 (1894)
(Spirituous Liquors)
(Malt Liquor)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
(Ardent Spirits)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
(Spirituous)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Associate Justice David Souter (1990-present)
16 cases (2.0/year) and 21 terms (2.63/year)
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S.Ct. 2168, 2189
(1998) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(Take Into Consideration)
(Consideration)
(Consider)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1887 (1998)
(Operate)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1958)
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Foster v. Love, 118 S. Ct. 464, 467 (1997)
(Election)
AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1869)
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 337 (1996)
(Price/Earnings Ratio)
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY & FINANCE (1992)
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 439 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting)
(Shall)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 872
n.1 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(Seminary)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 117 (1994)
(Injury)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1957)
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 n.12 (1994)
(Parody)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 781 (1993)
(Souter, J., partial opinion of Court)
(Business)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1942)
Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 210 (1993)
(Claim)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 571
n.1 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(Amortized)
(Depreciated)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993)
(Base)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1987)
(Base)
(Based)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 187-88 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting)
(Conduct)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199, 203 (1993)
(Context)
(Poverty)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1942)
Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 621 (1992)
(Sanction)
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 124 (1991)
(Institute)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.
unabr. 1987)
Associate Justice John Paul Stevens (1975-present)
35 cases (1.52/year) and 44 terms (1.91/year)
Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2098 (1998)
(Person)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S. 465, 470
(1997) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(In)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
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44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 491 n.4 (1996)
(Temperance)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 299 n.10 (1996)
(Concert)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 697 (1995)
(Harm)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1966)
Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 700 (1995)
(Shows)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1942)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
241, 242 n.5 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Modification)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933)
(Modify)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH USAGE (2d ed. 1987)
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1934)
WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1963)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269 n.23 (1994)
(Retroactive Statute)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 181 nn.37 & 38
(1993)
(Return)
(Refouler)
LAROUSSE MODERN FRENCH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1978)
NEW CASSELL'S FRENCH DICTIONARY (1973)
Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 191 n.15 (1993) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)
(Principal)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1966)
BUFFALO LAWREVIEW
Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 526 n.23 (1992)
(Tort)
(Contract)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 436 n.6 (1991)
(Attorney)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2d College ed. 1982)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Compact ed. 1981)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1975)
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 259 (1990) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Regularly)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91,
103-04 (1990) (Stevens, J., judgment & plurality opinion) (quoting
In re Peel, 534 N.E.2d 980, 984 (IM. 1989))
(Certificate)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6,
493 U.S. 67, 97 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting
in part)
(Discipline)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.
1987)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 648-49 & n.5 (1989)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Religion)
(Respect)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785)
SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(6th ed. 1796)
(Respect)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1989)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1988)
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Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 366 n.6
(1989)
(Salmonid)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press,
489 U.S. 749, 763-64 & n.16 (1989)
(Private)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 134 n.7 (1988)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Criterion)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1966)
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 221 n.2 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)
(Witness)
CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1771)
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 786 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)
(Material)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Regents of Univ. of California v. Public Employment Relations Bd.,
485 U.S. 589, 610 & n.4 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Good Will)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 370-71 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)
(Defraud)
ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW (1893)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (1897)
BURRILL'S LAW DICTIONARY (1859)
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 477-78 n.l1 (1987)
(Propaganda)
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (College ed. 1968)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW NT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102, 109 n.4 (1987)
(Disclose)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1977)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 n.11 (1987) (quoting
Matter of Acosta, Interim Decision No. 2986, at 14) (Mar. 1, 1985))
(Fear)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (16th ed. 1971)
United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 615 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)
(Damage)
(Damages)
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914)
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 406 n.20 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)
(Automobile)
(Camper)
(Motor Home)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 188 n.* (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Movement)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 532 n.4 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Remedy)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
(Efficient)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 605 n.12, 606
n.15 (1980)
(Seniority)
(System)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
456 [Vol. 47
1999] APPENDIX B: JUSTICES 457
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 581 n.9 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)
(Prison)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 n.14 (1978)
(Indecent)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1966)
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,243 n.* (1978)
(Stevens, J., concurring)
(Interference)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 629-30 n.5 (1977) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)
(Envelope)
WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1869)
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY (1860)
Associate Justice Potter Stewart (1959-1981)
4 cases (0.18/year) and 6 terms (0.27/year)
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696 n.13 (1980)
(Device)
(Scheme)
(Artifice)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1934)
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199 n.1 (1979) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)
(Malice)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211
(1979)
(Insurance)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1958)
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Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 892 n.6 (1961)
(Tradesman)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1958)
Associate and Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone (1925-1946)
5 cases (0.24/year) and 5 terms (0.24/year)
Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 501-02 n.1 (1945) (Stone,
C.J., dissenting)
(Evade)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 134 (1942)
(Embed)
OXFORD DICTIONARY
'Webster"
Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 507 (1941)
(Sale)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY
Paramount Publix Corp. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S.
464, 471 & n.1 (1935)
(Combination Printing)
ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF PHOTOGRAPHY (1896)
McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 491 (1931)
(Candy)
No specific dictionary listed
Associate Justice George Sutherland (1922-1938)
3 cases (0.19/year) and 3 terms (0.19/year)
O'Hara v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 269 U.S. 364, 371 (1926)
(Watch)
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United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 184 (1923) (quoting Orton
v. Orton, 42 N.Y. 486 (1867))
(Legacy)
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204,211 & n.1
(1923)
(Caucasian)
Dictionary of Races, Senate Document 662, 61st Cong., 3d Sess.
1910
Associate Justice Noah Swayne (1862-1881)
4 cases (0.21/year) and 4 terms (0.21/year)
Schumacher v. Cornell, 96 U.S. 549, 554 (1877)
(Wrench)
KNIGHT'S MECHANICAL DICTIONARY
Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238, 243 (1876)
(Tonnage)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
COWEL'S LAW DICTIONARY (1708)
Lapeyre v. United States, 84 U.S. 191, 195-97 & n.++ (1872)
(Proclamation)
COWEL'S LAW DICTIONARY
JACOB'S LAW DICTIONARY
Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 445 & n.18 (1868)
(Duty)
ToMLiN's LAW DICTIONARY
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
TTT
Associate Justice Clarence Thomas (1991-present)
25 cases (3.57/year) and 29 terms (4.14/year)
United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2034, 2036 n.9, 2037
(1998)
(Remedial Action)
(Instrumentality)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
(Excessive)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 118 S. Ct. 1618, 1624 (1998)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Application)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
(Application)
(Present)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1991)
United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997)
(Maximum)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1958)
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 342 (1997)
(Employed)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S.
564, 637-38 n.20 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Impost)
BARCLAY'S UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (B. Woodward rev.,
1782)
BLOUNT, A LAW DICTIONARY (1670)
A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
(Duty)
(Impost)
BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th
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ed. 1789)
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785)
Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 126 n.4 (1996)
(Motion)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH USAGE (2d ed. 1987)
Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 680 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)
(Forthwith)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186, 254 (1996)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)
(State)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1957)
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 528 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)
(Administer)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1957)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1991)
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 857 n.7 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Congress)
A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796)
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773)
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)
(Commerce)
A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796)
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
AN UNWVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1789)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)
(Punishment)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780)
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PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511
U.S. 700, 725 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Discharge)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1991)
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357-58 (1994)
(Delay)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994)
(Cognizable)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)
(Punishment)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791)
CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (1771)
A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780)
JACOB, THE LAW DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS,
AND PRESENT STATE, OF THE ENGLISH LAW (1811)
A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (1771)
SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1780)
WALKER, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers
Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 652 (1993) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part & concurring in jugdment)
(Clear Error)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 473 (1993)
(Provide For)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1981)
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 61 (1993)
(Genuine)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
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Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 220 n.8 (1993)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Affiant)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951)
District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S.
125, 129 (1992)
(Relate To)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 322 (1992)
(Testimony)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47, 53 (1992)
(Assignee)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 360 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part & concurring in judgment) (quoting Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting))
(Witness)
WEBSTER, AN A]mERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)
Molzofv. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307 (1992)
(Punitive Damages)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933)
CYCLOPEDIC LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1940)
UUU
VVW
Associate Justice Willis Van DeVanter (1911-1937)
1 case (0.04/year) and 1 term (0.04/year)
John P. King Mfg. Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277 U.S. 100,
102-03 (1928)
(Statute)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (Rawle's Rev.)
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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Chief Justice Fred Vinson (1946-1953)
1 case (0.14/year) and 2 terms (0.29/year)
Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 nn.14 & 15 (1947)
(Property)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(Property)
(Equity)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr.)
WWW
Chief Justice Earl Warren (1954-1969)
2 cases (0.13/year) and 3 terms (0.20/year)
United States v. An Article of Drug... Bacto-Unidisk. . ., 394 U.S.
784, 800 n.20 (1969)
(Drug)
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (24th ed. 1965)
Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 308 n.3 (1961)
(Invents)
(Discovers)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Associate and Chief Justice Edward White (1894-1921)
4 cases (0.15/year) and 7 terms (0.26/year)
Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 113 (1916)
(Legislative Officer)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(Legislative Officers)
BOUvIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (1897)
(Officer)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
(Office)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY
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Keppel v. Tiffin Sav. Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 362 (1905)
(Surrender)
STANDARD DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S INTL DICTIONARY
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Courtney, 186 U.S. 342, 346 (1902)
(Immediate)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 186 (1896)
(Abandonment)
DE MARAGY, INT'L DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
Associate Justice Byron White (1962-1993)
24 cases (0.77/year) and 30 terms (0.97/year)
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 671 n.7 (1993) (White, J., dissenting)
(Segregate)
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1983)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 412 n.9 (1993)
(Aggregate)
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1983)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 269 n.4 (1993) (White, J.,
dissenting)
(Remedial)
(Relief)
(Remedy)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)
(Cover)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Pioneer Investment Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380,
388 (1993)
(Neglect)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 482 (1991) (White, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part & concurring in judgment)
(Policy)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 296 (1991)
(Avoid)
(Fix)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 212
n.1 (1991) (White, J., concurring in part & concurring in judgment)
(Occupational)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 447 n.7 (1991)
(Right)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 n.9 (1989)
(Body Politic)
(Public Corporation)
ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS & PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR
ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE (1879)
ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW (1893)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (1891)
BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY & GLOSSARY (2d ed. 1871)
Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 894 (1989) (White, J., dissenting)
(Civil Action)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476-77 n.6
(1988)
(Tidelands)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1987)
(Race)
CENTURY DICTIONARY & CYCLOPEDIA (1911)
DONALD, CHAMBER'S ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1871)
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1916)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1986)
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WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1841)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1830)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF TEE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(W. Wheeler ed., 1887)
Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 335 (1986) (White, J.,
dissenting)
(Prompt)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unab. 1976)
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500 n.10 (1985)
(quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957)
(Lust)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 5th ed. 1981)
(Lust)
(Prurient)
(Pruriency)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1949)
(Prurient)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INVL DICTIONARY (unab. 4th ed. 1976)
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 630 n.2 (1985)
(Intrauterine Device)
URDANG DICTIONARY OF CURRENT MEDICAL TERMS (1981)
Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406, 411 (1983)
(Conveyance)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (P. Gove ed., 1976)
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S.
592, 600 n.8 (1982)
(Parens Patriae)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 402 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting)
(Potential)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1958)
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California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519, 527 (1978)
(Dedicate)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 312 (1975)
(White, J., dissenting)
(Encumbrance)
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914)
Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 218 n.' (1968) (White, J.,
dissenting)
(Pursuant)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1957)
United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 261 n.5 (1966)
(Firm)
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1948)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951)
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914)
CLARK & GOTTFIED, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS & FINANCE (1957)
CROWELL'S DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS & FINANCE (rev. ed. 1930)
DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS & INDUSTRY (Schwartz ed., 1954)
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW (1959)
DICTIONARY OF FOREIGN TRADE (Henius 2d ed. 1947)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 371 n.9 (1964)
(Institution)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1958)
Associate Justice William Woods (1881-1887)
1 case (0.17/year) and 1 term (0.17/year)
Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1885)
(To Carry On)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
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Appendix C
DICTIONARIES RELIED UPON BY THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT TO DEFINE TERMS
THROUGH THE 1997-1998 TERM*
AAA
ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS & PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR
ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE (1879)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69
n.9 (1989) (White, J.)
(Body Politic)
(Public Corporation)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 79
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Body Politic)
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of
Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 301 (1989) (Brennan, J.)
(Request)
ABBOTT'S LAW DICTIONARY (1879)
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 60 n.3 (1983) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting)
(Malice)
Some United States Supreme Court opinions do not clearly indicate which
specific dictionary or edition is being cited and, unfortunately, it is impossible to
clarify those ambiguities from the opinions (for example, despite the numerous
dictionaries that have carried the "Webster" name over the years, some Justices
have identified a source only as "Webster's Dictionary"). Accordingly, the dic-
tionaries cited herein generally are listed as they were cited in the opinions. As
a result of the citation ambiguities in the opinions, this Appendix may have two
(or more) separate listings for the same edition of the same dictionary. In light
of this duplication, and for ease of reference, headings have been added for
dictionaries where such duplication may exist.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW (J. Merrill ed., 1890)
Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 745 (1996) (Scalia, J.)
(Interest)
AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1970)
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 719 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(Harm)
AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1869)
Foster v. Love, 118 S. Ct. 464, 467 (1997) (Souter, J.)
(Election)
* VERSIONS OF AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY *
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed.
1992)
Cohen v. De la Cruz, 118 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1998) (O'Connor, J.)
(Debt for)
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct.
818, 823 (1998) (Scalia, J.)
(Doubt)
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 15 (1994) (O'Connor, J.)
(Moral Certainty)
AMIERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d College ed. 1992)
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct.
2168, 2180-81 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(Ensure)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1887 (1998)
(Souter J.)
(Operate)
Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 128
(1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Material)
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Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (Scalia, J.)
(Subject to)
Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., Inc., 519 U.S.
202, 207 (1997)
(Scalia, J.)
(Have)
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 133
(1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(Equitable)
NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90
(1995 ) (Breyer, J.)
(Employee)
Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513,
515 nn.1 & 3 (1994) (Blackmun, J.)
(Bong)
(Freebase)
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 15 (1994) (O'Connor, J.)
(Moral Certainty)
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357-58
(1994) (Thomas, J.)
(Delay)
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 552 (1994)
(Scalia, J.)
(Partiality)
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580
n.12 (1994) (Souter, J.)
(Parody)
ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 328
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(Understand)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1985)
Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 118
(1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(Substantial)
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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2d College ed. 1982)
Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 436 n.6 (1991) (Stevens, J.)
(Attorney)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1981)
Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 473 (1993) (Thomas, J.)
(Provide For)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1980)
City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 479 & n.6 (1987)
(Powell, J., concurring in judgment in part & dissenting in part)
(Challenge)
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 501 n.18, 503 n.20 (1982)
(Marshall, J.)
(Roach)
(Head)
ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW (1893)
Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 202 n.8 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Corporations)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69
n.9 (1989) (White, J.)
(Body Politic)
(Public Corporation)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 79
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Body Politic)
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 370-71 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Defraud)
ANDERSON'S LAW DICTIONARY (1996)
Wilson Bros., Inc. v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 191, 212 (1901)
(Shiras, J., dissenting)
(Act)
474
1999] APPENDIX C: DICTIONARIES 475
The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 130 (1894) (Brown, J.)
(Freight)
ASH, THE NEW & COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1775)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 537 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
BBB
BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th ed.
1789)
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
520 U.S. 564, 637 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Duty)
(Impost)
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring)
(Commerce)
BAILEY, UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1742)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 525 n.43,
app. (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
BAILEY, UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1730)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 520 n.28,
534-35 app. (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Sacrilegious)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (1969)
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 613
n.3 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Seniority)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
BALLENTINE's LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1948)
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 122 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)
(False Making)
United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 261 n.5 (1966)
(White, J.)
(Firm)
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969)
Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 621 (1992)
(Souter, J.)
(Sanction)
BARCLAY, A COMPLETE & UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1782)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 524-25
nn.44 & 45, 538 app. (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in judgment)
(Sacrilege)
(To Profane)
(Blasphemy)
(Profane)
BARCLAY'S UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (B. Woodward rev., 1782)
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
520 U.S. 564, 637-38 n.20 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Impost)
THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY (1988)
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1914
(1998) (Breyer, J.)
(Carry)
BELL, A DICTIONARY & DIGEST OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND (1861)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 539 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
BELL'S DICTIONARY OF SCOTTISH LAW
Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 461 (1899) (Brown,
J., dissenting)
(Smuggling)
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BERENYI, THE MODERN AMERICAN BusINEss DICTIONARY (1982)
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 184 (1988)
(Brennan, J.)
(Embargo)
* VERSIONS OF BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY *
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2034, 2036
n.9 (1998) (Thomas, J.)
(Remedial Action)
(Instrumentality)
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1915
(1998) (Breyer, J.)
(Carry Arms Or Weapons)
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1920,
1921 n.2 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(Carry Arms or Weapons)
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 118 S. Ct. 1618, 1624
(1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Application)
Cohen v. De la Cruz, 118 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1998)
(O'Connor, J.)
(Debt For)
United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997)
(Thomas, J.)
(Maximum)
Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S.
465, 470 (1997) (Stevens, J.)
(In)
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 342 (1997)
(Thomas, J.)
(Employed)
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Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 519 U. S.
248, 255 (1997) (O'Connor, J.)
(Entitle)
Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 38 (1996)
(Breyer, J.)
(Specifically)
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (O'Connor, J.)
(Use)
NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995)
(Breyer, J.)
(Employee)
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 616 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Corruptly)
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 439 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting)
(Shall)
Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 687 (1995)
(Rehnquist, C.J.)
(Doctrine of Laches)
Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294 (1995) (Breyer, J.)
(Collect Debt)
Nationsbank of N. Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 264 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.)
(Insurance)
Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory
Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 93 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
(Appeal)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
225 (1994) (Scalia, J.)
(Modify)
478
APPENDIX C: DICTIONARIES
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (1994) (Thomas,
J., concurring)
(Punishment)
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537-38
(1994) (Scalia, J.)
(Market Value)
United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 71 (1994)
(Rehnquist, C.J.)
(Original)
(Sentence)
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (Thomas, J.)
(Cognizable)
Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 428 n.8 (1994) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting)
(Public Domain)
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust &
Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 112 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.)
(Provide)
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 705 n.10 (1993)
(Scalia, J.)
(Incidents of Ownership)
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas,
J., dissenting)
(Punishment)
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 652
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring in part & concurring in
jugdment)
(Clear Error)
Department of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 505
(1993) (Blackmun, J.)
(Purpose)
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Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1993)
(O'Connor, J.)
(To Use)
Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 210 (1993)
(Souter, J.)
(Claim)
Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1993)
(Scalia, J.)
(Conviction)
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S.
546, 571 n.1 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(Amortized)
(Depreciated)
Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471-72 (1993) (O'Connor,
J.)
(Cold-Blooded)
Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 484 (1993) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting)
(Cold Blood)
Pioneer Investment Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs.
Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 402-03 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)
(Excusable Neglect)
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993)
(Souter, J.)
(Base)
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 178 (1993)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Aid and Abet)
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 232 (1993)
(Rehnquist, C.J.)
(Pardon)
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District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of
Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129 (1992) (Thomas, J.)
(Relate To)
Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 30 (1992) (O'Connor, J.)
(Collateral Attack)
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 954 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment in part &
dissenting in part)
(Stare Decisis)
Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 535-36
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment in part & dissenting in part)
(Prohibition)
Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 526
n.23 (1992)
(Tort)
(Contract)
Estate of Coward v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469,
477 (1992) (Kennedy, J.)
(Entitle)
United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 322 (1992)
(Thomas, J.)
(Testimony)
Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co.,
505 U.S. 214, 223 (1992) (Scalia, J.)
(Solicitation)
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607,
614 (1992) (Scalia, J.)
(Commercial)
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235-36 n.6 (1992)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Personal Injuries)
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United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 243 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(Personal Injuries)
Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 621 (1992)
(Souter, J.)
(Sanction)
Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47, 53 (1992)
(Thomas, J.)
(Assignee)
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 428 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(Redeem)
Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 124 (1991) (Souter, J.)
(Institute)
Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 296 (1991) (White, J.)
(Avoid)
(Fix)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991)
(Scalia, J.)
(Seizure)
United States v. Centennial Say. Bank FSB, 499 U.S.
573, 580 n.6 (1991) (Marshall, J.)
(Discharge)
Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 436 n.6 (1991) (Stevens, J.)
(Attorney)
Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 447 n.7 (1991) (White,
J.)
(Right)
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 121-22 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)
(False Making)
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FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 63 (1990)
(O'Connor, J.)
(Purportedly)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct.
1279, 1288 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(Court)
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974, 977 n.7 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J.)
(Willful)
Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 680 (1996)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Forthwith)
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 732-33 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(Proximate)
Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 513 U.S. 414, 426 (1995) (Breyer, J.)
(Amortization Plan)
Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,269 n.23
(1994) (Stevens, J.)
(Retroactive Statute)
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383
(1992) (Scalia, J.)
(Relating To)
Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 482 (1990) (Rehnquist,
C.J.)
(Child Support)
Board of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226, 237 (1990) (O'Connor, J.)
(Curriculum)
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Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 479 (1990)
(O'Connor, J.)
(Use)
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 416 (1990)
(Marshall, J.)
(Restitution)
NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775,
814-15 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Inference)
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,
515 n.13 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., judgment & plurality
opinion)
(Necessary)
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 297 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Fine)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 79
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Body Politic)
Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 894 (1989) (White, J.,
dissenting)
(Civil Action)
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of
Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 301 (1989) (Brennan, J.)
(Request)
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163-64
(1988) (Brennan, J.)
(Finding of Fact)
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 913-14 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Damages)
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Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486
U.S. 694, 700 (1988) (O'Connor, J.)
(Service of Process)
McCoy v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 450 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Amicus Curiae)
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 298-99
(1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part)
(Owner)
(Ownership)
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 137
(1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Willful)
EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107,
115 (1988) (Marshall, J.)
(Termination)
Regents of Univ. of California v. Public Employment
Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 610 & n.4 (1988) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)
(Good Will)
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 184 (1988)
(Brennan, J.)
(Embargo)
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 192 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Embargo)
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469,
476-77 n.6 (1988) (White, J.)
(Tidelands)
Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 409 n.17 (1987)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Per Curiam)
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United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 605 n.6 (1986)
(Powell, J.)
(Damages)
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S.
299, 306-07 & n.11 (1985) (Brennan, J.)
(In Pari Delicto Potior Est Conditio Defendentis)
Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984)
(Burger, C.J.)
(In Limine)
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 164-65 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)
(Note)
United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 480 (1984)
(Rehnquist, J.)
(Jurisdiction)
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 529 n.4
(1984) (Brennan, J.)
(Derivative Suit)
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Interest)
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 n.16
(1983) (Blackmun, J.)
(Relate)
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 925 n.2 (1983) (Burger,
C.J.)
(Veto)
American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power
Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 421 (1983) (Marshall, J.)
(Exempt)
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez,
458 U.S. 592, 600 n.8 (1982) (White, J.)
(Parens Patriae)
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Jewett v. Comm'r, 455 U.S. 305, 323 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(Disclaimer)
Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 169
(1981) (Brennan, J.)
(Authorize)
Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 532 n.4
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Remedy)
United States v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 253, 264 (1980)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Impound)
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 612
n.3 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Seniority)
United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 720 n.2 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Testimony)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)
Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 198 n.10
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(Authorized)
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 708-09 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(Lesser Offense)
Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 441 U.S. 434,
442 (1979) (Blackmun, J.)
(Mobilia Sequuntur Personum)
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531,
541 n.11 (1978) (Powell, J.)
(Boycott)
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 273 n.8 (1974) (Marshall,
J., dissenting)
(Commutation)
(Pardon)
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Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 211 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Color)
United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 311 n.2
(1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part)
(Intention)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951)
Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 220
n.8 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Affiant)
United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 261 n.5 (1966)
(White, J.)
(Firm)
United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 412 (1957)
(Burton, J.)
(Steal)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
241 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Modification)
Molzofv. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307 (1992)
(Thomas, J.)
(Punitive Damages)
Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 124 (1991) (Souter, J.)
(Institute)
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 77 (1990)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Maturity)
Washingtonian Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 47 &
nn.10 & 11 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting)
(Condition Precedent)
(Condition Subsequent)
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BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed.)
Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399, 407 (1958) (Burton,
J.) (quoting Horosko v. Mt. Pleasant Sch. Dist., 6 A.2d 866,
868, 869-70 (Pa. 1939))
(Incompetency)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910)
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 575-76
(1995) (Kennedy, J.)
(Prospectus)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (1891)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69
n.9 (1989) (White, J.)
(Body Politic)
(Public Corporation)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 78
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Body Politic)
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of
Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 301 (1989) (Brennan, J.)
(Request)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1921
(1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(Carries a Firearm)
Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand &
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 380 n.8 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.)
(quoting Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ'g Co.,
181 U.S. 92, 102 (1901))
(Common Law)
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 305-06 n.7 (1957)
(Harlan, J.)
(Organize)
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 n.7 (1951)
(Jackson, J., dissenting)
(Moral Turpitude)
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American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 450
n.6 (1947) (Reed, J.)
(Damage)
(Damages)
Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 113 (1916) (White, C.J.)
(Legislative Officer)
Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 396 (1906)
(Brewer, J., dissenting)
(Interest)
United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 269-70 (1905)
(Brewer, J., dissenting)
(Banishment)
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 219 (1905) (Brewer, J.)
(Return)
Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 617-18 (1902) (Brewer, J.)
(Excise)
Wilson Bros., Inc. v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 191, 212 (1901)
(Shiras, J., dissenting)
(Act)
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92,
102 (1901) (Brewer, J.)
(Common Law)
BLOUNT, A LAW-DICTIONARY (1670)
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
520 U.S. 564, 638 n.20 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Impost)
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 267 n.10 (1989)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Damages)
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Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 292, 297 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Damages)
(Fine)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 534
app. (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
* VERSIONS OF BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914)
Foucha v. Lousiana, 504 U.S. 71, 96 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting)
(Insanity)
United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 615 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Damage)
(Damages)
United States v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 253, 264 (1980)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Impound)
Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 312
(1975) (White, J., dissenting)
(Encumbrance)
United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 261 n.5 (1966)
(White, J.)
(Firm)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d rev. ed. 1914)
United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 412 n.8 (1957)
(Burton, J.)
(Theft)
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BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (Rawles 3d rev., 1914)
McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama, 520 U.S. 781,
794 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
(Sheriff)
Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399, 407 (1958)
(Burton, J.) (quoting Horosko v. Mt. Pleasant Sch. Dist.,
6 A.2d 866, 868, 869-70 (Pa. 1939))
(Incompetency)
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 n.7 (1951)
(Jackson, J., dissenting)
(Moral Turpitude)
BOUVIER's LAW DICTIONARY (1897)
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 370 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Defraud)
Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 113 (1916)
(White, C.J.)
(Legislative Officers)
BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION & LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (11th ed. 1866)
Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 201 n.8 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Corporations)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 78
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Bodies Politic and Corporate)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 539-40
app. (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1856)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (Scalia, J.)
(Seizure)
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BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1852)
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 265 nn.6 & 7 (1989) (Blackmun, J.)
(Fines for Offences)
(Damages)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (Rawle's Rev.)
John P. King Mfg. Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277
U.S. 100, 102-03 (1928) (Van DeVanter, J.)
(Statute)
American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284,
290-91 (1907) (Day, J.)
(Copyright)
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 348
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting)
(Garnishment)
Deal v. United States, 274 U.S. 277, 283 (1927) (McReynolds, J.)
(Robbery)
Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 398 (1920) (McKenna, J.,
dissenting)
(Concurrent Jurisdiction)
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206-07 (1920) (Pitney, J.)
(Income)
Chelentis v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918)
(McReynolds, J.)
(Right)
(Remedy)
Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., 211 U.S.
239, 246 (1908) (Day, J.)
(Arrestment)
Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 396 (1906)
(Brewer, J., dissenting)
(Interest)
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Martin v. Steamship Southwark, 191 U.S. 1, 8 (1903)
(Day, J.)
(Seaworthiness)
Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 617-18 (1902) (Brewer, J.)
(Excise)
The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 130 (1894) (Brown, J.)
(Freight)
United States v. Patterson, 150 U.S. 65, 68 (1893) (Brewer, J.)
(Hearing)
Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135,143 (1880)
(Miller, J., dissenting)
(Suit)
Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238, 243 (1876)
(Swayne, J.)
(Tonnage)
Case of the Sewing Machine Cos., 85 U.S. 553, 585 n.++
(1873) (Clifford, J.)
(Suit)
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 601 & n.++ (1870)
(Chase, C.J., dissenting)
(Pound Troy)
Gordon v. United States, 74 U.S. 188, 194 & n.* (1868)
(Grier, J.)
(Arbitrator)
Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. 290, 300 & n.++ (1866)
(Clifford, J.)
(Limitation)
Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 69 U.S. 450, 461-62 n." (1864)
(Field, J.)
(Pilots)
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BROWN, A LAW DICTIONARY (Sprague ed., 1875)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 540 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
BROWN'S LAW DICTIONARY (1874)
Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 461 (1899) (Brown,
J., dissenting)
(Smuggling)
BUCHANAN, A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1769)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 536 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
BULLOKAR, THE ENGLISH EXPOSITOR (14th ed. 1731)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 535 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Sacrilege)
BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (1792)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 538 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Prophaneness)
(Sacrilege)
Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 461 (1899) (Brown,
J., dissenting)
(Smugglers)
BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY & GLOSSARY (2d ed. 1871)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69
n.9 (1989) (White, J.)
(Body Politic)
(Public Corporation)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 79-
80 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Body Politic)
(Corporation Sole)
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BURRILL'S LAW DICTIONARY (1859)
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 370-71 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Defraud)
BURRILL'S LAW DICTIONARY
The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 130 (1894) (Brown, J.)
(Freight)
CCC
THE CAR-BUILDER'S DICTIONARY (1879)
Shields v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 350 U.S. 318,
326 n.2 (1956) (Reed, J., dissenting)
(Running Board)
CENTURY DICTIONARY & CYCLOPEDIA (1911)
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-
11 (1987) (White, J.)
(Race)
CENTURY DICTIONARY & CYCLOPEDIA (1902)
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453-54 & n.3
1939) (Butler, J.)
(Gang)
CENTURY DICTIONARY (Rev. ed.)
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 17 n.4 (1946)
(Douglas, J.)
(Debauchery)
CENTURY DICTIONARY
Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604,
610 (1978) (Marshall, J.) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v.
Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 530 (1903))
(Minerals)
Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 501 n.1 (1945)
(Stone, C.J., dissenting)
(Evade)
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Stewart v. United States, 316 U.S. 354, 362 n.6 (1942)
(Roberts, J.)
(Islands)
American Fruit Growers Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1,
11 (1931) (McReynolds, J.)
(Manufacture)
Deal v. United States, 274 U.S. 277, 283 (1927)
(McReynolds, J.)
(Depredation)
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 665 (1925) (Sanford, J.)
(Advocacy)
Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 396-97 n.2 (1920)
(McKenna, J., dissenting)
(Concurrent)
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206-07 (1920) (Pitney, J.)
(Income)
Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 113 (1916) (White, C.J.)
(Officer)
Mallinckrodt Chemical Workers v. Missouri ex rel.
Jones, 238 U.S. 41, 53 (1915) (Pitney, J.)
(Trust)
Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 320 (1912) (Day, J.)
(Intervene)
Montello Salt Co. v. Utah, 221 U.S. 452, 464-65 (1911)
(McKenna, J.)
(Include)
Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg.Co.,
220 U.S. 446, 454-55 (1911) (McKenna, J.)
(Rubberoid)
(Oid)
Toxaway Hotel Co. v. J.L. Smathers & Co., 216 U.S.
439, 448 (1910) (Lurton, J.)
(Merchantile)
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Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., 211 U.S.
239, 246 (1908) (Day, J.)
(Arrestment)
Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U.S. 453,
470-71 (1906) (Day, J.)(Exclusive)
Hackfeld & Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 442, 448-49
(1905) (Day, J.)
(Neglect)
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279,
292-93 (1904) (Fuller, C.J.)
(Anarchist)
(Anarchy)
Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88, 96 (1904) (Brown, J.)
(Periodical)
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 530
(1903) (Brown, J.)
(Mines)
(Minerals)
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Courtney, 186 U.S. 342, 346
(1902) (White, J.)
(Immediate)
Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 618 (1902) (Brewer, J.)
(Excise)
Wilson Bros., Inc. v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 191, 212 (1901)
(Shiras, J., dissenting)
(Act)
Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 462 (1899)
(Brown, J., dissenting)
(Smuggling)
United States v. Klumpp, 169 U.S. 209, 212 (1898)
(Fuller, C.J.)
(Worsted)
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United States v. Laws, 163 U.S. 258, 266 (1896)
(Peckham, J.)
(Profession)
Seeberger v. Wright & Lawther Oil & Lead Mfg. Co.,
157 U.S. 183, 185 (1895)
(Brown, J.)
(Draft)
(Draught)
Ernhardt v. Steinhardt, 153 U.S. 177, 182 (1894)
(Fuller, C.J.)
(Absinthe)
Sarlls v. United States, 152 U.S. 570, 572 (1894)
(Shiras, J.)
(Malt Liquor)
(Spirituous Liquors)
The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 130 (1894)
(Brown, J.)
(Freight)
United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 270 (1893)
(Gray, J., dissenting)
(High Seas)
Hollender v. Magone, 149 U.S. 586, 589 (1893) (Brewer, J.)
(Liquors)
Homer v. United States, 147 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1893)
(Blatchford, J.)
(Lottery)
CLARK & GOTTFIED, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS & FINANCE (1957)
United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 261 n.5 (1966)
(White, J.)
(Firm)
COCKER, ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1724)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 534 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Sacrilege)
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COCKERAM, ENGLISH DICTIONARIE (10th ed. 1651)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 533 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Sacrilege)
(Sacrilegious)
COLES, AN ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1732)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 535 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1991)
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1994) (O'Connor, J.)
(Moral Evidence)
A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796)
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
520 U.S. 564, 637 n.20 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Impost)
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 857
n.7 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Congress)
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring)
(Commerce)
COWEL'S LAW DICTIONARY (1708)
Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238, 243 (1876)
(Swayne, J.)
(Tonnage)
COWEL'S LAW DICTIONARY
Lapeyre v. United States, 84 U.S. 191, 195 & n.++
(1872) (Swayne, J.)
(Proclamation)
A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791)
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7 (1993)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Fine)
(Forfeit)
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Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas,
J., dissenting)
(Punishment)
CROWELL'S DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS & FINANCE (rev. ed. 1930)
United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 261 n.5 (1966)
(White, J.)
(Firm)
CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAw-DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1771)
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 nn.6 & 7 (1989)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Fines for Offenses)
(Damages)
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 221 n.2 (1988)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Witness)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 537 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (1771)
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas,
J., dissenting)
(Punishment)
CYCLOPEDIC LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1940)
Molzofv. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307 (1992)
(Thomas, J.)
(Punitive Damages)
CYCLOPEDIC LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1922)
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 77 (1990)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part)
(Maturity)
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CYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF LAW (1901)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 78
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Bodies Politic and Corporate)
DDD
DANA, DICTIONARY OF SEA TERMS
O'Hara v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 269 U.S. 364, 371
(1926) (Sutherland, J.)
(Watch)
DE MARAGY, INT'L DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580, 598 (1911)
(Hughes, J.)
(Abandonment)
Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 186
(1896) (White, J.)
(Abandonment)
DEFOE, A COMPLEAT ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1735)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 535 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blaspemy)
(Sacrilege)
DICTIONNAIRE LAROUSSE (1981)
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 191-92 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(Refouler)
DICTIONARIUM BRITANNICUM (Bailey ed., 1730)
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Offence)
DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS & INDUSTRY (Schwartz ed., 1954)
United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 261 n.5 (1966) (White, J.)
(Firm)
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A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773)
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 857-
58 n.7 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Congress)
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring)
(Commerce)
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785)
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
520 U.S. 564, 637 n.20 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Duty)
(Impost)
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1993)
(Rehnquist, C.J.)
(Try)
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1796)
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1993)
(Rehnquist, C.J.)
(Try)
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW (1959)
United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 261, 262 n.5 (1966)
(White, J.)
(Firm)
DICTIONARY OF FOREIGN TRADE (Henius 2d ed. 1947)
United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 261, 262 n.5 (1966)
(White, J.)
(Firm)
DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (2d ed. 1995)
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 432-33
n.9 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.)
(Shall)
DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (3d ed. 1965)
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 201 &
n.21 (1974) (Marshall, J.)
(Working Conditions)
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Dictionary of Races, Senate Document 662, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. 1910
United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 211
& n.1 (1923) (Sutherland, J.)
(Caucasian)
DONALD, CHAMBER'S ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1871)
Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 611
(1987) (White, J.)
(Race)
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (24th ed. 1965)
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 & n.20, 159, 160 & n.59
(1973) (Blackmun, J.)
(Quickening)
(Embryo)
(Fetus)
(Viable)
United States v. An Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk.. ., 394 U.S.
784, 800 n.20 (1969) (Warren, C.J.)
(Drug)
DYCHE, THE NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICITIONARY (1777)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 538 app.
1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
(Sacrilegious)
EEE
ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF PHOTOGRAPHY (1896)
Paramount Publix Corp. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp.,
294 U.S. 464, 471 & n.1 (1935)
(Stone, J.)
(Combination Printing)
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ENTICK, NEW SPELLING DICTIONARY (1786)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 538 app. (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Blasphemer)
(Sacrilege)
(Sacrilegious)
FFF
FAIRCHILD, DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY (1944)
Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 140 n.* (1952) (Minton,
J., dissenting)
(Imbecile)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1984)
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 192 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Embargo)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1957)
American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 509 (1981) (Brennan, J.)
(Feasible)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1952)
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 514 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)
(Compassion)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1947)
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 305-07 n.7 (1957)
(Harlan, J.)
(Organize)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1944)
United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 244, 246 n.14
1947) (Burton, J.)
(Aribitrary)
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United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 961-62 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring)
(Servitude)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1937)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 520 n.28
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Sacrilegious)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1915)
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 454-55 & n.3 (1939)
(Butler, J.)
(Gang)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1913)
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 961-62
(1988) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(Servitude)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1895)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 526-27 n.48 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Sacrilege)
(To Profane)
FUNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 526-27 n.48 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Sacrilege)
(To Profane)
Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 n.14 (1947)
(Vinson, C.J.)
(Property)
Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 500, 501 n.1
(1945) (Stone, C.J., dissenting)
(Evade)
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FUNK & WAGNALLS' STANDARD DICTIONARY
Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399, 407 (1958)
(Burton, J.) (quoting Horosko v. Mt. Pleasant Sch. Dist.,
6 A.2d 866, 868, 869-70 (Pa. 1939))
(Incompetency)
GGG
A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (1994) (Thomas,
J., concurring)
(Punishment)
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7 (1993)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Fine)
(Forfeit)
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas,
J., dissenting)
(Punishment)
GORDON & MARCHANT, A NEW COMPLETE ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1760)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 536
app. (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
LE GRAND, DICTIONNAIRE USUAL DE DROrr (1931)
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399-400 n.3 (1985)
(O'Connor, J.)
(Accident)
GRAND LAROUSSE DE LA LANGUE FRANQAISE (1987)
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 536 (1991)
(Marshall, J.)
(Lesion)
GRAND LAROUSSE DE LA LANGUE FRANQAISE (1971)
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399-400 (1985)
(O'Connor)
(Accident)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
HHH
"Huxley"
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279,
293 (1904) (Fuller, C.J.)
(Anarchy)
III
IMPERIAL DICTIONARY
Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 461 (1899) (Brown,
J., dissenting)
(Smuggling)
Seeberger v. Wright & Lawther Oil & Lead Mfg. Co.,
157 U.S. 183, 185 (1895) (Brown, J.)
(Draft)
(Draught)
The Britannia, 153 U.S. 130, 148 (1894) (Brown, J.,
dissenting)
(Course)
Homer v. United States, 147 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1893)
(Blatchford, J.)
(Lottery)
Ferguson v. Arthur, 117 U.S. 482, 487 (1886)
(Blatchford, J.)
(Proprietary)
JJJ
JACOB, THE LAW DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND
PRESENT STATE, OF THE ENGLISH LAW (1811)
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas,
J., dissenting)
(Punishment)
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JACOB'S LAW DICTIONARY
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 535
(1903) (Brown, J.)
(Mines)
Lapeyre v. United States, 84 U.S. 191, 195-97 & n.*
(1872) (Swayne, J.)
(Proclamation)
JERAUTE, VOCABULAIRE FRANgAIS-ANGLAIS ET ANGLAIS-FRANAIS DE
TERMES ET LOCUTIONS JURIDIQUES (1953)
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 536 (1991)
(Marshall, J.)
(Bodily Harm)
(Bodily Injury)
(Lesion)
(Corporel)
(Lesion Corporelle)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785)
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 295 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Fine)
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 648-49 &
n.5 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting
in part)
(Religion)
(Respect)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1785)
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993)
(Rehnquist, C.J.)
(Try)
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785)
United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2037
(1998) (Thomas, J.)
(Excessive)
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 719 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(Inferiour)
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JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1755)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 535-36
app. (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 535, 537
(1903) (Brown, J.)
(Metals)
(Minerals)
Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 619 (1902) (Brewer, J.)
(Excise)
Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 461 (1899) (Brown,
J., dissenting)
(To Smuggle)
(Smuggler)
Town of Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1887)
(Bradley, J.)
(Town)
(Village)
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 584 (1870) (Chase,
C.J., dissenting)
(Coining)
(Money)
KKK
KENRICK, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1773)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 537 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
(Profane)
KERSEY, A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1702)
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7 (1993)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Forfeit)
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Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(Offence)
KERSEY, A GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1721)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 534
app. (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
KNIGHT'S MECHANICAL DICTIONARY
Schumacher v. Cornell, 96 U.S. 549, 554 (1877)
(Swayne, J.)
(Wrench)
KOHLER, A DICTIONARY FOR ACCOUNTANTS (1952)
Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 106
n.7 (1960) (Clark, J.)
(Salvage Value)
(Useful life)
LLL
LAROUSSE MODERN FRENCH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1978)
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 181
nn.37 & 38 (1993) (Stevens, J.)
(Return)
(Refouler)
A LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1856)
Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 745 (1996) (Scalia, J.)
(Interest)
A LAW DICTIONARY (1883)
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 705 n.10 (1993)
(Scalia, J.)
(Incident)
A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY (2d ed. 1860)
Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 745 (1996) (Scalia, J.)
(Interest)
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THE LAW DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT
STATE OF THE ENGLISH LAW (1811)
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas,
J., dissenting)
(Punishment)
LAW LEXICON OR DICTIONARY OF JURISPRUDENCE (2d Amer. ed. 1860)
Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 745 (1996) (Scalia, J.)
(Interest)
LINGEMAN, DRUGS FROM A TO Z: A DICTIONARY (1969)
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
455 U.S. 489, 501 n.18 (1982) (Marshall, J.)
(Roach)
MMM
MARTIN, A NEW UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1754)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 535 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
MATHEWS, A SURVEY OF ENGLISH DICTIONARIES (1933)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 533 app.
n.* (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(General reference and no specific cite)
MCCULLOCH'S COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY
Arthur v. Moller, 97 U.S. 365, 368 (1878) (Hunt, J.)
(Print)
Oulton v. Savings Inst., 84 U.S. 109, 118-19 n.* (1872)
(Clifford, J.)
(Banks)
Bank for Sav. v. Collector, 70 U.S. 495, 512-13 & n.*
(1865) (Clifford, J.)
(Banks of Deposit)
(Banks for Savings)
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Insurance Cos. v. Wright, 68 U.S. 456, 473 n.* (1863)
(Miller, J.)
(Rating)
MCELRATH'S COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY
Arthur v. Moller, 97 U.S. 365, 367-68 (1878) (Hunt, J.)
(To Print)
(Lithograph)
MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS (3d ed. 1983)
Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S.
358, 364 n.1 (1991) (Kennedy, J.)
(Depreciation)
MELLINKOFF'S DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE (1992)
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 432-33
n.9 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.)
(Shall)
NNN
NEW CASSELL'S FRENCH DICTIONARY (1973)
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 181
nn.37 & 38 (1993) (Stevens, J.)
(Return)
(Refouler)
A NEW AND COMPLETE LAw-DICTIONARY (1771)
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas,
J., dissenting)
(Punishment)
A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1702)
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7 (1993)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Fine)
(Forfeit)
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A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES (J. Murry ed.,
1897)
Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 893 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(Exercise)
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY & FINANCE (1992)
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 337 (1996)
(Souter, J.)
(Price/Earnings Ratio)
THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC & MUSICIANS (S. Sadie ed.,
1980)
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 810 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Tonality)
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993)
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct.
818, 823 (1998) (Scalia, J.)
(Doubt)
Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 128
(1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Material)
Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S.
202, 207 (1997) (Scalia, J.)
(Have)
Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 763 (1995) (Scalia, J.)
(Endorsement)
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 610-11 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Endeavors)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
226-27 (1994) (Scalia, J.)
(Modify)
(Required)
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000
OGILVIE'S DICTIONARY
Town of Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1887)
(Bradley, J.)
(Town)
(Village)
* VERSIONS OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY *
OXFORD DICTIONARY
Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126,
134 (1942) (Stone, C.J.)
(Embed)
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY (C. Onions ed., 1966)
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1914
(1998) (Breyer, J.)
(Carry)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1914,
1915 (1998) (Breyer, J.)
(Carry)
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
520 U.S. 564, 638 n.20 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Impost)
Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 299 n.10
(1996) (Stevens, J.)
(Concert)
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 872 n.1 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(Seminary)
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring)
(Commerce)
See also entries under THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY.
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MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
227 (1994) (Scalia, J.)
(Modify)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
242 n.5 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Modify)
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1994) (O'Connor,
J.)
(Moral Evidence)
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580
n.12 (1994) (Souter, J.)
(Parody)
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 802
n.2 (1993) (Scalia, J., partial opinion of Court)
(Boycott)
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 187-88 (1993)
(Souter, J., dissenting)
(Conduct)
Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 244 (1991)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part)
(Originate)
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991)
(Rehnquist, C.J.)
(Mixture)
Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local
Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 97 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Discipline)
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,
238 (1989) (Brennan, J.)
(Pattern)
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OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1989)
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 649 & n.5
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part)
(Respect)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Compact ed. 1981)
Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 436 n.6 (1991) (Stevens.,
J.)
(Attorney)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 717 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(Take)
Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-
74 (1995) (Breyer, J.)
(Involving)
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 962 n.9
(1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)
(Servitude)
Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 375 (1987)
(Income)
Davis v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 221 & n.6 (1986) (Powell,
J., dissenting)
(Curtilage)
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 n.9
(1986) (Brennan, J.)
(Policy)
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 188 n.* (1983)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Movement)
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 85 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)
(Redress)
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American Textile Mrfs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,
508-09 (1981) (Brennan, J.)
(Feasible)
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531,
542 n.11 (1978) (Powell, J.)
(Boycott)
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 438 n.3 (1975)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Nunnery)
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 n.2 (1973) (Burger,
C.J.)
(Obscene)
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 n.10 (1950)
(Jackson, J.)
(Habeas Corpus)
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 454-55 & n.3
(1939) (Butler, J.)
(Gang)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 182 (1970)
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part)
(Of)
United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 445 (1960)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(Statute)
United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 412 (1957) (Burton, J.)
(Steal)
Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 n.14 (1947)
(Vinson, C.J.)
(Property)
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329
U.S. 441, 446 (1947) (Douglas, J.)
(Primarily)
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Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 17 nn.3, 4
(1946) (Douglas, J.)
(Prostitution)
(Debauchery)
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S.
275, 286-87 nn.10 & 11 (1946) (Douglas, J.)
(Discharge)
(Lay-off)
Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 501 n.1 (1945)
(Stone, C.J., dissenting)
(Evade)
OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1955)
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187
(1995) (Scalia, J.)
(Market)
PPP
2 PALGRAVE'S DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (H. Higgs ed., 1925)
Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 315 n.2
(1986) (Blackmun, J.)
(Interest)
PHILLIPS, THE NEW WORLD OF WORDS (3d ed. 1671)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 534 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilegious)
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RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. unabr.
1987)
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1914
(1998) (Breyer, J.)
(Carry)
Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 124 (1991) (Souter, J.)
(Institute)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1987)
Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local
Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 97 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Discipline)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH USAGE (2d ed. 1987)
Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 126 n.4 (1996)
(Thomas, J.)
(Motion)
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 80
(1995) (O'Connor, J.)
(Procedure)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
225 (1994) (Scalia, J.)
(Modify)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
242 n.5 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Modify)
Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 482 (1990) (Rehnquist,
C.J.)
(Child Support)
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RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1987)
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993)
(Souter, J.)
(Base)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1983)
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 14 (1994) (O'Connor, J.)
(Moral Certainty)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1979)
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Interest)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY (1966)
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 n.9
(1986) (Brennan, J.)
(Policy)
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 612
n.3 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Seniority)
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 349 n.7
(1972) (Powell, J.)
(Magistrate)
RAPALiE & LAWRENCE'S LAW DICTIONARY
United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 270 (1905)
(Brewer, J., dissenting)
(Banishment)
RICHARDSON, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1839)
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 295 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Fine)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 539 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
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RICHARDSON'S DICTIONARY
Town of Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1887)
(Bradley, J.)
(Town)
(Village)
Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 501 n.1 (1849) (Daniel,
J., dissenting)
(Commerce)
(Merchand)
RIDER, A NEW UNiVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1759)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 536 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
ROBERTS' DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1966)
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 613
n.4 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Seniority)
SSS
SAINT-EDME, DICTIONNAIRE DE LA PENALITe DANS TOUTES LES PARTIES
Du MONDE CONNU (1825)
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 453 n.* (1956)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)
(Trainer sur la Claie)
SCOTT, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1797)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 539 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
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SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed.
1796)
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 648-49 &
n.5 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting
in part)
(Religion)
(Respect)
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 295 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Fine)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 538 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780)
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7 (1993)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Fine)
(Forfeiture)
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas,
J., dissenting)
(Punishment)
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(Offence)
STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1895)
Serralles v. Esbri, 200 U.S. 103, 111 (1906) (Peckham,
J.)
(Centavo)
STANDARD DICTIONARY
Banco Mexicano de Commercio e Industria v. Deutsche
Bank, 263 U.S. 591, 601 (1924) (McKenna, J.)
(With Reference To)
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Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (Pitney, J.)
(Income)
Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159, 169
(1920) (Clarke, J.)
(Cattle)
Keppel v. Tiffin Sav. Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 362 (1905)
(White, J.)
(Surrender)
Keppel v. Tiffin Sav. Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 383 (1905)
(Day, J., dissenting)
(Surrender)
Hackfeld & Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 442, 449
(1905) (Day, J.)
(Neglect)
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 219 (1905)
(Brewer, J.)
(Return)
Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 462 (1899) (Brown,
J., dissenting)
(Smuggling)
STAUNTON, AN ECCLESIASTICAL DICTIONARY (1861)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 539 app.
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Blasphemy)
(Sacrilege)
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (23d ed. 1976)
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 657 n.9 (1977)
(Powell, J.)
(Hematoma)
STORMONTH'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1885)
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 60 n.3, 62 n.4 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(Malice)
(Wanton)
(Recklessness)
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STROUD, JUDICIAL DICTIONARY (1903)
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 297 n.17 (1964)
(Goldberg, J., concurring)
(Victualling House)
STROUD'S JuDIcIAL DICTIONARY
Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 371 (1906)
(Harlan, J.)
(Interested)
TTT
TOmLIN'S LAW DICTIONARY (1836)
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 nn.6 & 7 (1989)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Fines for Offences)
(Damages)
TOMLIN'S LAW DICTIONARY (1835)
Kring v. State, 107 U.S. 221, 227 (1883) (Miller, J.)
(Ex Post Facto)
TOMLIN'S LAW DICTIONARY
Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 461 (1899) (Brown,
J., dissenting)
(Smuggling)
Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296, 306 (1895) (Gray, J.)
(Hawkers)
Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 445 & n.18 (1868)
(Swayne, J.)
(Duty)
Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 387 (1866) (Miller, J.,
dissenting)
(Attainder)
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uUU
URDANG DICTIONARY OF CURRENT MEDICAL TERMS (1981)
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme
Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 630 n.2 (1985) (White, J.)
(Intrauterine Device)
VVV
WATW
WALKER, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791)
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7 (1993)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Fine)
(Foreiture)
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas,
J., dissenting)
(Punishment)
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(Offence)
WATT'S DICTIONARY OF CHEMISTRY (1866)
Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S.
293, 299 (1884) (Blatchford, J.)
(Alizarin)
* VERSIONS OF WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY *
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (W.
Wheeler ed., 1887)
Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-
11 (1987) (White, J.)
(Race)
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WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1869)
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 962 n.9
(1988) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(Servitude)
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 60 n.3 (1983) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting)
(Malice)
(Wanton)
(Wantonly)
(Lewdly)
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 629-30 n.5
(1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Envelope)
WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (C.
Goodrich ed., 1849)
Regents of Univ. of California v. Public Employment
Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 598 (1988) (O'Connor, J.)
(Compensation)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1841)
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-
11 (1987) (White, J.)
(Race)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1830)
Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-
11 (1987) (White, J.)
(Race)
WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1828)
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 920 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Department)
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)
United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2037
(1998) (Thomas, J.)
(Excessive)
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City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2173 (1997) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part)
(Licentious)
(Peace)
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)
(Punishment)
White v. fllinois, 502 U.S. 346, 360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part & concurring in judgment) (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting))
(Witness)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (Scalia, J.)
(Seizure)
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Offence)
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(Witness)
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)
(Establishment)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 525 n.47 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Sacrilege)
(Sacrilegious)
WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 745 (1996) (Scalia, J.)
(Rate)
* VERSIONS OF WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY *
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1994)
Bragdon v. Abbot, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2215 (1998)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Major)
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WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1991)
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 118 S. Ct. 1618, 1624
(1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Application)
(Present)
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 528-29 (1996)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Administer)
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 710 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)
(Injure)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
226 (1994) (Scalia, J.)
(Modify)
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of
Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 725 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)
(Discharge)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1988)
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 649 & n.5
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part)
(Respect)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1986)
Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-
11 (1987) (White, J.)
(Race)
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1983)
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 671 n.7 (1993) (White, J.,
dissenting)
(Segregate)
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 411 n.9
(1993) (White, J.)
(Aggregate)
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WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 133
(1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(Equitable)
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 671 n.7 (1993) (White, J.,
dissenting)
(Segregate)
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 412 n.9
(1993) (White, J.)
(Aggregate)
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 269 n.4 (1993)
(White, J., dissenting)
(Relief)
(Remedial)
(Remedy)
Pioneer Investment Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs.,
507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993) (White, J.)
(Neglect)
Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502,
529-30 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(Anonymous)
John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153
(1989) (Blackmun, J.)
(Compilation)
Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113 (1988)
(Scalia, J.)
(Criteria)
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 786 (1988)
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)
(Material)
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass'n,
485 U.S. 439, 468 n.4 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Prohibit)
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Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 673 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Income)
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 n.6
(1985) (Rehnquist, J.)
(Policy)
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 406 n.20 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Automobile)
(Camper)
(Motor Home)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1977)
United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102, 109 n.4
(1987) (Stevens, J.)
(Disclose)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1975)
Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 436 n.6 (1991) (Stevens, J.)
(Attorney)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1974)
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517, 521 n.11
(1979) (Brennan, J.)
(Presume)
(Intent)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1973)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
226 n.2 (1994) (Scalia, J.)
(Modify)
P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 77 n.7 (1979)
(Powell, J.)
(Including)
WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1963)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
227 (1994) (Scalia, J.)
(Modify)
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MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
242 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Modify)
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1949)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
226 n.2 (1994) (Scalia, J.)
(Modify)
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 & n.2 (1965)
(Clark, J.)
(Theism)
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1934)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
228 (1994) (Scalia, J.)
(Modify)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
242 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Modify)
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1916)
Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-
11 (1987) (White, J.)
(Race)
VERSIONS OF WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1986)
Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2098
(1998) (Stevens, J.)
(Person)
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1914,
1915 (1998) (Breyer, J.)
(Carry)
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 255
(1994) (Blackmun, J.)
(Or)
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MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
227 (1994) (Scalia, J.)
(Modify)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 590 (1993) (Blackmun, J.)
(Scientific)
(Knowledge)
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 191
(1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(Return)
Department of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 173
(1993) (O'Connor, J.)
(Confidential)
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 61 (1993) (Thomas, J.)
(Genuine)
Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471-72 (1993) (O'Connor,
J.)
(Pitiless)
(Cold-Blooded)
Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47, 53 (1992)
(Thomas, J.)
(Assignee)
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991)
(Rehnquist, C.J.)
(Mixture)
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n,
496 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1990) (Stevens, J., judgment &
plurality opinion) (quoting In re Peel, 534
N.E.2d 980, 984 (Ill. 1989))
(Certificate)
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Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n,
496 U.S. 91, 113 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in
judgment)
(Certificate)
(Certify)
(Certified Public Accountant)
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 416 (1990)
(Marshall, J.)
(Restitution)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 5th ed. 1981)
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500
n.10 (1985) (White, J.)
(Lust)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1981)
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 598-99 (1987)
(Powell, J., concurring)
(Creation)
(Evolution)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1981)
O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 83 (1996)
(Breyer, J.)
(On Account Of)
Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 299 n.10
(1996) (Stevens, J.)
(Concert)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
242 n.5 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Modify)
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 14, 19 (1994) (O'Connor, J.)
(Moral Certainty)
(Substantial)
Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 535-36
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment in part & dissenting in part)
(Require)
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Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co.,
505 U.S. 214, 223 (1992) (Scalia, J.)
(Solicit)
Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 61 (1990) (Marshall, J.)
(Withholding)
Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1990) (Scalia, J.)
(Adjustment)
(Recovery)
FWIPBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 259 (1990)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Regularly)
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S.
360, 366 n.6 (1989) (Stevens, J.)
(Salmonid)
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of
Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 301 (1989) (Brennan, J.)
(Request)
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 913-14 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Damages)
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 482 (1988) (O' Connor,
J.)
(Picketing)
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 324 n.2
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part)
(Oven)
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 192 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Embargo)
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 334, 335 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(Likely)
(Or)
1999] 535
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 477-78 n.10 (1987)
(Stevens, J.)
(Propaganda)
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 n.9
(1986) (Brennan, J.)
(Policy)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unab. 4th ed. 1976)
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500
n.10 (1985) (White, J.)
(Prurient)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unab. 1976)
Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 335 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting)
(Prompt)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (P. Gove ed., 1976)
Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406, 411
(1983) (White, J.)
(Conveyance)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976)
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993)
(Souter, J.)
(Base)
(Based)
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-79 (1993)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Conduct)
(Participate)
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 187-88 (1993)
(Souter, J., dissenting)
(Conduct)
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 482 (1991) (White, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part & concurring in
judgment)
(Policy)
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International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S.
187, 212 n.1 (1991) (White, J., concurring in part &
concurring in judgment)
(Occupational)
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 n.7 (1990)
(Brennan, J.)
(Defile)
(Trample)
Board of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226, 237 (1990) (O'Connor, J.)
(Curriculum)
Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local
Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 97 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Discipline)
Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763-64 & n.16 (1989) (Stevens,
J.)
(Private)
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 576, 577 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part & concurring in
judgment))
(Substantial)
(Reasonable)
EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107,
115 (1988) (Marshall, J.)
(Terminate)
Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 374 (1987) (Scalia, J.)
(Income)
United States v. John Doe, Inc., 481 U.S. 102, 109 n.4
(1987) (Stevens, J.)
(Disclose)
United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 480 (1984)
(Rehnquist, J.)
(Jurisdiction)
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Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Interest)
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J.)
(Appropriate)
American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,
508-09 (1981) (Brennan, J.)
(Feasible)
Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 169 n.9
(1981) (Brennan, J.)
(Authorize)
Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 98 n.16 (1981)
(Brennan, J.)
(Substantial)
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607, 719 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Feasible)
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (O'Connor, J.)
(Any)
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 80
(1995) (O'Connor, J.)
(Procedure)
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
227 (1994) (Scalia, J.)
(Modify)
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993)
(Souter, J.)
(Base)
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-79 (1993)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Conduct)
(Participate)
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Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 187-88 (1993)
(Souter, J., dissenting)
(Conduct)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (16th ed. 1971)
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 n.11 (1987) (Stevens,
J.) (quoting Matter of Acosta, Interim Decision No. 2986, at 14)
(Mar. 1, 1985))
(Fear)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971)
United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 71 (1994)
(Rehnquist, C.J.)
(Original)
(Sentence)
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (Kennedy, J.)
(Sacrifice)
(Ritual)
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993)
(Rehnquist, C.J.)
(Try)
(Sole)
Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 174 (1993)
(Kennedy, J.)
(Principal)
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 297 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Fine)
Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-
11 (1987) (White, J.)
(Race)
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 7 &
n.5 (1985) (Burger, C.J.)
(Manipulation)
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WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1969)
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 n.2 (1973) (Burger,
C.J.)
(Obscene)
(Pornography)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1966)
Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 820 (1974)
(Blackmun, J.)
(Acquire)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1966)
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 697 (1995) (Stevens, J.)
(Harm)
National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S.
249, 257 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
(Affect)
Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 191 n.15 (1993)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Principal)
Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 134 n.7
(1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Criterion)
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 n.14 (1978)
(Stevens, J.)
(Indecent)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1961)
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 n.3 (1986)
(Powell, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Gerrymander)
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 605
n.12, 606 n.15 (1980) (Stevens, J.)
(Seniority)
(System)
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California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 612
n.3 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Seniority)
Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,
283 (1974) (Marshall, J.)
(Scab)
United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 261 n.5 (1966)
(White, J.)
(Firm)
Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 483 n.4 (1962)
(Harlan, J., judgment & plurality opinion)
(Obscene)
(Lewd)
(Indecent)
(Filthy)
(Vile)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 491
n.4 (1996) (Stevens, J.)
(Temperance)
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 836 (1995) (Kennedy, J.)
(Promote)
(Manifest)
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994)
(O'Connor, J.)
(Statement)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 854-55 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., concurring)
(Punishment)
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664
(1993) (White, J.)
(Cover)
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John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153
(1989) (Blackmun, J.)
(Compilation)
United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 605 n.6 (1986)
(Powell, J.)
(Damages)
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979)
(Burger, C.J.)
(Property)
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 581 n.9 (1979) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)
(Prison)
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 n.9 (1979)
(Burger, C.J.)
(Unequivocal)
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,243
n.* (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(Interference)
California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519, 527
(1978) (White, J.)
(Dedicate)
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974) (Brennan,
J.) (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972))
(Opprobrious)
Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 710 n.1 (1972) (Brennan, J.)
(Emplane)
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972) (Brennan,
J.)
(Abusive)
(Opprobrious)
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WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 n.16
(1972) (Marshall, J.)
(Diversion)
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 306 n.7 (1969) (Brennan, J.)
(Entertainment)
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 234
(1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(Refuse Matter)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1961)
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199 n.1 (1979)
(Stewart, J., dissenting)
(Malice)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1958)
Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,
440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979) (Stewart, J.)
(Insurance)
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 892 n.6 (1961) (Stewart, J.)
(Tradesman)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1958)
United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1887 (1998)
(Souter J.)
(Operate)
United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997)
(Thomas, J.)
(Maximum)
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 402 (1979) (White,
J., dissenting)
(Potential)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1957)
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 514 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)
(Compassion)
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Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 745 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting)
(Complaint)
Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 218 n.* (1968)
(White, J., dissenting)
(Pursuant)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1957)
Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186,
254 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(State)
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 528 (1996)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Administer)
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 117 (1994) (Souter, J.)
(Injury)
Fort Stewart Schools v. Federal Labor Relations Auth.,
495 U.S. 641, 645 (1990) (Scalia, J.)
(Conditions)
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 171-72 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(Salary)
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
455 U.S. 489, 501 (1982) (Marshall, J.)
(Design)
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 349 n.7
(1972) (Powell, J.)
(Magistrate)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1956)
Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 483 n.4 (1962)
(Harlan, J., judgment & plurality opinion)
(Obscene)
(Lewd)
(Indecent)
(Filthy)
(Vile)
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WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1954)
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S.
263, 274 (1993) (Scalia, J.)
(Invidious)
WEBSTER'S SECOND INT'L DICTIONARY (1954)
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S.
263, 274 (1993) (Scalia, J.)
(Invidious)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1953)
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 240 n.2 (1979)
(Powell, J.)
(Covert)
United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 412 & n.8 (1957)
(Burton, J.)
(Stolen)
(Theft)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1950)
AVCO Corp. v. United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers, 118 S. Ct. 1626, 1629 (1998)
(Scalia, J., opinion of Court)
(For)
Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 808 (1998)
(Scalia, J., opinion of Court)
(No)
Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 128
(1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Material)
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (Scalia, J.)
(Subject To)
Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., 519 U.S. 202,
207 (1997) (Scalia, J.)
(Have)
Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753, 763 (1995) (Scalia, J.)
(Endorsement)
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United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 610 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Endeavors)
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187
(1995) (Scalia, J.)
(Market)
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 801
(1993) (Scalia, J., partial opinion of Court)
(Boycott)
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 624 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part & concurring in
judgment)
(Payment)
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
(Representatives)
Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 479 (1990)
(O'Connor)
(Use)
WEBSTER'S SECOND INT'L DICTIONARY (1950)
Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 128
(1989) (Scalia, J.)
(Irregularity)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1949)
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 496, 500 n.10
(1985) (White, J.) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
487 n.20 (1957))
(Lust)
(Prurient)
(Pruriency)
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957)
(Brennan, J.)
(Prurient)
(Pruriency)
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WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1949)
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S.Ct.
2168, 2189 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(Take Into Consideration)
(Consideration)
(Consider)
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct.
1952, 1955 (1998) (Scalia, J.)
(Eligible)
(Participate)
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 n.5
(1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(Carry)
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct.
1279, 1288 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(Court)
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219,
1241 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Notwithstanding)
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct.
818, 824 (1998) (Scalia, J.)
(Doubt)
(Objective)
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531,
541 n.11 (1978) (Powell, J.)
(Boycott)
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193 n.9 (1964)
(Brennan, J., judgment & plurality opinion)
(Community)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.
1949)
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995)
(O'Connor, J.)
(Use)
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Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 717, 732-33 (1995) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)
(Take)
(Proximate)
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 961 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring)
(Servitude)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW IN'L DICTIONARY (1945)
Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201 (1993)
(Rehnquist, C.J.)
(Country)
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Forged)
(Counterfeit)
(Forge)
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564 (1988) (Scalia,
J.)
(Substantial)
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 549 n.4 (1981) (Powell,
J., concurring in result)
(Deprive)
United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243-44 n.14 (1947)
(Burton, J.)
(Aribitrary)
(Capricious)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1942)
Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 700 (1995)
(Stevens, J.)
(Shows)
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 781
(1993) (Souter, J., partial opinion of Court)
(Business)
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Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199,
203 (1993) (Souter, J.)
(Context)
(Poverty)
Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 78 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J.)
(Exclusive)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1939)
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241-42 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Use)
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29, 231, 237-
38 (1993) (O'Connor, J.)
(Use)
(To Cane)
(In Relation To)
Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 32 (1958)
(Harlan, J.)
(Omit)
Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5, 17 & n.13 (1938) (Black,
J., dissenting)
(Unreasonable)
(Capricious)
(Unjust)
(Harsh)
(Arbitrary)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1938)
Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701, 729
n.12 (1949) (Burton, J., dissenting)
(Intended)
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 786 n.37 (1948)
(Burton, J.)
(Excessive)
Roland Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657, 673 (1946)
(Burton, J.)
(Retail)
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WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1935)
Coverdale v. Arkansas-Lousiana Pipe Line Co., 303
U.S. 604, 607 n.1 (1938) (Reed, J.)
(Prime Mover)
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U.S. 379,
383 n.3 (1937) (McReynolds, J.)
(Pursuant To)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1935)
Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Halliburton, 306 U.S. 550, 552 &
n.4 (1939) (Butler, J.)
(Packer)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr. 1934)
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 351-52 & n.5
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result)
(Religion)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1934)
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 188 n.* (1983)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(Movement)
Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 516
(1981) (Brennan, J.)
(Plain)
(Speedy)
(Efficient)
(Remedy)
Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 532 n.4
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Efficient)
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696 n.13 (1980) (Stewart, J.)
(Device)
(Scheme)
(Artifice)
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Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 nn.20 &
21 (1975) (Powell, J.)
(Device)
(Contrivance)
(Contrive)
(Manipulate)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 525 n.47
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Sacrilege)
(Sacrilegious)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed.
1934)
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996)
(O'Connor, J.)
(Imminent)
WEBSTER'S SEcOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (unabr.)
Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 nn.14 & 15 (1947)
(Vinson, C.J.)
(Property)
(Equity)
Tennessee Coal, Iron & Rail Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123,
321 U.S. 590, 598 n.11 (1944) (Murphy, J.)
(Work)
(Employ)
United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 417 (1938)
(Black, J.)
(Refund)
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 571 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment)
(Peer)
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 371 n.9 (1964) (White,
J.)
(Institution)
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Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 308 n.3
(1961) (Warren, C.J.)
(Invents)
(Discovers)
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 305-07 n.7 (1957)
(Harlan, J.)
(Organize)
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S.
275, 286 n.10 (1946) (Douglas, J.)
(Discharge)
United States v. Beach, 324 U.S. 193, 197 n.2 (1945)
(Murphy, J., dissenting)
(White Slave)
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 512
(1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting)
(Ship)
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251
n.10 (1940) (Roberts, J.)
(Alternative)
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453-55 & n.3
(1939) (Butler, J.)
(Gang)
White v. Aronson, 302 U.S. 16, 17 nn.2 & 3 (1937)
(McReynolds, J.)
(Puzzle)
(Game)
United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 48 (1937)
(McReynolds, J.)
(Make)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1923)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 854-55 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., concurring)
(Punishment)
552
APPENDIX C: DICTIONARIES
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1914)
United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 549 n.14 (1938)
(Black, J.)
(Counterfeit)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1913)
National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States,
440 U.S. 472, 480 n.10 (1979) (Blackmun, J.)
(Chamber of Commerce)
(Board of Trade)
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1910)
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 961 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring)
(Servitude)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTL DICTIONARY (1909)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 525 n.47
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Sacrilege)
(Sacrilegious)
WEBSTER'S INT'L DICTIONARY (1890)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 525 n.47
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Sacrilege)
(Sacrilegious)
Seeberger v. Wright & Lawther Oil & Lead Mfg. Co., 157 U.S. 183,
185 (1895) (Brown, J.)
(Draft)
(Draught)
WEBSTER'S NEW hiT DICTIONARY
BPOE Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 411 U.S. 924,
926 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting from dissmissal for
lack of substantial federal question)
(Ethnic)
Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 407 (1958) (Burton, J.)
(quoting Horosko v. Mt. Pleasant Sch. Dist., 6 A.2d 866,
868, 869-70 (Pa. 1939))
(Incompetency)
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Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 446 (1947)
(Douglas, J.)
(Primarily)
Stewart v. United States, 316 U.S. 354, 362 n.6 (1942)
(Roberts, J.)
(Islands)
Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 507 (1941) (Stone,
J.)
(Sale)
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery, 303 U.S. 552,
564 n.1 (1938) (McReynolds, J., dissenting)
(Dispute)
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co v. Coughran, 303 U.S.
485, 491 (1938) (McReynolds, J.)
(Operate)
Smyth v. United States, 302 U.S. 329, 365 n.1 (1937)
(McReynolds, J., dissenting)
(Reedem)
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S.
178, 186 & n.6 (1933) (Roberts, J.)
(Monopoly)
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (Pitney,
J.)
(Income)
Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159, 169
(1920) (Clarke, J.)
(Cattle)
Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 113 (1916)
(White, C.J.)
(Office)
Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 329 (1912) (Day, J.)
(Intervene)
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Hackfeld & Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 442, 449
(1905) (Day, J.)
(Neglect)
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 219 (1905)
(Brewer, J.)
(Return)
Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88, 96 (1904) (Brown, J.)
(Periodical)
(Magazines)
Magone v. Heller, 150 U.S. 70, 74 (1893) (Gray, J.)
(Expressly)
WEBSTER'S INTL DICTIONARY
Keppel v. Tiffin Sav. Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 362 (1905)
(White, J.)
(Surrender)
Board of Dirs. of the Chicago Theological Seminary
v. Illinois ex rel. Raymond, 188 U.S. 662, 673 (1903)
(Peckham, J.)
(Belonging)
Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 618 (1902) (Brewer, J.)
(Excise)
* OTHER VERSIONS OF WEBSTER'S DICTIONARIES
WEBSTER'S COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1806)
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 525 n.47
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)
(Sacrilege)
(Sacrilegious)
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (2d ed. unabr. 1979)
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1988)
(Rehnquist, C.J.)
(Caricature)
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WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1979)
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 12-13, 15 (1994) (O'Connor, J.)
(Moral Evidence)
(Moral Certainty)
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 n.9
(1986) (Brennan, J.)
(Policy)
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 499-500
(1986) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(Policy)
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (College ed. 1968)
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 477-78 n.l1 (1987)
(Stevens, J.)
(Propaganda)
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY
United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971) (Black, J.)
(Health)
Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 502 n.1 (1945)
(Stone, C.J., dissenting)
(Evade)
Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 396-97 n.2 (1920)
(McKenna, J., dissenting)
(Concurrent)
Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 462 (1899) (Brown,
J., dissenting)
(Smuggling)
Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 303 (1895)
(Brewer, J.)
(Felony)
Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 296 (1895)
(Brown, J.)
(Liable)
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The Britannia, 153 U.S. 130, 148 (1894) (Brown, J.,
dissenting)
(Course)
Boggle v. Maggone, 152 U.S. 623, 626 (1894) (Gray, J.)
(Sauce)
Sarlis v. United States, 152 U.S. 570, 572 (1894)
(Shiras, J.)
(Ardent Spirits)
The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 130 (1894) (Brown, J.)
(Freight)
United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 270 (1893)
(Gray, J., dissenting)
(High Seas)
Homer v. United States, 147 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1893)
(Blatchford, J.)
(Lottery)
Town of Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1887)
(Bradley, J.)
(Town)
(Village)
Ferguson v. Arthur, 117 U.S. 482, 487 (1886)
(Blatchford, J.)
(Proprietary)
(Proprietor)
Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U.S. 11, 12 (1885) (Matthews, J.)
(Mine)
(Mineral)
(Ore)
Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U.S. 727, 734-35
(1885) (Woods, J.)
(To Carry On)
Railroad Co. v. Missippippi, 102 U.S. 135, 143 (1880)
(Miller, J., dissenting)
(Suit)
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Arthur v. Moller, 97 U.S. 365, 367-68 (1878) (Hunt, J.)
(To Print)
(Lithograph)
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 721 (1877) (Field, J.)
(Editor)
Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664 (1874) (Miller, J.)
(Tax)
Case of the Sewing Machine Cos., 85 U.S. 553, 586 n.++
(1873) (Clifford, J.)
(Suit)
Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 392-93 (1866) (Miller,
J., dissenting)
(Punish)
"Webster"
Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126,
134 (1942) (Stone, C.J.)
(Embed)
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (Brewer,
J.)
(Servitude)
(Slavery)
(Slave)
WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY (1860)
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 60 n.3 (1983) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting)
(Malice)
(Wanton)
(Wantonly)
(Lewdly)
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 629-30 n.5
(1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Envelope)
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WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY
United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 184 (1923) (quoting
Orton v. Orton, 42 N.Y. 486 (1867)) (Sutherland, J.)
(Legacy)
Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 462 (1899) (Brown,
J., dissenting)
(Smuggling)
United States v. Laws, 163 U.S. 258, 266 (1896)
(Peckham, J.)
(Profession)
The Britannia, 153 U.S. 130, 148 (1894) (Brown, J.,
dissenting)
(Course)
Sarls v. United States, 152 U.S. 570, 572 (1894)
(Shiras, J.)
(Ardent Spirits)
The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 130 (1894) (Brown, J.)
(Freight)
United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 270 (1893)
(Gray, J., dissenting)
(High Seas)
Homer v. United States, 147 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1893)
(Blatchford, J.)
(Lottery)
Ferguson v. Arthur, 117 U.S. 482, 487 (1886)
(Blatchford, J.)
(Proprietary)
Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U.S. 727, 734-35
(1885) (Woods, J.)
(To Carry On)
Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 143-44 (1880)
(Miller, J., dissenting)
(Suit)
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Arthur v. Moller, 97 U.S. 365, 368 (1878) (Hunt, J.)
(Lithograph)
Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank, 88 U.S. 294, 299 n.*
(1874) (Davis, J.)
(Cattle)
WYLD'S UNiVERSAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 454-55 & n.3
(1939) (Butler, J.)
(Gang)
YYY
zzz
MISCELLANEOUS
"The best French dictionary we have"
Patapasco Ins. Co. v. Coulter, 28 U.S. 222, 230 (1830)
(Johnson, J.)
(Prevariquez)
No specific dictionary listed
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J.)
(Initiated)
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting)
(Hideous)
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McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 491
(1931) (Stone, J.)
(Candy)
